Stand Your Ground immunity in Florida

2024See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 , 462–63 (Fla. 2010) (evidentiary hearing required for motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 3.190(b) based on Stand Your Ground immunity); State ex rel.

2024See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 , 462–63 (Fla. 2010) (evidentiary hearing required for motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 3.190(b) based on Stand Your Ground immunity); State ex rel.

2022Love, 286 So. 3d at 186; see Kumar v. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557, 559 (Fla. 2017) (“The Legislature, however, did not suggest procedural mechanisms for invoking and determining Stand Your Ground immunity.”); Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 775 (Fla. 2015) (“These courts have adopted a procedure in which the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, in the context of their analogous immunity laws.”); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 459 (Fla. 2010) (“The trial court recognized that no procedure had yet been enacted for deciding cla

2021In 2015, this Court held that “the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity at the pretrial evidentiary hearing.” Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 775 (Fla. 2015), superseded by statute as stated in Sparks v. State, 299 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

2019We cannot presume counsel acted in a strategic manner here given the rapidly evolving state of the law at the time of the appellant’s trial. 3 Compare State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding a convicted felon in possession of a firearm was engaged in unlawful activity under section 776.013 and not entitled to Stand Your Ground immunity) with Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA [April 10,] 2013) (certifying a conflict with Hill and holding a defense under section 776.012 did not preclude Stand Your Ground immunity).

2018See § 776.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (noting that a defendant engaged in unlawful activity could seek Stand Your Ground immunity under section 776.012 even though the unlawful activity would preclude immunity under section 776.013).

2019See generally Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[B]ecause [Appellant] was entitled to raise a defense under section 776.012(1), the trial court's instruction that he had a duty to retreat if he was engaged in unlawful activity effectively deprived [Appellant] of his sole defense and constituted fundamental error."); Little, 111 So. 3d at 219, 221 (concluding that immunity - 10 - applies to a person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or 776.013(3), therefore the defendant's status as a felon in illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude a claim

2019See generally Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[B]ecause [Appellant] was entitled to raise a defense under section 776.012(1), the trial court's instruction that he had a duty to retreat if he was engaged in unlawful activity effectively deprived [Appellant] of his sole defense and constituted fundamental error."); Little, 111 So. 3d at 219, 221 (concluding that immunity - 10 - applies to a person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or 776.013(3), therefore the defendant's status as a felon in illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude a claim

2018As in Martin, if the trial court concludes after the new hearing that Catalano is entitled to Stand Your Ground immunity, "it shall enter an order to that effect and dismiss the information with prejudice." Id. at D1018 (citing McDaniel v. State, 24 So. 3d 654, 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)).

2018Cf. McDaniel v. State, 24 So. 3d 654, 656-58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (remanding for a new hearing on defendant's motion to -9- dismiss based on Stand Your Ground immunity where the original order was silent regarding the evidentiary standard that applied); Glaze v. Worley, 157 So. 3d 552, 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Makar, J., concurring) ("Our Court would be in an equal position to the trial judge if the parties had been operating under the correct law with all of the evidence, and presented their cases accordingly, but that did not happen.

2019Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (affirming denial of Stand-Your-Ground immunity where the testimony below “contradict[ed] wildly” and the evidence showed that the defendant did not act in self-defense when he stabbed the victim).

2015When a defendant claims Stand Your Ground immunity, a trial court “is to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the purpose of which is to consider factual disputes.” Id.

2024Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1973) (issuing writ to compel trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the transactional immunity or use immunity provisions of section 914.04, Florida Statutes, were applicable); Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that trial court had discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss 5 alleging prosecutorial misconduct and selective prosecution); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (directing trial court to allow the defendant to file a written motion to dismiss and

2024Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1973) (issuing writ to compel trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the transactional immunity or use immunity provisions of section 914.04, Florida Statutes, were applicable); Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that trial court had discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss 5 alleging prosecutorial misconduct and selective prosecution); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (directing trial court to allow the defendant to file a written motion to dismiss and

2024Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1973) (issuing writ to compel trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the transactional immunity or use immunity provisions of section 914.04, Florida Statutes, were applicable); Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that trial court had discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss 5 alleging prosecutorial misconduct and selective prosecution); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (directing trial court to allow the defendant to file a written motion to dismiss and

