7 Colorado opinions name it 1 courts 1988–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Tennesongreen2 sentences1996However, unlike the statutory scheme under scrutiny in Zant , 462 U.S. at 871-72, 874-75 , 914 , 103 S.Ct. at 2739-40, 2741-42 , 2762 , Colorado's death penalty statute aims not just to narrow the class of death-eligible prisoners, but requires the additional step that the jury then weigh aggravating against mitigating factors, see, e.g. , Tenneson , 788 P.2d at 789 , 791 , and precludes a jury verdict of death unless " [t] here are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that were proved," § 16-11-103 (2) (b) (II) (B) , 8A C.R.S. ( 1986 ) . 1996However, unlike the statutory scheme under scrutiny in Zant, 462 U.S. at 871-72, 874-75, 914 , 103 S.Ct. at 2739-40, 2741-42, 2762 , Colorado’s death penalty statute aims not just to narrow the class of death-eligible prisoners, but requires the additional step that the jury then weigh aggravating against mitigating factors, see, e.g., Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 789, 791 , and precludes a jury verdict of death unless “[tjhere are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that were proved,” § 16 — 11—103(2)(b)(II)(B), 8A C.R.S. (1986). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences1996In the final analysis, the Colorado death penalty statutory scheme is like that of Mississippi, see Clemons , 593 So.2d at 1006 , in that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors "the jury makes the ultimate individualized decision on whether death is the appropriate penalty." People v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez IV ) , 794 P.2d 965, 973 ( Colo. 1990 ) , cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1055 , 111 S.Ct. 770 , 112 L.Ed.2d 789 ( 1991 ) ; see also Tenneson , 788 P.2d at 795 ( "All of the foregoing considerations and authorities contribute to support the conclusion that Colorado's death penalty statute 1996In the final analysis, the Colorado death penalty statutory scheme is like that of Mississippi, see Clemons, 593 So.2d at 1006 , in that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors “the jury makes the ultimate individualized decision on whether death is the appropriate penalty.” People v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez IV), 794 P.2d 965, 973 (Colo.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055 , 111 S.Ct. 770 , 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991); see also Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 795 (“All of the foregoing considerations and authorities contribute to support the conclusion that Colorado’s death penalty statute must be const | 2 | 2 |
Zant v. Stephensgreen2 sentences1996However, unlike the statutory scheme under scrutiny in Zant, 462 U.S. at 871-72, 874-75, 914 , 103 S.Ct. at 2739-40, 2741-42, 2762 , Colorado’s death penalty statute aims not just to narrow the class of death-eligible prisoners, but requires the additional step that the jury then weigh aggravating against mitigating factors, see, e.g., Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 789, 791 , and precludes a jury verdict of death unless “[tjhere are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that were proved,” § 16 — 11—103(2)(b)(II)(B), 8A C.R.S. (1986). 1996However, unlike the statutory scheme under scrutiny in Zant, 462 U.S. at 871-72, 874-75, 914 , 103 S.Ct. at 2739-40, 2741-42, 2762 , Colorado’s death penalty statute aims not just to narrow the class of death-eligible prisoners, but requires the additional step that the jury then weigh aggravating against mitigating factors, see, e.g., Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 789, 791 , and precludes a jury verdict of death unless “[tjhere are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that were proved,” § 16 — 11—103(2)(b)(II)(B), 8A C.R.S. (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Stringer v. Blackgreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229 , 112- S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992) (describing Mississippi’s weighing statute). 1999See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229 , 112- S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992) (describing Mississippi’s weighing statute). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wechslergreen1 sentence1993See People v. Wechsler, 854 P.2d 217, 222-23 (Colo.1993). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beygreen2 sentences1990In Tenneson , we wrote "[t]he qualitatively unique and irretrievably final nature of the death penalty `makes it unthinkable for jurors to impose the death penalty when they harbor a reasonable doubt as to its justness.'" Tenneson , at 791-92 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123 , 548 A.2d 887, 903 (1988)). 1990In Tenneson , we wrote "[t]he qualitatively unique and irretrievably final nature of the death penalty `makes it unthinkable for jurors to impose the death penalty when they harbor a reasonable doubt as to its justness.'" Tenneson , at 791-92 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123 , 548 A.2d 887, 903 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences1990(Emphasis added.) We considered an instruction identical in all respects relevant to the unanimity issue in People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 194-196 (Colo.1990). 1990(Emphasis added.) We considered an instruction identical in all respects relevant to the unanimity issue in People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 194-196 (Colo.1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clemons v. State
green
2 sentences1996In the final analysis, the Colorado death penalty statutory scheme is like that of Mississippi, see Clemons , 593 So.2d at 1006 , in that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors "the jury makes the ultimate individualized decision on whether death is the appropriate penalty." People v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez IV ) , 794 P.2d 965, 973 ( Colo. 1990 ) , cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1055 , 111 S.Ct. 770 , 112 L.Ed.2d 789 ( 1991 ) ; see also Tenneson , 788 P.2d at 795 ( "All of the foregoing considerations and authorities contribute to support the conclusion that Colorado's death penalty statute 1996In the final analysis, the Colorado death penalty statutory scheme is like that of Mississippi, see Clemons, 593 So.2d at 1006 , in that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors “the jury makes the ultimate individualized decision on whether death is the appropriate penalty.” People v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez IV), 794 P.2d 965, 973 (Colo.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055 , 111 S.Ct. 770 , 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991); see also Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 795 (“All of the foregoing considerations and authorities contribute to support the conclusion that Colorado’s death penalty statute must be const | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Rodriguez v. Colorado
green
2 sentences1996In the final analysis, the Colorado death penalty statutory scheme is like that of Mississippi, see Clemons , 593 So.2d at 1006 , in that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors "the jury makes the ultimate individualized decision on whether death is the appropriate penalty." People v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez IV ) , 794 P.2d 965, 973 ( Colo. 1990 ) , cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1055 , 111 S.Ct. 770 , 112 L.Ed.2d 789 ( 1991 ) ; see also Tenneson , 788 P.2d at 795 ( "All of the foregoing considerations and authorities contribute to support the conclusion that Colorado's death penalty statute 1996In the final analysis, the Colorado death penalty statutory scheme is like that of Mississippi, see Clemons, 593 So.2d at 1006 , in that after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors “the jury makes the ultimate individualized decision on whether death is the appropriate penalty.” People v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez IV), 794 P.2d 965, 973 (Colo.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055 , 111 S.Ct. 770 , 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991); see also Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 795 (“All of the foregoing considerations and authorities contribute to support the conclusion that Colorado’s death penalty statute must be const | 2 | 1996–1996 |
People v. District Court
green
2 sentences1988The sentence of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances as set forth in subsections (5) and (6) of this section and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing hearing. ง 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986). [7] In People v. District Court, 190 Colo. 342 , 546 P.2d 1268 (1976), this court concluded that in a capital case prospective jurors could be questioned on voir dire regarding their views on capital punishment. 1988The sentence of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances as set forth in subsections (5) and (6) of this section and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing hearing. ง 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986). [7] In People v. District Court, 190 Colo. 342 , 546 P.2d 1268 (1976), this court concluded that in a capital case prospective jurors could be questioned on voir dire regarding their views on capital punishment. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.