communication privilege in Pennsylvania

2023The Court further stated: Placing this burden on defendants is consistent with the plain language of the Wiretap Act and comports with common sense, as ____________________________________________ 6 The Court cited its earlier decisions in Pennsylvania State Police v. Grove, 161 A.3d 877 (Pa. 2017), and Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519 (Pa. 1998), which state that a claimant alleging a Wiretap Act violation must show: “(1) that he engaged in a communication; (2) that he possessed an expectation that the communication would not be intercepted; (3) that his expectation was justifiable under the cir

2023The Court further stated: Placing this burden on defendants is consistent with the plain language of the Wiretap Act and comports with common sense, as ____________________________________________ 6 The Court cited its earlier decisions in Pennsylvania State Police v. Grove, 161 A.3d 877 (Pa. 2017), and Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519 (Pa. 1998), which state that a claimant alleging a Wiretap Act violation must show: “(1) that he engaged in a communication; (2) that he possessed an expectation that the communication would not be intercepted; (3) that his expectation was justifiable under the cir

2022Relying on this Court’s decisions in Beasley, supra and Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123 , -4- J-A12004-22 127 (Pa. Super. 1995), the Commonwealth claims Gadley’s threats “need not have been communicated directly in order to satisfy the communication requirement.” Commonwealth Brief at 8-9.

2022Relying on this Court’s decisions in Beasley, supra and Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123 , -4- J-A12004-22 127 (Pa. Super. 1995), the Commonwealth claims Gadley’s threats “need not have been communicated directly in order to satisfy the communication requirement.” Commonwealth Brief at 8-9.

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001Lexis 25, (2001) (holding that in order to fall under the marital privilege, nonverbal conduct must clearly be a substitute for oral communications and the mere description by one spouse of general, noncommunica-tive conduct is not protected under the privilege); State v. Lorenz, 622 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.2001) (holding marital privilege only covers communications not observations); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668 (Minn.1990) (adopting narrow construction of term “communication” to include only words, acts or gestures intended to convey meaning to the other spouse). ¶ 15 On the other hand, some

2001Lexis 25, (2001) (holding that in order to fall under the marital privilege, nonverbal conduct must clearly be a substitute for oral communications and the mere description by one spouse of general, noncommunicative conduct is not protected under the privilege); State v. Lorenz, 622 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.2001) (holding marital privilege only covers communications not observations); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668 (Minn.1990) (adopting narrow construction of term "communication" to include only words, acts or gestures intended to convey meaning to the other spouse). ¶ 15 On the other hand, some o

2001Lexis 25, (2001) (holding that in order to fall under the marital privilege, nonverbal conduct must clearly be a substitute for oral communications and the mere description by one spouse of general, noncommunica-tive conduct is not protected under the privilege); State v. Lorenz, 622 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.2001) (holding marital privilege only covers communications not observations); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668 (Minn.1990) (adopting narrow construction of term “communication” to include only words, acts or gestures intended to convey meaning to the other spouse). ¶ 15 On the other hand, some

2001Lexis 25, (2001) (holding that in order to fall under the marital privilege, nonverbal conduct must clearly be a substitute for oral communications and the mere description by one spouse of general, noncommunicative conduct is not protected under the privilege); State v. Lorenz, 622 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.2001) (holding marital privilege only covers communications not observations); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668 (Minn.1990) (adopting narrow construction of term "communication" to include only words, acts or gestures intended to convey meaning to the other spouse). ¶ 15 On the other hand, some o

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

2001See State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29 , 680 P.2d 257 (1984) (holding the statutory marital privilege under K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-428(a) does not extend to all observations of the acts of one spouse by the other but is limited to spoken or written statements or nonverbal signs or gestures seeking to transmit information from one spouse to another); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447 , 520 P.2d 495 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Clark, 112 Ariz. 493 , 543 P.2d 1122 (1975) (restricting marital privilege under § 13-1802 A.R.S. to words and not acts thereby permitting testim

1979No person shall divulge or use the contents or purport of a communication intercepted in violation of this act.” A criminal statute of the Commonwealth, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5702, provides: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he: (1) intercepts without permission of the parties to the communication a message or other communication by telephone or telegraph; (2) installs or employs any device for overhearing or recording communications passing through a telephone or telegraph line with intent to intercept a communication in violation of this chapter; or (3) divulges or uses without

1979No person shall divulge or use the contents or purport of a communication intercepted in violation of this act.” A criminal statute of the Commonwealth, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5702, provides: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he: (1) intercepts without permission of the parties to the communication a message or other communication by telephone or telegraph; (2) installs or employs any device for overhearing or recording communications passing through a telephone or telegraph line with intent to intercept a communication in violation of this chapter; or (3) divulges or uses without

1925The question whether or not a communication is privileged is primarily a question of law for the court, where the facts and circumstances surrounding the publication are not in dispute: Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404 ; Neeb v. Hope, supra; Echard v. Morton, 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 579 . 'By the above definition of ia privileged communication it is clear that privileged occasion of the utterance, without more, cannot justify it, except where the utterance itself or the circumstances connected therewith negative the presumption of malice.

1925The question whether or not a communication is privileged is primarily a question of law for the court, where the facts and circumstances surrounding the publication are not in dispute: Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404 ; Neeb v. Hope, supra; Echard v. Morton, 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 579 . 'By the above definition of ia privileged communication it is clear that privileged occasion of the utterance, without more, cannot justify it, except where the utterance itself or the circumstances connected therewith negative the presumption of malice.

1925The question whether or not a communication is privileged is primarily a question of law for the court, where the facts and circumstances surrounding the publication are not in dispute: Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404 ; Neeb v. Hope, supra; Echard v. Morton, 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 579 . 'By the above definition of ia privileged communication it is clear that privileged occasion of the utterance, without more, cannot justify it, except where the utterance itself or the circumstances connected therewith negative the presumption of malice.

1925A privileged communication is one made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, in a proper manner and upon reasonable or probable cause: Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. 334, 338 ; and, as the immunity of such a communication is an exception to the general rule that nothing short of the truth is a defense, he who relies upon the exception must prove all the facts necessary to bring himself within it: Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 215 Pa. 470 .

1925A privileged communication is one made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, in a proper manner and upon reasonable or probable cause: Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. 334, 338 ; and, as the immunity of such a communication is an exception to the general rule that nothing short of the truth is a defense, he who relies upon the exception must prove all the facts necessary to bring himself within it: Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 215 Pa. 470 .