2024Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1973) (issuing writ to compel trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the transactional immunity or use immunity provisions of section 914.04, Florida Statutes, were applicable); Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that trial court had discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss 5 alleging prosecutorial misconduct and selective prosecution); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (directing trial court to allow the defendant to file a written motion to dismiss and

2024Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1973) (issuing writ to compel trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the transactional immunity or use immunity provisions of section 914.04, Florida Statutes, were applicable); Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that trial court had discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss 5 alleging prosecutorial misconduct and selective prosecution); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (directing trial court to allow the defendant to file a written motion to dismiss and

2024Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1973) (issuing writ to compel trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the transactional immunity or use immunity provisions of section 914.04, Florida Statutes, were applicable); Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that trial court had discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss 5 alleging prosecutorial misconduct and selective prosecution); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (directing trial court to allow the defendant to file a written motion to dismiss and

2023See, e.g., Cunningham v. State, 159 So. 3d 275, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (recognizing that “the mere display of a gun is not deadly force as a matter of law” (emphasis in original) (citing Carter v. State, 115 So. 3d 1031 , 1037 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also Howard v. State, 698 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“[E]ven the display of a deadly weapon, without more, is not ‘deadly force.’” (citing Toledo v. State, 452 So. 2d 661 , 662 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)).

2023That standard requires the court to determine whether, based on circumstances as they appeared to the defendant when he or she acted, a reasonable and prudent person situated in the same circumstances and knowing what the defendant knew would have used the same force as did the defendant”) (citing Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)); Toledo v. State, 452 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (finding a person in the exercise of his right of self-defense may use only such force as a reasonable person, situated as he was and knowing what he knew, would have used under like circumst

2023See also Viera v. 7 State, 163 So. 3d 602, 604-05 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“[T]he objective standard is to be applied by a trial court in evaluating the factual circumstances presented in a Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss.

2015See also Viera, 163 So.3d at 605 (affirming denial of Stand Your Ground immunity where there was conflicting testimony and competent substantial evidence contradicting Viera’s version of the events); Mederos, 102 So.3d at 11 (affirming denial of Stand Your Ground immunity where the testimony below “contradict[ed] wildly” and where there was competent substantial evidence that Mede-ros was not acting in self-defense when he stabbed the victim).

2022Love, 286 So. 3d at 186; see Kumar v. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557, 559 (Fla. 2017) (“The Legislature, however, did not suggest procedural mechanisms for invoking and determining Stand Your Ground immunity.”); Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 775 (Fla. 2015) (“These courts have adopted a procedure in which the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, in the context of their analogous immunity laws.”); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 459 (Fla. 2010) (“The trial court recognized that no procedure had yet been enacted for deciding cla

2019See, e.g., Kumar v. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557, 559 (Fla. 2017) (“The Legislature, however, did not suggest procedural mechanisms for invoking and determining Stand Your Ground immunity.”); 4 Bretherick, 170 So. 3d at 775 4.

2019See generally Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[B]ecause [Appellant] was entitled to raise a defense under section 776.012(1), the trial court's instruction that he had a duty to retreat if he was engaged in unlawful activity effectively deprived [Appellant] of his sole defense and constituted fundamental error."); Little, 111 So. 3d at 219, 221 (concluding that immunity - 10 - applies to a person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or 776.013(3), therefore the defendant's status as a felon in illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude a claim

2019See generally Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[B]ecause [Appellant] was entitled to raise a defense under section 776.012(1), the trial court's instruction that he had a duty to retreat if he was engaged in unlawful activity effectively deprived [Appellant] of his sole defense and constituted fundamental error."); Little, 111 So. 3d at 219, 221 (concluding that immunity - 10 - applies to a person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or 776.013(3), therefore the defendant's status as a felon in illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude a claim

2018See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219 .

2018See Holly , 450 So.2d at 219 .

2017See Peterson v. State, 983 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st DGA 2008) (“[W]hen immunity under this law is properly raised by a defendant, the trial court must decide the matter by confronting and weighing only factual disputes.”).

2012See Peterson, 983 So.2d at 29 (A party claiming immunity whose motion to dismiss was denied “is not precluded from submitting the matter to the jury as an affirmative defense in his criminal trial.”).

2017See Leasure, 105 So.3d at 12—13 (agreeing with the trial court that "because of the myriad of inconsistencies in her statements and the inconsistent medical evidence, Leasure failed to prove entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence”).

2015See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 121 So.3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Leasure v. State, 105 So.3d 5, 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Montijo v. State, 61 So.3d 424, 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); see also Fla. Std.

