Gunwall analysis in Washington

2026This exemplifies the harsh and arbitrary outcome for a defendant like Ross. 16 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 58 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 17 Under Ramos, a party is required to provide a Gunwall analysis. 187 Wn.2d at 454 .

2026This exemplifies the harsh and arbitrary outcome for a defendant like Ross. 16 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 58 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 17 Under Ramos, a party is required to provide a Gunwall analysis. 187 Wn.2d at 454 .

2016Furthermore, when “prior cases direct the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.” State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769 , 958 P.2d 982 (1998).

2016Furthermore, when “prior cases direct the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.” State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769 , 958 P.2d 982 (1998).

2016Furthermore, when “prior cases direct the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.” State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769 , 958 P.2d 982 (1998).

2016Furthermore, when “prior cases direct the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.” State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769 , 958 P.2d 982 (1998).

2016Cf. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wn.2d 586 , 854 P.2d 1 (1993) (refusing to address the plaintiffs’ contentions that the Washington Constitution provides greater protection from government takings of property where they did not brief the Gunwall factors). ¶34 A property owner may bring an inverse condemnation claim to “ ‘recover the value of property which has been appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain.’ ” Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan County, 169 Wn.2d 598, 605 , 238 P.3d 1129 (2010) (quoting Dickgieser v. State, 153 Wn.2d 530, 534-35 , 105 P.3d 26 (2005)).

2016Cf. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wn.2d 586 , 854 P.2d 1 (1993) (refusing to address the plaintiffs’ contentions that the Washington Constitution provides greater protection from government takings of property where they did not brief the Gunwall factors). ¶34 A property owner may bring an inverse condemnation claim to “ ‘recover the value of property which has been appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain.’ ” Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan County, 169 Wn.2d 598, 605 , 238 P.3d 1129 (2010) (quoting Dickgieser v. State, 153 Wn.2d 530, 534-35 , 105 P.3d 26 (2005)).

2007The six Gunwall factors parallel interpretive inquiries made when determining “whether the state constitution ultimately provides greater protection than its corresponding federal provision.” Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 115 , 937 P.2d 154 , 943 P.2d 1358 (1997) (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 575 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). ¶17 This court previously determined that the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution “requires an independent constitutional analysis from the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.” Grant County Fire P

2007The six Gunwall factors parallel interpretive inquiries made when determining “whether the state constitution ultimately provides greater protection than its corresponding federal provision.” Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 115 , 937 P.2d 154 , 943 P.2d 1358 (1997) (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 575 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). ¶17 This court previously determined that the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution “requires an independent constitutional analysis from the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.” Grant County Fire P

2018Gunwall requires an analysis of six factors: “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.” Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 115 . 5 Forbes argues that this court must conduct a new Gunwall analysis because the court in Ino Ino did not address what Forbes argues is the specific question at issue here.

2018Gunwall requires an analysis of six factors: “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.” Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 115 . 5 Forbes argues that this court must conduct a new Gunwall analysis because the court in Ino Ino did not address what Forbes argues is the specific question at issue here.

2022See State v. Olivias, 122 Wn.2d 73, 82 , 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (declining to consider state constitutional grounds where appellants failed to address Gunwall factors and failed to analyze the federal and state constitutions separately or explain why a distinction should be made between the federal and state constitutional rights). 5 J.M. did not object to the admission of statements he made to Officer Wilson at the trial court and raises a challenge to those statements for the first time on appeal.

2022See State v. Olivias, 122 Wn.2d 73, 82 , 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (declining to consider state constitutional grounds where appellants failed to address Gunwall factors and failed to analyze the federal and state constitutions separately or explain why a distinction should be made between the federal and state constitutional rights). 5 J.M. did not object to the admission of statements he made to Officer Wilson at the trial court and raises a challenge to those statements for the first time on appeal.

2025State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100 , 196 P.3d 645 (2008) (stating that “[t]he protection provided by the state provision is coextensive with that provided by the Fifth Amendment”), State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 57-62 , 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (concluding that a Gunwall analysis does not support extending greater protection through article I, section 9 than provided by its federal counterpart), State v. Earls, 116 Wn.2d 364, 374-75 , 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (stating that where the defendant argued article I, section 9 should be interpreted as more protective than its federal counterpart, “resort to the

2025State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100 , 196 P.3d 645 (2008) (stating that “[t]he protection provided by the state provision is coextensive with that provided by the Fifth Amendment”), State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 57-62 , 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (concluding that a Gunwall analysis does not support extending greater protection through article I, section 9 than provided by its federal counterpart), State v. Earls, 116 Wn.2d 364, 374-75 , 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (stating that where the defendant argued article I, section 9 should be interpreted as more protective than its federal counterpart, “resort to the

2007The six Gunwall factors parallel interpretive inquiries made when determining “whether the state constitution ultimately provides greater protection than its corresponding federal provision.” Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 115 , 937 P.2d 154 , 943 P.2d 1358 (1997) (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 575 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). ¶17 This court previously determined that the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution “requires an independent constitutional analysis from the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.” Grant County Fire P

