Idaho rule in Idaho

2016In Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 147 Idaho 109 , 206 P.3d 473 (2009), we held that “a hospital may be found vicariously liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services.” Id. at 116 , 206 P,3d at 480.

2016In Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 147 Idaho 109 , 206 P.3d 473 (2009), we held that “a hospital may be found vicariously liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority for the negligence of independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services.” Id. at 116 , 206 P,3d at 480.

2023Brauner v. AHC of Boise, LLC, 166 Idaho 398 , 408, 459 P.3d 1246 , 1256 (2020); Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372 , 376 n.3, 987 P.2d 284 , 288 n.3 (1999) (citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334 , 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980)). 8 The Ninth Circuit explains that “materiality” is a “low threshold . . . satisfied so long as the information . . . would have helped to prepare a defense.” United States. v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hernandez- Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013)).

2023Brauner v. AHC of Boise, LLC, 166 Idaho 398 , 408, 459 P.3d 1246 , 1256 (2020); Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372 , 376 n.3, 987 P.2d 284 , 288 n.3 (1999) (citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334 , 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980)). 8 The Ninth Circuit explains that “materiality” is a “low threshold . . . satisfied so long as the information . . . would have helped to prepare a defense.” United States. v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hernandez- Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013)).

2022Moreover, as we discussed in Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 575 , 401 P.3d 148, 153 (2017), the Idaho rule is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), and in that event “[w]e prefer to interpret the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with interpretations of the same language in the federal rules.” Id. (quoting Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 622 , 338 P.3d 1220, 1226 (2014)).

2022Moreover, as we discussed in Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 575 , 401 P.3d 148, 153 (2017), the Idaho rule is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), and in that event “[w]e prefer to interpret the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with interpretations of the same language in the federal rules.” Id. (quoting Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 622 , 338 P.3d 1220, 1226 (2014)).

2020“When a federal rule is identical in material respects to an Idaho rule, this Court may consider decisions of the federal courts interpreting the federal rule when interpreting the Idaho rule.” Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 874 , 380 P.3d 681, 687 (2016) (citations omitted).

2020“When a federal rule is identical in material respects to an Idaho rule, this Court may consider decisions of the federal courts interpreting the federal rule when interpreting the Idaho rule.” Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 874 , 380 P.3d 681, 687 (2016) (citations omitted).

2009Citing State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 536 , 164 P.3d 814, 816 (2007), Mother argues that the magistrate did not follow Idaho’s presumption that children should remain with their natural parents.

2009Citing State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 536 , 164 P.3d 814, 816 (2007), Mother argues that the magistrate did not follow Idaho’s presumption that children should remain with their natural parents.

2026In addition to the above considerations, courts deciding whether to permit one parent to relocate with the children must “take into account Idaho’s presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one parent is [a] habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.” Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 454 , 197 P.3d at 315 (citations omitted); see also Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 405 , 64 P.3d 327, 331 (2003) (“Idaho favors the active participation of both parents in raising children after divorce, which policy is reflected in [section]

2026In addition to the above considerations, courts deciding whether to permit one parent to relocate with the children must “take into account Idaho’s presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one parent is [a] habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.” Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 454 , 197 P.3d at 315 (citations omitted); see also Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 405 , 64 P.3d 327, 331 (2003) (“Idaho favors the active participation of both parents in raising children after divorce, which policy is reflected in [section]

2026In addition to the above considerations, courts deciding whether to permit one parent to relocate with the children must “take into account Idaho’s presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one parent is [a] habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.” Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 454 , 197 P.3d at 315 (citations omitted); see also Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 405 , 64 P.3d 327, 331 (2003) (“Idaho favors the active participation of both parents in raising children after divorce, which policy is reflected in [section]

2026In addition to the above considerations, courts deciding whether to permit one parent to relocate with the children must “take into account Idaho’s presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one parent is [a] habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.” Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 454 , 197 P.3d at 315 (citations omitted); see also Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 405 , 64 P.3d 327, 331 (2003) (“Idaho favors the active participation of both parents in raising children after divorce, which policy is reflected in [section]

2026Finally, the court correctly cited our decision in Weiland v. Ruppel, 139 Idaho 122, 125 , 75 P.3d 176, 179 (2003), for the propositions that “relocation cases are fact-driven cases,” and “[s]o long as the court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and results from the proper 19 consideration of the facts pursuant to all relevant factors including those set forth in the statute, the trial court’s discretion has been properly exercised.” With all of these principles in mind, the magistrate court considered the parties’ competing positions, evaluated the evidence presented at trial, r

2026Finally, the court correctly cited our decision in Weiland v. Ruppel, 139 Idaho 122, 125 , 75 P.3d 176, 179 (2003), for the propositions that “relocation cases are fact-driven cases,” and “[s]o long as the court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and results from the proper 19 consideration of the facts pursuant to all relevant factors including those set forth in the statute, the trial court’s discretion has been properly exercised.” With all of these principles in mind, the magistrate court considered the parties’ competing positions, evaluated the evidence presented at trial, r

2023Brauner v. AHC of Boise, LLC, 166 Idaho 398 , 408, 459 P.3d 1246 , 1256 (2020); Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372 , 376 n.3, 987 P.2d 284 , 288 n.3 (1999) (citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334 , 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980)). 8 The Ninth Circuit explains that “materiality” is a “low threshold . . . satisfied so long as the information . . . would have helped to prepare a defense.” United States. v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hernandez- Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013)).

