home venue privilege in Florida

2025See also Spradley v. Parole Comm’n, 198 So. 3d 642 , 646–47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (remanding for venue transfer to Leon County); Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Wilkinson, 799 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“The purpose of the home venue privilege given to state agencies is to ‘promote orderly and uniform handling of state litigation’ and to ‘minimize 2 expenditure of public funds and manpower.’”) (quoting Carlile, 354 So. 2d at 364 ).

2024The sword-wielder exception to the home venue privilege described in Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1977), suggests that venue in Hillsborough County was proper, which calls into question the trial court's conclusion that it was not.

2022“The home venue privilege provides that, absent waiver or exception, venue in a suit against the State, or an agency or subdivision of the State, is proper only in the county in which the State, or the agency or subdivision of the State, maintains its principal headquarters.” Fla. Dept. of Child. & Fams. v. Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So. 2d 1278, 1286 (Fla. 2004).

2022Bd. of Osceola Cnty., 903 So. 2d at 966 ; see also Sun- 6 Sentinel, 865 So. 2d at 1288 (“[A] trial court must apply the home venue privilege unless one of the exceptions to the privilege is satisfied.”).

2015The Florida Supreme Court recognized the joint tortfeasor exception in Board of County Commissioners v. Grice, 438 So.2d 392, 395 (Fla.1983) (“[A] trial court has discretion to dispense with the home venue privilege when a govemmén-tal body is sued as a joint tortfeasor.”) (emphasis added).

2006Ambry contended that Board of County Commissioners of Madison County v. Grice, 438 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla.1983), established exceptions to the home venue privilege, including when the action involves joint tortfeasors.

2017R. 3.1(B), and the removal notice specifically stated it was not intended to waive any available defenses, see Middleton, 24 So. 3d at 627 (holding a state agency’s willingness to transfer venue to Jackson County, rather than the agency’s home venue of Leon County, did not constitute a waiver of the home-venue privilege so as to allow the suit to proceed in Pinellas County where it was filed).

2017R. 3.1(B), and the removal notice specifically stated it was not intended to waive any available defenses, see Middleton, 24 So. 3d at 627 (holding a state agency’s willingness to transfer venue to Jackson County, rather than the agency’s home venue of Leon County, did not constitute a waiver of the home-venue privilege so as to allow the suit to proceed in Pinellas County where it was filed).

2025See also Spradley v. Parole Comm’n, 198 So. 3d 642 , 646–47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (remanding for venue transfer to Leon County); Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Wilkinson, 799 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“The purpose of the home venue privilege given to state agencies is to ‘promote orderly and uniform handling of state litigation’ and to ‘minimize 2 expenditure of public funds and manpower.’”) (quoting Carlile, 354 So. 2d at 364 ).

2012“The governmental agency bears the initial burden of proving its entitlement to the home venue privilege.” Dep’t of Agric. v. Middleton, 24 So.3d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Wilkinson, 799 So.2d 258, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). “ ‘The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to plead and prove’ that an exception to the privilege applies.” Id.

2011This exception is applicable where a “plaintiff seeks judicial protection from a real or imminent danger of invasion of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Barr, 644 So.2d at 335 ).

2010Barr, 644 So.2d at 335 .

2009See School Bd. of Osceola Cty. v. State Bd. of Educ., 903 So.2d 963, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (holding that a county school board could not use the sword-wielder exception to defeat the home venue privilege); Department of Cmty. Affairs v. Holmes County, 668 So.2d 1096, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“The Plaintiff Counties are not ‘individuals’ within the meaning of that exception [sword-wielder] whose constitutional rights have been directly threatened by the state agency.”).

2005See, e.g., Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387 So.2d at 942 ; Carlile, 354 So.2d at 366 ; Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Holmes County, 668 So.2d 1096, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Navarro v. Barnett Bank of W.