2007The six Gunwall factors parallel interpretive inquiries made when determining "whether the state constitution ultimately provides greater protection than its corresponding federal provision." Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash.2d 103, 115 , 937 P.2d 154 , 943 P.2d 1358 (1997) (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 575 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). ¶ 13 This court previously determined that the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution "requires an independent constitutional analysis from the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution." [6] Grant Coun

2025State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100 , 196 P.3d 645 (2008) (stating that “[t]he protection provided by the state provision is coextensive with that provided by the Fifth Amendment”), State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 57-62 , 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (concluding that a Gunwall analysis does not support extending greater protection through article I, section 9 than provided by its federal counterpart), State v. Earls, 116 Wn.2d 364, 374-75 , 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (stating that where the defendant argued article I, section 9 should be interpreted as more protective than its federal counterpart, “resort to the

2025State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100 , 196 P.3d 645 (2008) (stating that “[t]he protection provided by the state provision is coextensive with that provided by the Fifth Amendment”), State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 57-62 , 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (concluding that a Gunwall analysis does not support extending greater protection through article I, section 9 than provided by its federal counterpart), State v. Earls, 116 Wn.2d 364, 374-75 , 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (stating that where the defendant argued article I, section 9 should be interpreted as more protective than its federal counterpart, “resort to the

2018See, e.g., McNabb, 163 Wn.2d at 400 (“It is well settled that the privacy protections provided by article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution have an independent meaning from that provided by the federal constitution.”); State v. Athan, 160 8 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 9 We examine the Gunwall factors only if “it is not settled law that an independent analysis should be conducted.” McNabb, 163 Wn.2d at 399 . 14 Consol.

2018See, e.g., McNabb, 163 Wn.2d at 400 (“It is well settled that the privacy protections provided by article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution have an independent meaning from that provided by the federal constitution.”); State v. Athan, 160 8 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 9 We examine the Gunwall factors only if “it is not settled law that an independent analysis should be conducted.” McNabb, 163 Wn.2d at 399 . 14 Consol.

2015See State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 834 , 10 P. 3d 977 ( 2000) ( declining to address argument that state constitutional provision provided greater protection that its federal counterpart where appellant failed to brief Gunwall factors).

2015See State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 834 , 10 P.3d 977 (2000) (declining to address argument that state constitutional provision provided greater protection than its federal counterpart where appellant failed to brief Gunwall factors).

2019State v. Lui, 179 Wash.2d 457 , 468-70, 315 P.3d 493 (2014) ("This court has concluded that article I, section 22 merits an independent *774 analysis as to both the manner and the scope of the confrontation right." (citing State v. Pugh , 167 Wash.2d 825 , 835, 225 P.3d 892 (2009) )); State v. Martin, 171 Wash.2d 521 , 528-33, 252 P.3d 872 (2011) (conducting a Gunwall 2 analysis and concluding that an independent analysis of article I, section 22 was necessary); Pugh, 167 Wash.2d at 834 -35 , 225 P.3d 892 (stating that "a Gunwall analysis is no longer necessary" and independently analyzing art

2019State v. Lui, 179 Wash.2d 457 , 468-70, 315 P.3d 493 (2014) ("This court has concluded that article I, section 22 merits an independent *774 analysis as to both the manner and the scope of the confrontation right." (citing State v. Pugh , 167 Wash.2d 825 , 835, 225 P.3d 892 (2009) )); State v. Martin, 171 Wash.2d 521 , 528-33, 252 P.3d 872 (2011) (conducting a Gunwall 2 analysis and concluding that an independent analysis of article I, section 22 was necessary); Pugh, 167 Wash.2d at 834 -35 , 225 P.3d 892 (stating that "a Gunwall analysis is no longer necessary" and independently analyzing art

2015See State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 834 , 10 P. 3d 977 ( 2000) ( declining to address argument that state constitutional provision provided greater protection that its federal counterpart where appellant failed to brief Gunwall factors).

2015See State v. Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 834 , 10 P.3d 977 (2000) (declining to address argument that state constitutional provision provided greater protection than its federal counterpart where appellant failed to brief Gunwall factors).

2018State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472 , 755 P.2d 797 (1988).16 15 The six criteria are: “(1) the textual language, (2) differences in the texts, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.” Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58 . 16 The majority cites several cases where our Supreme Court has held that a Gunwall analysis is not necessary because it is well settled that article 1, section 7 is interpreted independently of the Fourth Amendment: McNabb v. Dep’t of Corrections, 163 Wn.2d 393, 399 , 180 P3d 1257 (2008);

2018State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472 , 755 P.2d 797 (1988).16 15 The six criteria are: “(1) the textual language, (2) differences in the texts, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.” Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58 . 16 The majority cites several cases where our Supreme Court has held that a Gunwall analysis is not necessary because it is well settled that article 1, section 7 is interpreted independently of the Fourth Amendment: McNabb v. Dep’t of Corrections, 163 Wn.2d 393, 399 , 180 P3d 1257 (2008);

2024“Whether the Washington constitution provides a level of protection different from the federal constitution in a given case is determined by reference to the six nonexclusive Gunwall factors.” State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 179 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994).

