Greeley claim in Ohio

2007However, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Kulch , supra, also explained, citing its earlier reasoning in Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244 , 652 N.E.2d 940 , that "an employee who fails to strictly comply with the requirements of R.C. 4113.52 cannot base a Greeley claim solely upon the public policy embodied in that statute." In light of our holding that Appellant's whistleblower claim fails, she cannot bring a Greeley claim based upon that statute.

2007However, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Kulch , supra, also explained, citing its earlier reasoning in Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244 , 652 N.E.2d 940 , that "an employee who fails to strictly comply with the requirements of R.C. 4113.52 cannot base a Greeley claim solely upon the public policy embodied in that statute." In light of our holding that Appellant's whistleblower claim fails, she cannot bring a Greeley claim based upon that statute.

2007We held that in the absence of any language indicating that the General Assembly intended the remedies of R.C. 4113.52 to be exclusive, “the mere existence of statutory remedies in R.C. 4113.52 does not, without more, operate to bar recognition of [a] Greeley claim for tortious wrongful discharge in violation of R.C. 4113.52.” Id. at 156, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 26} Wiles, however, rejected any interpretation of Kulch that would indicate that a statutory remedy that provides less than a full panoply of relief gives rise to a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge. 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 20

2007Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 (“a valid Greeley claim is not limited to situations where the discharge violates a statute”). {¶28} Moreover, case law demonstrates that the cited policy need not prohibit discharge per se.

2003Our inquiry, however, does not end here. {¶ 25} “[A]n employee is entitled to maintain a Greeley claim against his employer whether or not the employee complies with the dictates of R.C. 4113.52 if he can identify a source of public policy separate from the public policy embodied in R.C. 4113.52.” (Emphasis sic.) Doody v. Centerior Energy Corp. (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 673, 679 , 739 N.E.2d 851 .

2003Our inquiry, however, does not end here. {¶ 25} “[A]n employee is entitled to maintain a Greeley claim against his employer whether or not the employee complies with the dictates of R.C. 4113.52 if he can identify a source of public policy separate from the public policy embodied in R.C. 4113.52.” (Emphasis sic.) Doody v. Centerior Energy Corp. (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 673, 679 , 739 N.E.2d 851 .

2021The tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, also known as a Greeley claim, is an -8- exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.” House v. Iacovelli, 159 Ohio St.3d 466 , 2020-Ohio-435 , 152 N.E.3d 178, ¶ 11 , citing Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234 , 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990). {¶ 19} To succeed on a Greeley claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that a clear public policy existed and was manifested either in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation or in the common law (“the clarity eleme

2021The tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, also known as a Greeley claim, is an -8- exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.” House v. Iacovelli, 159 Ohio St.3d 466 , 2020-Ohio-435 , 152 N.E.3d 178, ¶ 11 , citing Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234 , 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990). {¶ 19} To succeed on a Greeley claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that a clear public policy existed and was manifested either in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation or in the common law (“the clarity eleme

2018When construing all material factual allegations in her complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in Shingler’s favor, it is unclear if Provider Services terminated her employment abruptly in order to prevent Shingler from filing a written 7 In Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 149 , 1997-Ohio-219 , 677 N.E.2d 308 , the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the wrongfully discharged employee was entitled to maintain his Greeley claim either in addition to or in lieu of his statutory cause of action.

2005Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St. 3d 134 , 153 , 162 , 1997-Ohio-219 . 2 Appellant also challenges the trial court's findings as to the elements of jeopardy, cause, and overriding justification.

2005Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383 , 385 . {¶ 10} If the moving party meets its initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C), then the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in the rule, in an effort to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact suitable for trial.

2001Appellant timely filed the instant appeal and now assigns the following as error: "[1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of [appellant] in granting [appellees'] [m]otion fort [ sic ] [s]ummary [j]udgment on [appellant's] claims of [r]etaliatory [d]iscrimination. "[2.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of [appellant] in granting [appellees'] [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment on [appellant's] Greeley claim. "[3.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of [appellant] in granting [appellees'] [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment on [appellant's] claim for [i]ntentional [i]nfliction of [e]m

2002Rodgers Co., Inc. (E.D.Va.1998), 998 F.Supp. 657, 665-666 , affirmed without published opinion (C.A.4,1999), 182 F.3d 909 , 1999 WL 486643 .

