7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2010We found no error in the use of the LeBlanc instruction as applied to second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter in State v. Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, ¶¶ 3, 6-8 , 202 P.3d 514, 515, 516-17 (App. 2008). ¶ 30 Eddington claims, however, that Garcia was wrongly decided and that LeBlanc does not apply to second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter because the latter is not truly a lesser-included offense of the former. 2010We found no error in the use of the LeBlanc instruction as applied to second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter in State v. Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, ¶¶ 3, 6-8 , 202 P.3d 514, 515, 516-17 (App. 2008). ¶ 30 Eddington claims, however, that Garcia was wrongly decided and that LeBlanc does not apply to second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter because the latter is not truly a lesser-included offense of the former. | 3 | 3 |
Peak v. Acunagreen2 sentences2010See Peak v. Acuña, 203 Ariz. 83, ¶¶ 5-6 , 50 P.3d 833, 834-35 (2002) (holding heat-of-passion manslaughter not lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for double jeopardy purposes). 2010See Peak v. Acuña, 203 Ariz. 83, ¶¶ 5-6 , 50 P.3d 833, 834-35 (2002) (holding heat-of-passion manslaughter not lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for double jeopardy purposes). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2026See State v. Garcia, 102 Ariz. 468, 471 (1967) (stating that when the court submits forms of verdict to the jury, “it should give a form of every kind of a verdict that may possibly be returned by the jury”). ¶22 For these reasons, we agree with the parties that the trial court committed error by giving the LeBlanc instruction on provocation manslaughter and then repeating the instructional error in the verdict form. 10 STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court B. 2026See State v. Garcia, 102 Ariz. 468, 471 (1967) (stating that when the court submits forms of verdict to the jury, “it should give a form of every kind of a verdict that may possibly be returned by the jury”). ¶22 For these reasons, we agree with the parties that the trial court committed error by giving the LeBlanc instruction on provocation manslaughter and then repeating the instructional error in the verdict form. 10 STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court B. | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Luagreen2 sentences2026See Lua, 237 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 19. 2026See Lua, 237 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 19 (noting that a jury following a LeBlanc instruction would logically never consider provocation manslaughter). | 1 | 1 |
Ernest Lee Brazzel v. State of Washington v. Alice Paynegreen2 sentences2019See Brazzel v. Washington , 491 F.3d 976 , 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they 'cannot agree,' they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime ...."); State v. Espinoza , 233 Ariz. 176 , 179 ¶ 10, 310 P.3d 52 , 55 (App. 2013) ("[A] jury's mere statement that it has been unable to reach a verdict after persistent deliberations-and after proceeding to consider a lesser offense in the context of a LeBlanc instruction-does not, without further inquiry by the court, demonstrate a true deadlock 2019See Brazzel v. Washington , 491 F.3d 976 , 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they 'cannot agree,' they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime ...."); State v. Espinoza , 233 Ariz. 176 , 179 ¶ 10, 310 P.3d 52 , 55 (App. 2013) ("[A] jury's mere statement that it has been unable to reach a verdict after persistent deliberations-and after proceeding to consider a lesser offense in the context of a LeBlanc instruction-does not, without further inquiry by the court, demonstrate a true deadlock | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Huntergreen2 sentences2006See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (“There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (describing the most common form of “manifest necessity” as a “mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict”). ¶ 14 From a purely logical viewpoint, the LeBlanc instruction (as opposed to an acquittal-first instruction) undercuts G 2006See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (“There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (describing the most common form of “manifest necessity” as a “mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict”). ¶ 14 From a purely logical viewpoint, the LeBlanc instruction (as opposed to an acquittal-first instruction) undercuts G | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. LeBlanc
green
2 sentences2019See Brazzel v. Washington , 491 F.3d 976 , 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they 'cannot agree,' they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime ...."); State v. Espinoza , 233 Ariz. 176 , 179 ¶ 10, 310 P.3d 52 , 55 (App. 2013) ("[A] jury's mere statement that it has been unable to reach a verdict after persistent deliberations-and after proceeding to consider a lesser offense in the context of a LeBlanc instruction-does not, without further inquiry by the court, demonstrate a true deadlock 2019See Brazzel v. Washington , 491 F.3d 976 , 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they 'cannot agree,' they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime ...."); State v. Espinoza , 233 Ariz. 176 , 179 ¶ 10, 310 P.3d 52 , 55 (App. 2013) ("[A] jury's mere statement that it has been unable to reach a verdict after persistent deliberations-and after proceeding to consider a lesser offense in the context of a LeBlanc instruction-does not, without further inquiry by the court, demonstrate a true deadlock | 4 | 2010–2019 |