2023Roughly two months after Hearing Officer Kane issued his summary and recommendations, in January 2015, ISP (and ISPFS) published notice of its adopted and “pending” rule for the administration of BAC tests under IDAPA 11.03.01 that became final at the end of the 2015 legislative session, i.e., a final rule with the “force and effect of law[,]” Pizzuto v. Idaho Dep’t of Correction, 170 Idaho 94 , __, 508 P.3d 293, 296 (2022).

2023Roughly two months after Hearing Officer Kane issued his summary and recommendations, in January 2015, ISP (and ISPFS) published notice of its adopted and “pending” rule for the administration of BAC tests under IDAPA 11.03.01 that became final at the end of the 2015 legislative session, i.e., a final rule with the “force and effect of law[,]” Pizzuto v. Idaho Dep’t of Correction, 170 Idaho 94 , __, 508 P.3d 293, 296 (2022).

2023See State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298 , 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). 5 finding regarding a child’s intent if it is supported by substantial evidence.

2023See State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298 , 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). 5 finding regarding a child’s intent if it is supported by substantial evidence.

2023Brauner v. AHC of Boise, LLC, 166 Idaho 398 , 408, 459 P.3d 1246 , 1256 (2020); Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372 , 376 n.3, 987 P.2d 284 , 288 n.3 (1999) (citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334 , 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980)). 8 The Ninth Circuit explains that “materiality” is a “low threshold . . . satisfied so long as the information . . . would have helped to prepare a defense.” United States. v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hernandez- Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013)).

2022Moreover, as we discussed in Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 575 , 401 P.3d 148, 153 (2017), the Idaho rule is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), and in that event “[w]e prefer to interpret the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with interpretations of the same language in the federal rules.” Id. (quoting Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 622 , 338 P.3d 1220, 1226 (2014)).

2022Moreover, as we discussed in Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 575 , 401 P.3d 148, 153 (2017), the Idaho rule is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), and in that event “[w]e prefer to interpret the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with interpretations of the same language in the federal rules.” Id. (quoting Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 622 , 338 P.3d 1220, 1226 (2014)).

2022State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 991 , 842 P.2d 660, 670 (1992) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 , 254 P. 788 (1927)).

2022State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 991 , 842 P.2d 660, 670 (1992) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 , 254 P. 788 (1927)).

2021In all of the above cases, the Court considered the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance or comprehensive plan to a pending land-use application or zoning decision. 15 See, e.g., S. Fork Coal., 117 Idaho at 860 , 792 P.2d at 885 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance to an application for a housing development); Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436 , 210 P.3d at 544 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted comprehensive plan to a conditional re-zoning decision).

2021In all of the above cases, the Court considered the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance or comprehensive plan to a pending land-use application or zoning decision. 15 See, e.g., S. Fork Coal., 117 Idaho at 860 , 792 P.2d at 885 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance to an application for a housing development); Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436 , 210 P.3d at 544 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted comprehensive plan to a conditional re-zoning decision).

2021In all of the above cases, the Court considered the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance or comprehensive plan to a pending land-use application or zoning decision. 15 See, e.g., S. Fork Coal., 117 Idaho at 860 , 792 P.2d at 885 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance to an application for a housing development); Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436 , 210 P.3d at 544 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted comprehensive plan to a conditional re-zoning decision).

2021In all of the above cases, the Court considered the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance or comprehensive plan to a pending land-use application or zoning decision. 15 See, e.g., S. Fork Coal., 117 Idaho at 860 , 792 P.2d at 885 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted ordinance to an application for a housing development); Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436 , 210 P.3d at 544 (considering the applicability of a subsequently enacted comprehensive plan to a conditional re-zoning decision).

2020State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 813 , 203 P.3d 1203, 1212 (2009); State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 669-70 , 862 P.3d 1089 , 1091-92 (Ct. App. 1993).

2020State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 813 , 203 P.3d 1203, 1212 (2009); State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 669-70 , 862 P.3d 1089 , 1091-92 (Ct. App. 1993).

2017Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 264 , 220 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2009) (applying the Idaho standard of review when a Delaware choice of law was at issue).

2017Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 264 , 220 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2009) (applying the Idaho standard of review when a Delaware choice of law was at issue).

2015Prior to 2006, the federal rule used the same wording as the Idaho rule, "attacking the credibility of a witness.” In 2006, the wording was changed to "attacking a witness's character for truthfulness.” The official comments to the 2006 amendment states that the change was made in response to the line of authority discussed above, especially United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033 (5th Cir.1992). 6 .

2015Prior to 2006, the federal rule used the same wording as the Idaho rule, "attacking the credibility of a witness.” In 2006, the wording was changed to "attacking a witness's character for truthfulness.” The official comments to the 2006 amendment states that the change was made in response to the line of authority discussed above, especially United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033 (5th Cir.1992). 6 .

2014Second, the corresponding federal rule of evidence, on which the Idaho rule is based, has been interpreted to refer solely to physical injuries. 3 United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 , 603 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see also State v. Cecil J., 913 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (psychological trauma not recognized as an “injury” for purposes of similar provision of rape shield statute).

2014Second, the corresponding federal rule of evidence, on which the Idaho rule is based, has been interpreted to refer solely to physical injuries. 3 United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 , 603 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see also State v. Cecil J., 913 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (psychological trauma not recognized as an “injury” for purposes of similar provision of rape shield statute).