2012See, e.g., Dickinson v. Fla. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 763 So.2d 1245,1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (concluding that actions in an earlier case did not affect the privilege in the present case); see also Dep’t of Agric. v. Middleton, 24 So.3d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (rejecting a waiver argument because throughout the proceedings in the trial court “the State Agencies consistently asserted their entitlement to the home venue privilege” and “[a]t no time did the State Agencies agree to submit to venue in Pinellas County or submit to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court located in Pinellas Coun

2004In Dickinson v. Florida National Organization for Women, Inc., 763 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), this court stated: “[w]here the state agency’s actions are statewide in scope, in the absence of any showing of particularized harm to the plaintiffs that will occur within the county itself separate and apart from the generalized harm suffered by all citizens by the operation or enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law, the home venue privilege applies.” Id. at 1248 .

2009Governmental defendants may waive the home venue privilege by moving to transfer venue from their home venue to another venue, see Mansfield v. Singletary, 610 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), or by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court in which the plaintiff has filed suit, see Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580 , 35 So.2d 844, 848 (1948).

2009Governmental defendants may waive the home venue privilege by moving to transfer venue from their home venue to another venue, see Mansfield v. Singletary, 610 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), or by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court in which the plaintiff has filed suit, see Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580 , 35 So.2d 844, 848 (1948).

2005See, e.g., Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387 So.2d at 942 ; Carlile, 354 So.2d at 366 ; Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Holmes County, 668 So.2d 1096, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Navarro v. Barnett Bank of W.

2004It also allows for a "uniformity of interpretation" and "prevents conflicting judicial rulings in different jurisdictions." Id.; see also Carlile, 354 So.2d at 364 ("Such a rule promotes orderly and uniform handling of state litigation and helps to minimize expenditure of public funds and manpower."); Triple "A" Enters., 387 So.2d at 943 ("The common law venue privilege allows for uniform interpretation by one court, thus promoting efficient and uniform rulings, and minimizing expenditure of effort and public funds.").

2024Dep't of Agric. v. Middleton, 24 So. 3d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing 7 Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 2006)).

2009See Bush v. State, 945 So.2d 1207, 1212 (Fla.2006) (“Absent waiver or application of an identified exception, the home venue privilege appears to be an absolute right.”) (quoting Jacksonville Elec.

2012Two such examples are Boca Raton Housing Authority v. Carousel Development, Inc., 482 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein this Court held that Boca Raton Housing Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege, and Ven-Fuel v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 332 So.2d 81, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975),. wherein this Court concluded that Jacksonville Electric Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege.

2012Two such examples are Boca Raton Housing Authority v. Carousel Development, Inc., 482 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein this Court held that Boca Raton Housing Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege, and Ven-Fuel v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 332 So.2d 81, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975),. wherein this Court concluded that Jacksonville Electric Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege.

2010Addison v. City of Tampa, 33 So.3d 742, 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("Unless a recognized exception applies, the home venue privilege is absolute." (citing Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So.2d 1278, 1288 (Fla. 2004))).

2010Addison v. City of Tampa, 33 So.3d 742, 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Unless a recognized exception applies, the home venue privilege is absolute.” (citing Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So.2d 1278, 1288 (Fla.2004))).

2006See Lewis v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 697 So.2d 965, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2004Lewis v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 697 So.2d 965, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2005See Dickinson v. Fla. Nat'l Org. for Women, 763 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); New England Int'l Sur., Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Ins., 511 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (concluding that insurer could not maintain its action for injunctive and declaratory relief in Palm Beach County against the Department of Insurance since the suit was not brought to protect "some specific property or other constitutional right situated in Palm Beach County").

2000In New England Int'l Sur., Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Ins., 511 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), we concluded that an insurer could not maintain its action for injunctive and declaratory relief in Palm Beach County against the Department of Insurance, since the suit was not brought to protect "some specific property or other constitutional right situated in Palm Beach County..." (emphasis added).

2022Bd. of Osceola Cnty., 903 So. 2d at 966 ; see also Sun- 6 Sentinel, 865 So. 2d at 1288 (“[A] trial court must apply the home venue privilege unless one of the exceptions to the privilege is satisfied.”).

2009See School Bd. of Osceola Cty. v. State Bd. of Educ., 903 So.2d 963, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (holding that a county school board could not use the sword-wielder exception to defeat the home venue privilege); Department of Cmty. Affairs v. Holmes County, 668 So.2d 1096, 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“The Plaintiff Counties are not ‘individuals’ within the meaning of that exception [sword-wielder] whose constitutional rights have been directly threatened by the state agency.”).

