efficacy of the chosen defense in Georgia

2016See, e.g., Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 368 (2) (a) ( 711 SE2d 660 ) (2011) (“The fact that [defendant], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.”). 3.

2016See, e.g., Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 368 (2) (a) ( 711 SE2d 660 ) (2011) (“The fact that [defendant], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.”). 3.

2022Of course, “[e]ffectiveness is not judged by hindsight or by the result.”15 It is not a ground for reversal that defense counsel made a strategic decision that the positive aspects of Smith’s testimony outweighed the negative aspects, and the fact 14 Browne v. State, 261 Ga. App. 648, 649 (2) ( 583 SE2d 496 ) (2003). 15 Carmichael v. State, 353 Ga. App. 64 , 74 (3) (b) ( 836 SE2d 184 ) (2019) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 9 that, in hindsight, Massingill and trial counsel now question “the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.”16 (d) Lastly, Mas

2022Of course, “[e]ffectiveness is not judged by hindsight or by the result.”15 It is not a ground for reversal that defense counsel made a strategic decision that the positive aspects of Smith’s testimony outweighed the negative aspects, and the fact 14 Browne v. State, 261 Ga. App. 648, 649 (2) ( 583 SE2d 496 ) (2003). 15 Carmichael v. State, 353 Ga. App. 64 , 74 (3) (b) ( 836 SE2d 184 ) (2019) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 9 that, in hindsight, Massingill and trial counsel now question “the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.”16 (d) Lastly, Mas

2013In light of the damaging evidence against Williams, it is not a ground for reversal that his lawyers made a strategic decision that the positive aspects of the evidence would outweigh the negative, “and the fact that [Williams], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.” Chapman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 514, 519-520 (1) (e) ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (footnotes omitted). (i) Finally, Williams complains that, once his lawyers believed that he intended to testify at the sentencing hearing in an inappropriate manner notwithstanding

2013In light of the damaging evidence against Williams, it is not a ground for reversal that his lawyers made a strategic decision that the positive aspects of the evidence would outweigh the negative, “and the fact that [Williams], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.” Chapman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 514, 519-520 (1) (e) ( 733 SE2d 848 ) (2012) (footnotes omitted). (i) Finally, Williams complains that, once his lawyers believed that he intended to testify at the sentencing hearing in an inappropriate manner notwithstanding

2013But decisions with respect to testifying in one’s own defense are tactical ones “to be made by the defendant himself after consultation with his trial counsel[,] and there is no general requirement that a trial court interject itself into that decision-making process.” Burton v. State, 263 Ga. 725, 728 (6) ( 438 SE2d 83 ) (1994) (citations omitted).

2013But decisions with respect to testifying in one’s own defense are tactical ones “to be made by the defendant himself after consultation with his trial counsel[,] and there is no general requirement that a trial court interject itself into that decision-making process.” Burton v. State, 263 Ga. 725, 728 (6) ( 438 SE2d 83 ) (1994) (citations omitted).

2013See Woods v. State, 271 Ga. 452 (2) (b) ( 519 SE2d 918 ) (1999) (work in meeting with defendant and interviewing witnesses shows trial counsel adequately prepared for trial); see also Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 368 (2) (a) ( 711 SE2d 660 ) (2011) (“The fact that [defendant], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.”). (g) Hall next claims he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to use prior inconsistent statements to impeach witnesses at trial and argue the strongest points of

2013See Woods v. State, 271 Ga. 452 (2) (b) ( 519 SE2d 918 ) (1999) (work in meeting with defendant and interviewing witnesses shows trial counsel adequately prepared for trial); see also Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 368 (2) (a) ( 711 SE2d 660 ) (2011) (“The fact that [defendant], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.”). (g) Hall next claims he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to use prior inconsistent statements to impeach witnesses at trial and argue the strongest points of

2012Such a strategic decision is not a ground for reversal,27 and 25 (Punctuation omitted.) Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 825-826 (2) ( 681 SE2d 248 ) (2009). 26 See generally OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2) (“Evidence that the [testifying] defendant has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted [for purposes of impeachment] if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more . . . if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant”). 27 See Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814-815 (2) (c) (

2012Such a strategic decision is not a ground for reversal,27 and 25 (Punctuation omitted.) Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 825-826 (2) ( 681 SE2d 248 ) (2009). 26 See generally OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2) (“Evidence that the [testifying] defendant has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted [for purposes of impeachment] if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more . . . if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant”). 27 See Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814-815 (2) (c) (

2012Such a strategic decision is not a ground for reversal,27 and 25 (Punctuation omitted.) Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 825-826 (2) ( 681 SE2d 248 ) (2009). 26 See generally OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2) (“Evidence that the [testifying] defendant has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted [for purposes of impeachment] if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more . . . if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant”). 27 See Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814-815 (2) (c) (

2012Such a strategic decision is not a ground for reversal,27 and 25 (Punctuation omitted.) Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 825-826 (2) ( 681 SE2d 248 ) (2009). 26 See generally OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (2) (“Evidence that the [testifying] defendant has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted [for purposes of impeachment] if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more . . . if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant”). 27 See Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812, 814-815 (2) (c) (

2011See Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235 (2) ( 647 SE2d 48 ) (2007).

2011See Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235 (2) ( 647 SE2d 48 ) (2007).