State v. Eddington
green
2 sentences2026Moreover, State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72 , 82 ¶ 32 (App. 2010), makes it clear that a LeBlanc instruction does not prevent the jury from considering adequate provocation manslaughter. 2026Moreover, State v. Eddington, 226 Ariz. 72 , 82 ¶ 32 (App. 2010), makes it clear that a LeBlanc instruction does not prevent the jury from considering adequate provocation manslaughter. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State of Arizona v. Shiloe Dominique Espinoza
green
2 sentences2019See Brazzel v. Washington , 491 F.3d 976 , 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they 'cannot agree,' they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime ...."); State v. Espinoza , 233 Ariz. 176 , 179 ¶ 10, 310 P.3d 52 , 55 (App. 2013) ("[A] jury's mere statement that it has been unable to reach a verdict after persistent deliberations-and after proceeding to consider a lesser offense in the context of a LeBlanc instruction-does not, without further inquiry by the court, demonstrate a true deadlock 2019See Brazzel v. Washington , 491 F.3d 976 , 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they 'cannot agree,' they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime ...."); State v. Espinoza , 233 Ariz. 176 , 179 ¶ 10, 310 P.3d 52 , 55 (App. 2013) ("[A] jury's mere statement that it has been unable to reach a verdict after persistent deliberations-and after proceeding to consider a lesser offense in the context of a LeBlanc instruction-does not, without further inquiry by the court, demonstrate a true deadlock | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lemke v. Rayes
green
2 sentences2013We then observed that “[a] contrary holding would raise significant questions regarding whether a defendant convicted of a lesser-included offense in Arizona under the LeBlanc instruction is constitutionally protected from retrial on the greater offense.” Id. 2013We then observed that “[a] contrary holding would raise significant questions regarding whether a defendant convicted of a lesser-included offense in Arizona under the LeBlanc instruction is constitutionally protected from retrial on the greater offense.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Schiro v. Farley
green
2 sentences2006Therefore, Lemke is unable to meet his burden of establishing the “factual predicate for the application of the doctrine ..., namely, that an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in his favor.” Schiro, 510 U.S. at 223 , 114 S.Ct. 783 (internal quotation omitted). 2006Therefore, Lemke is unable to meet his burden of establishing the “factual predicate for the application of the doctrine ..., namely, that an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in his favor.” Schiro, 510 U.S. at 223 , 114 S.Ct. 783 (internal quotation omitted). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences2006A contrary holding would raise significant questions regarding whether a defendant convicted of a lesser-included offense in Arizona under the LeBlanc instruction is constitutionally protected from retrial on the greater offense, an eventuality that we doubt the LeBlanc court intended when it abandoned use of the “acquittal-first” instruction in favor of the “reasonable efforts” approach. ¶ 16 We next consider Lemke’s second premise — that armed robbery is the “same offense” as felony murder predicated on armed robbery—by using the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 2006A contrary holding would raise significant questions regarding whether a defendant convicted of a lesser-included offense in Arizona under the LeBlanc instruction is constitutionally protected from retrial on the greater offense, an eventuality that we doubt the LeBlanc court intended when it abandoned use of the “acquittal-first” instruction in favor of the “reasonable efforts” approach. ¶ 16 We next consider Lemke’s second premise — that armed robbery is the “same offense” as felony murder predicated on armed robbery—by using the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Green v. United States
green
2 sentences2006See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (“There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (describing the most common form of “manifest necessity” as a “mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict”). ¶ 14 From a purely logical viewpoint, the LeBlanc instruction (as opposed to an acquittal-first instruction) undercuts G 2006See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (“There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (describing the most common form of “manifest necessity” as a “mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict”). ¶ 14 From a purely logical viewpoint, the LeBlanc instruction (as opposed to an acquittal-first instruction) undercuts G | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2006See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (“There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (describing the most common form of “manifest necessity” as a “mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict”). ¶ 14 From a purely logical viewpoint, the LeBlanc instruction (as opposed to an acquittal-first instruction) undercuts G 2006See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (“There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (describing the most common form of “manifest necessity” as a “mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict”). ¶ 14 From a purely logical viewpoint, the LeBlanc instruction (as opposed to an acquittal-first instruction) undercuts G | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.