8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Strodegreen2 sentences2014See also State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d at 5 (the State presented evidence challenging the score on the basis that the defendant had been malingering); Smith v. State, 2010 WL 3638033 , at *30 (the State presented evidence that the defendant’s I.Q. test score should be discounted because of malingering); Van Tran v. State, 2006 WL 3327828 , at 4-6 (the State argued that the Vietnamese-born defendant’s low I.Q. test score reflected cultural and linguistic bias). 2014See also State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d at 5 (the State presented evidence challenging the score on the basis that the defendant had been malingering); Smith v. State, -20- 2010 WL 3638033 , at *30 (the State presented evidence that the defendant’s I.Q. test score should be discounted because of malingering); Van Tran v. State, 2006 WL 3327828 , at 4-6 (the State argued that the Vietnamese-born defendant’s low I.Q. test score reflected cultural and linguistic bias). | 6 | 6 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. Florida
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court agreed “with medical experts that when a defendant’s I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.” Id. 2014The Supreme Court agreed “with medical experts that when a defendant’s I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.” Id. at 2001 . | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Howell v. State
green
2 sentences2012Thereafter, the psychologist prepared an affidavit stating that an I.Q. test score of 70 actually represented “a band or zone of sixty-five to seventy-five.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d at 453 . 2012Thereafter, the psychologist prepared an affidavit stating that an I.Q. test score of 70 actually represented “a band or zone of sixty-five to seventy-five.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d at 453 . | 3 | 2011–2012 |
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2011The Court declined to adopt this interpretation and instead concluded that Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1) provides “a clear and objective guideline to be followed by the courts when applying the [statutory] three-prong test.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d at 458 . 39 In reaching this conclusion, the Court conceded that “mental retardation is a difficult condition to accurately define.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d at 457 . 40 However, citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242 , the Court pointed with favor to both the AAMR’s and the American Psychological Association’s def 2011The Court declined to adopt this interpretation and instead concluded that Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1) provides “a clear and objective guideline to be followed by the courts when applying the [statutory] three-prong test.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d at 458 . 39 In reaching this conclusion, the Court conceded that “mental retardation is a difficult condition to accurately define.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d at 457 . 40 However, citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242 , the Court pointed with favor to both the AAMR’s and the American Psychological Association’s def | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Sawyer v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2001The Meaning of “Actually Innocent of the Offense” Assuming arguendo that the test results from the WAIS-III do constitute “new scientific evidence,” the petitioner must nevertheless demonstrate that these results establish his actual innocence “of the offense or offenses for which [he] was convicted.” The petitioner does not argue that his alleged mental retardation proves his innocence of his underlying crime of murder; rather, he urges this Court to adopt an expanded meaning of this phrase to include “actual innocence of or ineligibility for the death 'penalty.” As support, the petitioner ci 2001The Meaning of “Actually Innocent of the Offense” Assuming arguendo that the test results from the WAIS-III do constitute “new scientific evidence,” the petitioner must nevertheless demonstrate that these results establish his actual innocence “of the offense or offenses for which [he] was convicted.” The petitioner does not argue that his alleged mental retardation proves his innocence of his underlying crime of murder; rather, he urges this Court to adopt an expanded meaning of this phrase to include “actual innocence of or ineligibility for the death 'penalty.” As support, the petitioner ci | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.