civil commitment hearing in Arizona

2008Tyars v. Firmer, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[sjhackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action. ..."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1980) (“[A] committing court may exclude a respondent where his presence makes it impossible to conduct the hearing in a reasonable manner....”); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D.Neb.1975) ("T

2008NOTES [1] He said, "I think that she did so because of her, her problems, Your Honor, and not due to involuntary [sic] actions on her behalf." [2] Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[s]hackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action...."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A] committing court may exclude a respondent w

2008Hosp., 384 F.Supp. 1085, 1094 (E.D.Mich.1974) ("Under Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)[,j a criminal defendant may be removed from trial where his conduct is so disruptive that the proceeding cannot continue in any reasonable manner.

2008Hosp., 384 F.Supp. 1085, 1094 (E.D.Mich.1974) ("Under Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)[,] a criminal defendant may be removed from trial where his conduct is so disruptive that the proceeding cannot continue in any reasonable manner.

2008Tyars v. Firmer, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[sjhackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action. ..."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1980) (“[A] committing court may exclude a respondent where his presence makes it impossible to conduct the hearing in a reasonable manner....”); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D.Neb.1975) ("T

2008NOTES [1] He said, "I think that she did so because of her, her problems, Your Honor, and not due to involuntary [sic] actions on her behalf." [2] Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[s]hackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action...."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A] committing court may exclude a respondent w

2008Tyars v. Firmer, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[sjhackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action. ..."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1980) (“[A] committing court may exclude a respondent where his presence makes it impossible to conduct the hearing in a reasonable manner....”); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D.Neb.1975) ("T

2008NOTES [1] He said, "I think that she did so because of her, her problems, Your Honor, and not due to involuntary [sic] actions on her behalf." [2] Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[s]hackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action...."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A] committing court may exclude a respondent w

2008Tyars v. Firmer, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[sjhackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action. ..."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1980) (“[A] committing court may exclude a respondent where his presence makes it impossible to conduct the hearing in a reasonable manner....”); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D.Neb.1975) ("T

2008NOTES [1] He said, "I think that she did so because of her, her problems, Your Honor, and not due to involuntary [sic] actions on her behalf." [2] Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[s]hackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action...."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A] committing court may exclude a respondent w

2008Tyars v. Firmer, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[sjhackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action. ..."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1980) (“[A] committing court may exclude a respondent where his presence makes it impossible to conduct the hearing in a reasonable manner....”); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D.Neb.1975) ("T

2008NOTES [1] He said, "I think that she did so because of her, her problems, Your Honor, and not due to involuntary [sic] actions on her behalf." [2] Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in a civil commitment hearing, the "[s]hackling, restraining or even removing a respondent from the courtroom must be limited to cases urgently demanding that action...."); Suzuki v. Quisenberry (Suzuki I), 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1130 (D.Haw.1976) affirmed in part, reversed in part and dismissed in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A] committing court may exclude a respondent w

2025MH 2008- 002596, 223 Ariz. at 35, ¶ 12 . ¶7 Under A.R.S. § 36-539(B), a “patient’s attorney may subpoena and cross-examine witnesses and present evidence” at a civil commitment hearing.

2015“We review the application and interpretation of statutes as well as constitutional claims de novo because they are questions of law.” In re MH 2007-001275, 219 Ariz. 216, 219, ¶ 19 , 196 P.3d 819 , 822 (App. 2008), superseded by statute on other grounds by A.R.S. §§ 36-537 and -539. ¶7 Preliminarily, Petitioner contends that because Appellant failed to argue to the trial court that there was any issue regarding his counsel’s waiver of his appearance or that the court should have explored alternative means by which he could attend the hearing, Appellant has 3 Later testimony revealed doctors h

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011MH 2007-000629, 219 Ariz. at 292, ¶ 13 , 197 P.3d at 753 .

2011In re MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318, 322, ¶ 17 , 152 P.3d 1201, 1205 (App.2007).

2011In re MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318, 322, ¶ 17 , 152 P.3d 1201, 1205 (App.2007).

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (1995) (holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing “implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel”); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 , 29 P.3d 485, 491, ¶30 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that “where a state statute affords an individual subject to involuntary commitment with the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that counsel could be prejudicia

2011Id. at 496 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 19 As to the second factor, risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, the Supreme Court has recognized that a civil commitment case “turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (emphasis in original).

2011Id. at 496 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 19 As to the second factor, risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, the Supreme Court has recognized that a civil commitment case “turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (emphasis in original).

2011Id. at 496 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 19 As to the second factor, risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, the Supreme Court has recognized that a civil commitment case “turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (emphasis in original).

2011Id. at 496 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 19 As to the second factor, risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, the Supreme Court has recognized that a civil commitment case “turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (emphasis in original).

2007In Honor v. Yamuchi, 307 Ark. 324 , 820 S.W.2d 267 (1991), for example, the court held that due process requires that a person subject to a civil commitment hearing who chooses to proceed without counsel must do so intelligently, or the “waiver” is invalid.

2007In Honor v. Yamuchi, 307 Ark. 324 , 820 S.W.2d 267 (1991), for example, the court held that due process requires that a person subject to a civil commitment hearing who chooses to proceed without counsel must do so intelligently, or the “waiver” is invalid.