successive-writ bar in Mississippi

2020White, 59 So. 3d at 636 (¶¶11-12).

2011“The successive-writ bar does not apply where a PCR movant shows ‘he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that, if it had been introduced at trial, it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence.’ ” White, 59 So.3d at 635 (¶ 9) (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6)).

2015Several exceptions exist to the successive-writ bar, including claims of newly discovered evidence under section 99-39-23(6) and “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights[.]” Smith v. State, 149 So.3d 1027, 1031-32 (¶¶ 8-11) (Miss.2014) (quoting Rowland, 42 So.3d at 507 (¶ 12)) (holding that constitutional claims are excepted from the successive-writ bar and the common-law doctrine of res judicata).

2014Accordingly, Riley reasons that he is entitled to raise this issue repeatedly and perpetually based on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 506 (¶ 9) (Miss.2010), in which the supreme court stated that “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA.” In other words, Riley argues that neither the time-bar 1 nor the successive-writ bar applies to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. ¶ 8.

2013See Carbin v. State, 942 So.2d 231, 233 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted).

2013Dobbs v. State, 18 So.3d 295, 298 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (citing Carbin v. State, 942 So.2d 231, 233 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2006)).

2018To find an exception to the statute of limitation or the successive-writ bar, "[t]here must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim ...." Stovall v. State , 873 So.2d 1056 , 1058 (¶ 7) (Miss.

2015“To find an exception to the successive-writ bar, ‘there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim’ of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Id. (quoting Stovall v. State, 873 So.2d 1056, 1058 (¶7) (Miss.Ct.App.2004)).

2009Johnson v. State, 962 So.2d 87, 89 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). ¶ 5.

2009Johnson v. State, 962 So.2d 87, 89 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). ¶ 7.

1995Code Ann. § 99-39-27 (9), [Lockett] must demonstrate that there have been intervening decisions from either this Court or the U.S. Supreme Court which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence." Gilliard v. State, 614 So.2d 370, 373 (Miss. 1992).

1993See also Irving v. State, 618 So.2d 58 (Miss. 1992) (" Maynard and Clemons would have *804 `actually adversely affected a petitioner's sentence"); Gilliard v. State, 614 So.2d 370 (Miss. 1992) (holding that these cases are "as a matter of state law ... intervening decisions which would except the application of the successive writ bar of the Post-Conviction Relief Act and Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 22"); Miss.

2011The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Jackson’s latest PCR motion, explaining that “Jackson’s motion is procedurally barred as an impermissible subsequent attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, as Jackson has failed to show that it falls within any of the statutory exceptions to the successive-writ bar.” Jackson v. State, 67 So.3d 781, 782 (Miss.Ct.App. 2009).

2007The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Jackson’s latest PCR motion, explaining that “Jackson’s motion is procedurally barred as an impermissible subsequent attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, as Jackson has failed to show that it falls within any of the statutory exceptions to the successive-writ bar.” Jackson v. State, 2009 WL 441440, *2 (Miss.

1997However, in Lockett v. State, 656 So.2d 76, 80 (Miss. 1995) ( Lockett II ), this Court recognized that the supervening insanity exception applies to the successive writ bar, and not the time bar.

1995However, in Lockett v. State, 656 So.2d 76, 80 (Miss. 1995) (Lockett II), this Court recognized that the supervening insanity exception applies to the successive writ bar, and not the time bar.

2026Brown now asserts that Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009), Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), and Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), are all “intervening decisions which give rise to new claims that support relief for Brown” such that his Confrontation Clause claims are excepted from the waiver and successive-writ bars.

2024Shanks v. State, 233 So. 3d 877, 883 (¶22) (Miss.

2023Nevertheless, “the UPCCRA provides an exception to the successive-writ bar . . . [for] those cases in which the petitioner claims that his sentence has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked.” Williamson v. State, 269 So. 3d 421, 425 (¶21) (Miss.

2023See Fluker, 170 So. 3d at 475 (“[The common-law doctrine of res judicata does not apply to post-conviction claims of constitutional dimensions.

2020However, the statute of limitations and the successive-writ bar both make an exception for cases in which the petitioner can show the existence of . . . “evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that, if it had been introduced at trial, it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence.” Kidd, 221 So. 3d at 1044 (¶14) (quoting Miss.

2020Jordan, 213 So. 3d at 43 (¶10). 7 The referenced motions are Wheeler’s “Petition for Habeas Corpus/Post Conviction Relief” and “Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Seek This Court’s Recommendation for Parole Reinstatement for Failure to Prosecute.” 15 ¶33.

2020Apr. 30, 2020) (“[T]he Brady claim is subject to the time bar, the successive-writ bar, and res judicata.”) (motion for rehearing pending); Mason v. State, 235 So. 3d 129, 131 (¶¶4-5) (Miss.

2020Chapman, 167 So. 3d at 1172-74 (¶¶6-12).

2019The trial court’s denial of that motion was affirmed by this Court in O’Neal I. 4 See O’Neal I, 156 So. 3d at 354-55 (¶¶1-3).

2018Ct. App. 2013) (citing Williams , 110 So. 3d at 847 (¶ 10) ).

2018"The successive-writ bar does not apply where a PCR movant shows he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that, if it had been introduced at trial, it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence." Allen , 177 So.3d at 1151 (¶ 6) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Miss.