contemplation rule in Alabama

1992In this instance, [the non-party] was not absent within the contemplation of the rule and to this court was not prejudiced by the failure to be added as a party.’ ” Long, supra, at 973 .

1992In this instance, [the non-party] was not absent within the contemplation of the rule and to this court was not prejudiced by the failure to be added as a party. *Page 871 " 'According to Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.411(6) 2nd Ed. (1974) at 1552 [sic]: " ' "If a non-party who thus participates in litigation has an interest sufficiently close to the matter in litigation, and has adequate opportunity to litigate in support of or in defense against the cause of action on which the suit is based, the policies . . . require that the participating non-party should be bound by the resulting j

1992In this instance, [the non-party] was not absent within the contemplation of the rule and to this court was not prejudiced by the failure to be added as a party. *Page 871 " 'According to Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.411(6) 2nd Ed. (1974) at 1552 [sic]: " ' "If a non-party who thus participates in litigation has an interest sufficiently close to the matter in litigation, and has adequate opportunity to litigate in support of or in defense against the cause of action on which the suit is based, the policies . . . require that the participating non-party should be bound by the resulting j

1992In this instance, [the non-party] was not absent within the contemplation of the rule and to this court was not prejudiced by the failure to be added as a party. *Page 871 " 'According to Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.411(6) 2nd Ed. (1974) at 1552 [sic]: " ' "If a non-party who thus participates in litigation has an interest sufficiently close to the matter in litigation, and has adequate opportunity to litigate in support of or in defense against the cause of action on which the suit is based, the policies . . . require that the participating non-party should be bound by the resulting j

1979See Skipworth v. Skipworth , 360 So.2d 975 (Ala. 1978); King v. King , 269 Ala. 468 , 114 So.2d 145 (1959).

1979See Skipworth v. Skipworth , 360 So.2d 975 (Ala. 1978); King v. King , 269 Ala. 468 , 114 So.2d 145 (1959).

1932That such contracts as to the interest are void ab initio is declared in McCormick v. Fallier, 223 Ala. 80 , 134 So. 471, 475 .

1932That such contracts as to the interest are void ab initio is declared in McCormick v. Fallier, 223 Ala. 80 , 134 So. 471, 475 .

1926The sole question presented on this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to permit a finding of fact that the vendee of the car had such a reputation of being a violator of the prohibition laws, and -at such a time and such a place, as, within the contemplation of the rule announced in Edwards v. State (Ala. Sup.) 104 So. 255 , 1 and other later cases, may have put the vendor on notice thereof, and so imposed upon him the duty of active diligence to avoid the unlawful use of its property by this vendee.

1915THOMAS, J. (1) Medical services are necessaries within the contemplation of the rule making the husband liable for necessaries furnished to the wife, and when such services are necessary the husband cannot escape liability therefor by showing that he did not call in the physician, or even that the physician was called in against his consent and over his objections .—Cothran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380 . (2) If, however, through no fault of the husband, the wife abandons his home and refuses to live or cohabit with him, he is not responsible for her necessaries, unless expressly requested by him; and p

1915THOMAS, J. (1) Medical services are necessaries within the contemplation of the rule making the husband liable for necessaries furnished to the wife, and when such services are necessary the husband cannot escape liability therefor by showing that he did not call in the physician, or even that the physician was called in against his consent and over his objections .—Cothran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380 . (2) If, however, through no fault of the husband, the wife abandons his home and refuses to live or cohabit with him, he is not responsible for her necessaries, unless expressly requested by him; and p

1910And in an earlier case this court said that the wife could not with any propriety be regarded as the purchaser of her husband’s estate by the simple act of marriage. — Gibson v. Carson, 3 Ala. 421 .

1910In this state, at a time when marriage vested the. wife’s personal property in the husband, it was held by this court that the fact of marriage without moré did not constitute the husband a purchaser within the contemplation of that clause of the statute of frauds which then declared that “when any loan of goods and chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom, or those claiming under them, possession shall have remained for the space of three years, without demand made and pursued by due course of law, on the part of the pretendéd lender, etc., the same shall be taken