2002Rodgers Co., Inc. (E.D.Va.1998), 998 F.Supp. 657, 665-666 , affirmed without published opinion (C.A.4,1999), 182 F.3d 909 , 1999 WL 486643 .

2002He argues that the important policy objectives of the FMLA will be jeopardized absent our recognition of a Greeley claim because the Act’s statutory remedies do not provide “make whole tort relief.” Specifically, Wiles notes that the FMLA does not allow recovery of punitive damages and compensatory damages for “anxiety and emotional distress.” See Gavin, supra; Keene v. Rinaldi (M.D.N.C.2000), 127 F.Supp.2d 770, 772-773 ; Settle v. S.W.

2002He argues that the important policy objectives of the FMLA will be jeopardized absent our recognition of a Greeley claim because the Act’s statutory remedies do not provide “make whole tort relief.” Specifically, Wiles notes that the FMLA does not allow recovery of punitive damages and compensatory damages for “anxiety and emotional distress.” See Gavin, supra; Keene v. Rinaldi (M.D.N.C.2000), 127 F.Supp.2d 770, 772-773 ; Settle v. S.W.

1997Id. at 261-262 . 6 This court’s creation of a Greeley claim based on the federal policy to promote “workplace safety” permits an employee to do in Ohio courts that which OSHA forbids in federal court — to bring a private cause of action.

1997Id. at 261-262 . 6 This court’s creation of a Greeley claim based on the federal policy to promote “workplace safety” permits an employee to do in Ohio courts that which OSHA forbids in federal court — to bring a private cause of action.

1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature’s expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’ ” Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 5

1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature’s expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’ ” Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 5

1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature’s expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’ ” Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 5

1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature’s expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’ ” Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 5

1997This conclusion is supported by a number of our prior cases, including Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131 , 543 N.E.2d 1212 ; Kerans v. Porter Paint Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 486 , 575 N.E.2d 428 ; and Collins, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d 65 , 652 N.E.2d 653 .

1997This conclusion is supported by a number of our prior cases, including Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131 , 543 N.E.2d 1212 ; Kerans v. Porter Paint Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 486 , 575 N.E.2d 428 ; and Collins, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d 65 , 652 N.E.2d 653 .

1997Disabilities (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 252 , 594 N.E.2d 959 , the appellate court determined that an age discrimination claim under former R.C. 4101.17(A) provided remedies as broad as those available under Greeley and, therefore, a Greeley claim was unavailable.

1997Disabilities (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 252 , 594 N.E.2d 959 , the appellate court determined that an age discrimination claim under former R.C. 4101.17(A) provided remedies as broad as those available under Greeley and, therefore, a Greeley claim was unavailable.

1997Id. at 489 , 575 N.E.2d at 431 . {¶ 51} Recently, in Collins, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d 65 , 652 N.E.2d 653 , we recognized the right of an employee to maintain a Greeley claim based upon sexual harassment/discrimination in the workplace.

1997Id. at 489 , 575 N.E.2d at 431 . {¶ 51} Recently, in Collins, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d 65 , 652 N.E.2d 653 , we recognized the right of an employee to maintain a Greeley claim based upon sexual harassment/discrimination in the workplace.

1997For the reasons expressed in the dissent to Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 299-302 , 662 N.E.2d 264, 278-280 , I would find that Structural Fibers satisfied its burden under summary judgment when it repeatedly asserted that it was entitled to judgment as to Kulch’s entire R.C. 4113.52 whistleblower claim.

1997For the reasons expressed in the dissent to Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 299-302 , 662 N.E.2d 264, 278-280 , I would find that Structural Fibers satisfied its burden under summary judgment when it repeatedly asserted that it was entitled to judgment as to Kulch’s entire R.C. 4113.52 whistleblower claim.

2026They assert that 19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Ungerbuehler’s injury occurred outside of her employment and she failed to pursue a workers’ compensation claim within months of her injury. {¶61} To be sure, Sutton held that R.C. 4123.90 “expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees, including injured employees who have not filed, instituted, or pursued a workers’ compensation claim.” Sutton, 2011-Ohio-2723, at ¶ 22 .

2026They assert that 19 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Ungerbuehler’s injury occurred outside of her employment and she failed to pursue a workers’ compensation claim within months of her injury. {¶61} To be sure, Sutton held that R.C. 4123.90 “expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees, including injured employees who have not filed, instituted, or pursued a workers’ compensation claim.” Sutton, 2011-Ohio-2723, at ¶ 22 .