2015As stated in Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), the objective standard is to be applied by a trial court in evaluating the factual circumstances presented in a Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss.

2015As stated in Mobley v. State, 132 So.3d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), the objective standard is to be applied by a trial court in evaluating the factual circumstances presented in a Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss.

2020See Hight v. State, 253 So. 3d 1137, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

2019We find no error in the procedure the trial court used to handle the stand-your-ground hearing prior to this court’s decision in Hight v. State, 253 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), which held that the 2017 amendment contained in subsection 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2017), did not apply retroactively.

2019See Commander, 246 So. 3d at 1303-04 .

2018However, based on this Court’s recent decisions in Commander v. State, 246 So. 3d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), and Edwards v. State, 2018 WL 4997631 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 16, 2018), we are constrained to reverse the trial court’s ruling on the Stand Your Ground motion.

2019See generally Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[B]ecause [Appellant] was entitled to raise a defense under section 776.012(1), the trial court's instruction that he had a duty to retreat if he was engaged in unlawful activity effectively deprived [Appellant] of his sole defense and constituted fundamental error."); Little, 111 So. 3d at 219, 221 (concluding that immunity - 10 - applies to a person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or 776.013(3), therefore the defendant's status as a felon in illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude a claim

2019See generally Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 205 So. 3d 803, 806-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[B]ecause [Appellant] was entitled to raise a defense under section 776.012(1), the trial court's instruction that he had a duty to retreat if he was engaged in unlawful activity effectively deprived [Appellant] of his sole defense and constituted fundamental error."); Little, 111 So. 3d at 219, 221 (concluding that immunity - 10 - applies to a person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or 776.013(3), therefore the defendant's status as a felon in illegal possession of a firearm did not preclude a claim

2025See Sandoval v. State, 225 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (holding that the postconviction court properly considered the inconsistency in the witnesses' statements when finding the testimony incredible).

2025See Sandoval v. State, 225 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (holding that the postconviction court properly considered the inconsistency in the witnesses' statements when finding the testimony incredible).

2025See State v. Quevedo, 357 So. 3d 1249 , 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (noting that on review of trial court’s order on motion to dismiss due to Stand Your Ground immunity, “the trial court’s factual findings are presumed correct and can be reversed only if they are not supported by competent substantial evidence”); Smith v. State, 969 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (affirming jury finding that bottle of bleach can be used as deadly weapon); see also Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (explaining tipsy coachman doctrine); § 776.041(2), Fla. Stat. (limiting use of self-defense by

2025Greelish, 914 A.2d at 1216 (quoting Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W. 2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978)); see also Herrell, 491 So. 2d at 1175–76 (construing statute as “requiring the landlord to file an action for possession 8 in all circumstances” apart from limited exceptions “which, if they occur, permit the landlord to reenter the premises peaceably and retake possession”); Paese v. State, 381 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (involving felony criminal charges and a stand-your-ground hearing arising from an investigation of a possible building code violation by a condominium owner).

2025Greelish, 914 A.2d at 1216 (quoting Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W. 2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978)); see also Herrell, 491 So. 2d at 1175–76 (construing statute as “requiring the landlord to file an action for possession 8 in all circumstances” apart from limited exceptions “which, if they occur, permit the landlord to reenter the premises peaceably and retake possession”); Paese v. State, 381 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (involving felony criminal charges and a stand-your-ground hearing arising from an investigation of a possible building code violation by a condominium owner).

2025See State v. Quevedo, 357 So. 3d 1249 , 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (noting that on review of trial court’s order on motion to dismiss due to Stand Your Ground immunity, “the trial court’s factual findings are presumed correct and can be reversed only if they are not supported by competent substantial evidence”); Smith v. State, 969 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (affirming jury finding that bottle of bleach can be used as deadly weapon); see also Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (explaining tipsy coachman doctrine); § 776.041(2), Fla. Stat. (limiting use of self-defense by

2025Finally, the State has neither attempted to identify particular elements of any of the State's charges for which the medical records may be relevant in whole or in part, nor has it proved that the requested documents may include information relevant to those discrete elements.2 See Tyson, 114 So. 3d at 445 (holding that the State failed to 1 We note that at least as of the time of the hearing, Jaeger had not filed any Stand Your Ground motion under section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2023), and she conceded, "If we end up pursuing the self- defense claim, that's an affirmative defense and we wo