futility exception in Georgia

2017See id. at 438 (“Even where a litigant would be required to return to the same administrative body that had already denied it relief, . . . the futility exception does not apply if the issue presented is not the same as the issue previously decided adversely to the litigant.”).13 13 Shelley’s failure to seek or obtain a decision from a local administrative agency influences the process by which he can appeal the superior court’s decision to this Court.

2017See id. at 438 (“Even where a litigant would be required to return to the same administrative body that had already denied it relief, . . . the futility exception does not apply if the issue presented is not the same as the issue previously decided adversely to the litigant.”). 13 Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to Tyrone on Shelley’s as-applied claims, although we do so for a different reason than that relied on by the superior court.

2017See Reed v. Reed, 295 Ga. 574, 578 ( 761 SE2d 326 ) (2014) (“We ‘may affirm the judgment of a lower court so long as it is right for any reason.’ ” (citation omitted)). 14 3.

2017See Reed v. Reed, 295 Ga. 574, 578 ( 761 SE2d 326 ) (2014) (“We ‘may affirm the judgment of a lower court so long as it is right for any reason.’ ” (citation omitted)). 14 3.

2013Further, Schindler argues that even though the trial court did not expressly mention the futility doctrine in its summary judgment order, it is nevertheless appropriate for us to affirm the trial court’s order under the “right for any reason” rule. 10 As our Supreme Court recently explained “‘(A) grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason, whether stated or unstated in the trial court’s order, so long as the movant raised the issue in the trial court and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.’ Anderson v. Jones, 322 Ga. App. ___ , ___ n. 2 ( 745 SE2d 787

2013Further, Schindler argues that even though the trial court did not expressly mention the futility doctrine in its summary judgment order, it is nevertheless appropriate for us to affirm the trial court’s order under the “right for any reason” rule. 10 As our Supreme Court recently explained “‘(A) grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason, whether stated or unstated in the trial court’s order, so long as the movant raised the issue in the trial court and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.’ Anderson v. Jones, 322 Ga. App. ___ , ___ n. 2 ( 745 SE2d 787

2012Additionally, “[e]nforcing the statute according to its terms also serves the salutary function of eliminating the need for courts to evaluate, as this court is asked to do in this case, whether failing to make a demand was excusable.” Albers, 31 P3d at 829 (F) (1) (b) (¶ 33). 32 See OCGA § 14-11-801 (3) (requiring, before a member commences a derivative action, that “[90] days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the member has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the limited liability company or unless irreparable injury to the limited liability company

2012Additionally, “[e]nforcing the statute according to its terms also serves the salutary function of eliminating the need for courts to evaluate, as this court is asked to do in this case, whether failing to make a demand was excusable.” Albers, 31 P3d at 829 (F) (1) (b) (¶ 33). 32 See OCGA § 14-11-801 (3) (requiring, before a member commences a derivative action, that “[90] days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the member has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the limited liability company or unless irreparable injury to the limited liability company

2012Partners L.P., 31 P3d 821, 829 (F) (1) (b) (¶ 33) (Ariz. 2001) (reviewing similar statute and holding that “[t]empting as it might be to imply a futility exception, we must follow the language of [the statute], which is clear and admits of no exception”); Allen v. Ferrera, 540 SE2d 761, 765 (I) (N.C. 2000) (reviewing similar statute and declining to apply futility exception).

2012Partners L.P., 31 P3d 821, 829 (F) (1) (b) (¶ 33) (Ariz. 2001) (reviewing similar statute and holding that “[t]empting as it might be to imply a futility exception, we must follow the language of [the statute], which is clear and admits of no exception”); Allen v. Ferrera, 540 SE2d 761, 765 (I) (N.C. 2000) (reviewing similar statute and declining to apply futility exception).

2012Additionally, “[e]nforcing the statute according to its terms also serves the salutary function of eliminating the need for courts to evaluate, as this court is asked to do in this case, whether failing to make a demand was excusable.” Albers, 31 P3d at 829 (F) (1) (b) (¶ 33). 32 See OCGA § 14-11-801 (3) (requiring, before a member commences a derivative action, that “[90] days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the member has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the limited liability company or unless irreparable injury to the limited liability company

2011Our Supreme Court applied the futility exception in Glynn County Bd. of Ed. v. Lane, 261 Ga. 544, 545-546 (1), 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991), a case materially similar to the present one.

2011Our Supreme Court applied the futility exception in Glynn County Bd. of Ed. v. Lane, 261 Ga. 544, 545-546 (1), 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991), a case materially similar to the present one.