2013See, e.g., Pinellas Cnty. v. Baldwin, 80 So.3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (affirming the circuit court’s denial of the county’s motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue, where the property was located in a different county, and because plaintiffs complaint for inverse condemnation invoked the sword-wielder exception to the county’s home venue privilege); Levy Cnty. v. Diamond, 7 So.3d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding the Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund and the Department of Environmental Protection could voluntarily waive the home venue privilege and consent to the trial of t

2012Cf. Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 829 So.2d 928, 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding "that when a property owner sues to compel compliance with Chapter 73, the venue provision, section 73.021, applies”).

2025See also Spradley v. Parole Comm’n, 198 So. 3d 642 , 646–47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (remanding for venue transfer to Leon County); Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Wilkinson, 799 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“The purpose of the home venue privilege given to state agencies is to ‘promote orderly and uniform handling of state litigation’ and to ‘minimize 2 expenditure of public funds and manpower.’”) (quoting Carlile, 354 So. 2d at 364 ).

2017Constructors, Inc., 727 So.2d 305, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“Failure to raise improper venue,” including improper venue based on the home venue privilege, “prior to or contemporaneous with a party’s answer constitutes waiver.” (citing Fla. R.

2015See Williams v., Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) (“They [principal and agent] are in no sense joint tort-feasors, but the basis of the liability of the principal, or master, is the well-known doctrine óf respondeat superior.”); Grobman v. Posey, 863 So.2d 1230 , 1235- (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Vicarious liability does not mesh with the concept of liability that can be apportioned among joint tortfea-sors.”); Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“While at’ times the term ‘joint tort-feasors’ has been loosely used ... in connection with the doctrine of respondeat sup

2015See Williams v., Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) (“They [principal and agent] are in no sense joint tort-feasors, but the basis of the liability of the principal, or master, is the well-known doctrine óf respondeat superior.”); Grobman v. Posey, 863 So.2d 1230 , 1235- (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Vicarious liability does not mesh with the concept of liability that can be apportioned among joint tortfea-sors.”); Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“While at’ times the term ‘joint tort-feasors’ has been loosely used ... in connection with the doctrine of respondeat sup

2015See Williams v., Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) (“They [principal and agent] are in no sense joint tort-feasors, but the basis of the liability of the principal, or master, is the well-known doctrine óf respondeat superior.”); Grobman v. Posey, 863 So.2d 1230 , 1235- (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Vicarious liability does not mesh with the concept of liability that can be apportioned among joint tortfea-sors.”); Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“While at’ times the term ‘joint tort-feasors’ has been loosely used ... in connection with the doctrine of respondeat sup

2015See Williams v., Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) (“They [principal and agent] are in no sense joint tort-feasors, but the basis of the liability of the principal, or master, is the well-known doctrine óf respondeat superior.”); Grobman v. Posey, 863 So.2d 1230 , 1235- (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Vicarious liability does not mesh with the concept of liability that can be apportioned among joint tortfea-sors.”); Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“While at’ times the term ‘joint tort-feasors’ has been loosely used ... in connection with the doctrine of respondeat sup

2013See, e.g., Pinellas Cnty. v. Baldwin, 80 So.3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (affirming the circuit court’s denial of the county’s motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue, where the property was located in a different county, and because plaintiffs complaint for inverse condemnation invoked the sword-wielder exception to the county’s home venue privilege); Levy Cnty. v. Diamond, 7 So.3d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding the Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund and the Department of Environmental Protection could voluntarily waive the home venue privilege and consent to the trial of t

2012Two such examples are Boca Raton Housing Authority v. Carousel Development, Inc., 482 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein this Court held that Boca Raton Housing Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege, and Ven-Fuel v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 332 So.2d 81, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975),. wherein this Court concluded that Jacksonville Electric Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege.

2012Two such examples are Boca Raton Housing Authority v. Carousel Development, Inc., 482 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), wherein this Court held that Boca Raton Housing Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege, and Ven-Fuel v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 332 So.2d 81, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975),. wherein this Court concluded that Jacksonville Electric Authority was a governmental entity entitled to the home venue privilege.