Consumer Protection Act claim in Washington

2021Because Long fails to establish that Flores’s actions had the capacity to deceive the general public, the court did not err in dismissing Long’s Consumer Protection Act claim. 37 RCW 19.86.020; Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wn.

1992App. 286, 293 , 640 P.2d 1077 (1982) (allowing Consumer Protection Act claim although plaintiff was found to have waived breach of contract claim). 60 "Courts have the authority to limit issues on a new trial in those cases where it clearly appears that the original issues were distinct and separate from each other and that justice does not require the resubmission of the whole case to the jury." Keegan v. Grant Cy.

1981App. 359 , 623 P.2d 710 (1981), cited by the majority, repeats the test that a Consumer Protection Act claim may be based on a per se violation of a statute or on a deceptive practice unregulated by statute but involving the public interest, and held that the act did not apply for a breach of warranty in the sale of a mobile home.

1981App. 359 , 623 P.2d 710 (1981), cited by the majority, repeats the test that a Consumer Protection Act claim may be based on a per se violation of a statute or on a deceptive practice unregulated by statute but involving the public interest, and held that the act did not apply for a breach of warranty in the sale of a mobile home.

2015Although she cannot bring a claim for damages under the DTA without a foreclosure sale, she may bring a claim for similar actions under the CPA.29 To prevail on an action for damages under the CPA, the plaintiff must establish "(1) [an] unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her business or property; (5) causation."30 "[W]hether a particular action gives rise to a Consumer Protection Act violation is reviewable as a question of law."31 Under our Supreme Court's Hangman Ridge32 test, a plaintiff may

2015Although she cannot bring a claim for damages under the DTA without a foreclosure sale, she may bring a claim for similar actions under the CPA.29 To prevail on an action for damages under the CPA, the plaintiff must establish "(1) [an] unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her business or property; (5) causation."30 "[W]hether a particular action gives rise to a Consumer Protection Act violation is reviewable as a question of law."31 Under our Supreme Court's Hangman Ridge32 test, a plaintiff may

2015And in light of the recent sale of the property, Big Blue's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. 13 Frias v. Asset Foreclosure Servs., Inc., 181 Wn.2d 412, 429 , 334 P.3d 529 (2014). -12- No. 72623-4-1/13 Violations of the Consumer Protection Act Although Big Blue cannot bring a claim for damages under the DTA without a foreclosure sale, it may bring CPA claims for violations of the DTA.14 To prevail on a CPA claim, the plaintiff must establish "(1) [an] unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintif

2015And in light of the recent sale of the property, Big Blue's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. 13 Frias v. Asset Foreclosure Servs., Inc., 181 Wn.2d 412, 429 , 334 P.3d 529 (2014). -12- No. 72623-4-1/13 Violations of the Consumer Protection Act Although Big Blue cannot bring a claim for damages under the DTA without a foreclosure sale, it may bring CPA claims for violations of the DTA.14 To prevail on a CPA claim, the plaintiff must establish "(1) [an] unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintif

2013Michael, 165 Wn.2d at 602-05 .

2013Michael, 165 Wn.2d at 602-05 .

2012Indeed, our Supreme Court has already indicated that an investor has a viable Consumer Protection Act claim against an attorney who simultaneously represents the promoter of a tax shelter scheme if the attorney “failed to disclose the conflict for the purpose of obtaining clients or increasing profits.” Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wn.2d 451, 465 , 824 P.2d 1207 (1992). ¶23 Whether a deceptive act has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public is a question of fact.

2012Indeed, our Supreme Court has already indicated that an investor has a viable Consumer Protection Act claim against an attorney who simultaneously represents the promoter of a tax shelter scheme if the attorney “failed to disclose the conflict for the purpose of obtaining clients or increasing profits.” Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wn.2d 451, 465 , 824 P.2d 1207 (1992). ¶23 Whether a deceptive act has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public is a question of fact.

2009Co. v. Dan Paulson Constr., Inc., 161 Wn.2d 903 , 169 P.3d 1 (2007) (discussing elements of an insurance bad faith claim). ¶33 The trial court properly dismissed the Ensleys’ claims on summary judgment.

2009Co. v. Dan Paulson Constr., Inc., 161 Wn.2d 903 , 169 P.3d 1 (2007) (discussing elements of an insurance bad faith claim). ¶33 The trial court properly dismissed the Ensleys’ claims on summary judgment.

2009Branom, 94 Wash.App. at 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (quoting Sly, 75 Wash.App. at 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 ).

2009Branom, 94 Wash.App. at 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (quoting Sly, 75 Wash.App. at 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 ).

2009Co. v. Dan Paulson Constr., Inc., 161 Wn.2d 903 , 169 P.3d 1 (2007) (discussing elements of an insurance bad faith claim). ¶33 The trial court properly dismissed the Ensleys’ claims on summary judgment.

2009Co. v. Dan Paulson Constr., Inc., 161 Wn.2d 903 , 169 P.3d 1 (2007) (discussing elements of an insurance bad faith claim). ¶33 The trial court properly dismissed the Ensleys’ claims on summary judgment.

2007Tallmadge, 25 Wn.

2007Tallmadge, 25 Wn.

2005App. 531 , 591 P.2d 824 (1979). ¶49 Whether Douglass had actual knowledge is a disputed material fact that precludes summary judgment on the Consumer Protection Act claim.