2024“Whether the Washington constitution provides a level of protection different from the federal constitution in a given case is determined by reference to the six nonexclusive Gunwall factors.” State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 179 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994).

2019We therefore take this opportunity to reaffirm that no Gunwall analysis is required to justify an independent state constitutional analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts. 3 Courts and parties may assume an independent state analysis is justified and move directly to the merits of the article I, section 7 claim presented. ¶ 16 "It is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the Fourth Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the federal constitution." State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d 454 , 462, 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (citing State v.

2018“Accordingly, a Gunwall analysis is unnecessary to establish that this court should undertake an independent state constitutional analysis.” Athan, 160 Wn.2d at 365 (footnote omitted); see also State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (same); State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 463 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (same).

2019We therefore take this opportunity to reaffirm that no Gunwall analysis is required to justify an independent state constitutional analysis of article I, section 7 in new contexts. 3 Courts and parties may assume an independent state analysis is justified and move directly to the merits of the article I, section 7 claim presented. ¶ 16 "It is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the Fourth Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the federal constitution." State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d 454 , 462, 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (citing State v.

2018“Accordingly, a Gunwall analysis is unnecessary to establish that this court should undertake an independent state constitutional analysis.” Athan, 160 Wn.2d at 365 (footnote omitted); see also State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 26 , 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (same); State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 463 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (same).

2006Ed. 1188 (1938). 5 Under the Gunwall factors, Walker focuses and relies exclusively on our prior cases to support her arguments. ¶9 This court has defined the scope of article I, section 7 as protecting “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.” State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511 , 688 P.2d 151 (1984).

2006Ed. 1188 (1938). 5 Under the Gunwall factors, Walker focuses and relies exclusively on our prior cases to support her arguments. ¶9 This court has defined the scope of article I, section 7 as protecting “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.” State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511 , 688 P.2d 151 (1984).

2023See, e.g., State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 101-07 , 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) (adhering to the “same elements” test in Blockburger 5 to assess double jeopardy claims and holding the Gunwall factors did not support the proposed “same conduct” test in Grady6). 4 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986).

2023See, e.g., State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 101-07 , 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) (adhering to the “same elements” test in Blockburger 5 to assess double jeopardy claims and holding the Gunwall factors did not support the proposed “same conduct” test in Grady6). 4 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986).

2019State v. Lui, 179 Wash.2d 457 , 468-70, 315 P.3d 493 (2014) ("This court has concluded that article I, section 22 merits an independent *774 analysis as to both the manner and the scope of the confrontation right." (citing State v. Pugh , 167 Wash.2d 825 , 835, 225 P.3d 892 (2009) )); State v. Martin, 171 Wash.2d 521 , 528-33, 252 P.3d 872 (2011) (conducting a Gunwall 2 analysis and concluding that an independent analysis of article I, section 22 was necessary); Pugh, 167 Wash.2d at 834 -35 , 225 P.3d 892 (stating that "a Gunwall analysis is no longer necessary" and independently analyzing art

2019State v. Lui, 179 Wash.2d 457 , 468-70, 315 P.3d 493 (2014) ("This court has concluded that article I, section 22 merits an independent *774 analysis as to both the manner and the scope of the confrontation right." (citing State v. Pugh , 167 Wash.2d 825 , 835, 225 P.3d 892 (2009) )); State v. Martin, 171 Wash.2d 521 , 528-33, 252 P.3d 872 (2011) (conducting a Gunwall 2 analysis and concluding that an independent analysis of article I, section 22 was necessary); Pugh, 167 Wash.2d at 834 -35 , 225 P.3d 892 (stating that "a Gunwall analysis is no longer necessary" and independently analyzing art

2018State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472 , 755 P.2d 797 (1988).16 15 The six criteria are: “(1) the textual language, (2) differences in the texts, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.” Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58 . 16 The majority cites several cases where our Supreme Court has held that a Gunwall analysis is not necessary because it is well settled that article 1, section 7 is interpreted independently of the Fourth Amendment: McNabb v. Dep’t of Corrections, 163 Wn.2d 393, 399 , 180 P3d 1257 (2008);

2018State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472 , 755 P.2d 797 (1988).16 15 The six criteria are: “(1) the textual language, (2) differences in the texts, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.” Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58 . 16 The majority cites several cases where our Supreme Court has held that a Gunwall analysis is not necessary because it is well settled that article 1, section 7 is interpreted independently of the Fourth Amendment: McNabb v. Dep’t of Corrections, 163 Wn.2d 393, 399 , 180 P3d 1257 (2008);

2018With our inconsistent precedent, conducting the Gunwall analysis for this particular context is the prudent starting point for this case. ^ See State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887 , 329 P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652,674 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996); State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712 , 921 P.2d 495 (1996); State v. Thome, 129 Wn.2d 736, 772-33 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996), abrogated on other grounds byBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2018With our inconsistent precedent, conducting the Gunwall analysis for this particular context is the prudent starting point for this case. ^ See State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887 , 329 P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652,674 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996); State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712 , 921 P.2d 495 (1996); State v. Thome, 129 Wn.2d 736, 772-33 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996), abrogated on other grounds byBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.