2005App. 531 , 591 P.2d 824 (1979). ¶49 Whether Douglass had actual knowledge is a disputed material fact that precludes summary judgment on the Consumer Protection Act claim.

2005Luxon, 42 Wn.

2005Luxon, 42 Wn.

1991Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 111 Wn.2d 396, 410 , 759 P.2d 418 (1988) addresses this issue as follows: In Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wn.2d 735, 744 , 733 P.2d 208 (1987), we stated fees awarded under the statute at issue here, RCW 19.86.090, "should only represent the reasonable amount of time and effort expended which should have been expended for the actions of [the defendant] which constituted a Consumer Protection Act violation." It is further evident that the trial court gave consideration to the factors for fixing attorney's fees outlined in Bowers at page 596.

1991Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 111 Wn.2d 396, 410 , 759 P.2d 418 (1988) addresses this issue as follows: In Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wn.2d 735, 744 , 733 P.2d 208 (1987), we stated fees awarded under the statute at issue here, RCW 19.86.090, "should only represent the reasonable amount of time and effort expended which should have been expended for the actions of [the defendant] which constituted a Consumer Protection Act violation." It is further evident that the trial court gave consideration to the factors for fixing attorney's fees outlined in Bowers at page 596.

2000Kallevig, 114 Wn.2d at 920-21 .

2000Kallevig, 114 Wn.2d at 920-21 .

1998App. 845, 851 , 939 P.2d 1245 (1997) (“We hold that an insured may not bring a bad faith or Consumer Protection Act claim based on procedural errors or shortcomings in an insurer’s investigation unless the insurer wrongfully denies the claim or the errors harm the insured.” (emphasis added)).

1998Co., 86 Wash.App. 845, 851 , 939 P.2d 1245 (1997) ("We hold that an insured may not bring a bad faith or Consumer Protection Act claim based on procedural errors or shortcomings in an insurer's investigation unless the insurer wrongfully denies the claim or the errors harm the insured." (emphasis added)).

1983Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40 , 614 P.2d 184 (1980); Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wn.

1983Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40 , 614 P.2d 184 (1980); Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wn.

1981Co., 90 Wn.2d 355 , 581 P.2d 1349 (1978); the unlawful act here being Federated's alleged violation of RCW 48.01.030. 1 A Consumer Protection Act claim against an insurance company for breach of its duty to exercise good faith under RCW 48.01.030 is limited to the insured.

1981Co., 90 Wn.2d 355 , 581 P.2d 1349 (1978); the unlawful act here being Federated's alleged violation of RCW 48.01.030. 1 A Consumer Protection Act claim against an insurance company for breach of its duty to exercise good faith under RCW 48.01.030 is limited to the insured.

2026Instead, the general rule is that a “‘cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when a party has the right to apply to a court for relief.’” Shepard v. Holmes, 185 Wn.

2026Instead, the general rule is that a “‘cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when a party has the right to apply to a court for relief.’” Shepard v. Holmes, 185 Wn.

2021Id. (quoting Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wn.2d 10 761, 777, 837 P.2d 1007 (1992)). 11 119 Wn.2d 761, 769, 770-80 , 837 P.2d 1007 (1992). 12 Id. at 777. 13 Id. at 777, 779-80. 14 95 Wn.2d 280, 284 , 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 4 No. 81300-5-I/5 that regulate real estate licenses and services.15 Because neither agency had the authority to hear or grant relief on a Consumer Protection Act claim, the available administrative remedies were inadequate, excusing the exhaustion requirement.16 Rivin primarily sought money damages and attorney fees for the alleged contractual breaches.

2021Id. (quoting Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wn.2d 10 761, 777, 837 P.2d 1007 (1992)). 11 119 Wn.2d 761, 769, 770-80 , 837 P.2d 1007 (1992). 12 Id. at 777. 13 Id. at 777, 779-80. 14 95 Wn.2d 280, 284 , 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 4 No. 81300-5-I/5 that regulate real estate licenses and services.15 Because neither agency had the authority to hear or grant relief on a Consumer Protection Act claim, the available administrative remedies were inadequate, excusing the exhaustion requirement.16 Rivin primarily sought money damages and attorney fees for the alleged contractual breaches.

2021Id. (quoting Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wn.2d 10 761, 777, 837 P.2d 1007 (1992)). 11 119 Wn.2d 761, 769, 770-80 , 837 P.2d 1007 (1992). 12 Id. at 777. 13 Id. at 777, 779-80. 14 95 Wn.2d 280, 284 , 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 4 No. 81300-5-I/5 that regulate real estate licenses and services.15 Because neither agency had the authority to hear or grant relief on a Consumer Protection Act claim, the available administrative remedies were inadequate, excusing the exhaustion requirement.16 Rivin primarily sought money damages and attorney fees for the alleged contractual breaches.

2021Id. (quoting Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 119 Wn.2d 10 761, 777, 837 P.2d 1007 (1992)). 11 119 Wn.2d 761, 769, 770-80 , 837 P.2d 1007 (1992). 12 Id. at 777. 13 Id. at 777, 779-80. 14 95 Wn.2d 280, 284 , 622 P.2d 1190 (1980). 4 No. 81300-5-I/5 that regulate real estate licenses and services.15 Because neither agency had the authority to hear or grant relief on a Consumer Protection Act claim, the available administrative remedies were inadequate, excusing the exhaustion requirement.16 Rivin primarily sought money damages and attorney fees for the alleged contractual breaches.