local ordinance requirement in Georgia

2017See, e.g., Haralson County, 291 Ga. at 323 (citing Wansley to apply the local-ordinance requirement to the county zoning board’s denial of a business permit based on a zoning violation). “[I]t is important that the Court refute its reasoning [in a mistaken decision] to ensure that the case can no longer be cited in efforts to pollute other streams of our law.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647 .

2017See, e.g., Haralson County, 291 Ga. at 323 (citing Wansley to apply the local- ordinance requirement to the county zoning board’s denial of a business permit based on a zoning violation). “[I]t is important that the Court refute its reasoning [in a mistaken decision] to ensure that the case can no longer be cited in efforts to pollute other streams of our law.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647 .

2017See, e.g., Haralson County, 291 Ga. at 323 (citing Wansley to apply the local-ordinance requirement to the county zoning board’s denial of a business permit based on a zoning violation). “[I]t is important that the Court refute its reasoning [in a mistaken decision] to ensure that the case can no longer be cited in efforts to pollute other streams of our law.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647 .

2017See, e.g., Haralson County, 291 Ga. at 323 (citing Wansley to apply the local- ordinance requirement to the county zoning board’s denial of a business permit based on a zoning violation). “[I]t is important that the Court refute its reasoning [in a mistaken decision] to ensure that the case can no longer be cited in efforts to pollute other streams of our law.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 647 .

2017We turn next to the remaining stare decisis factors — the age of the precedent, the reliance it has induced, and its workability See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “ ‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’ ” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2017We turn next to the remaining stare decisis factors — the age of the precedent, the reliance it has induced, and its workability See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “ ‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’ ” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2017See Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793 .

2017See Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793 .

2017See Presnell, 112 Ga. App. at 579 .

2017See Presnell, 112 Ga. App. at 579 .

2017See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245 Ga. 794, 795 ( 267 SE2d 234 ) (1980) 5 We note at the outset of this discussion that the initial cases expressing the local-ordinance requirement did not involve zoning variances, but rather conditional or special use permits.

2017See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245 Ga. 794, 795 ( 267 SE2d 234 ) (1980) 5 We note at the outset of this discussion that the initial cases expressing the local-ordinance requirement did not involve zoning variances, but rather conditional or special use permits.

2017Compare Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 642 ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (explaining that overruling the line of precedent at issue would undermine numerous intergovernmental contracts).

2017Compare Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 642 ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (explaining that overruling the line of precedent at issue would undermine numerous intergovernmental contracts).

2022Although [that precedent’s] bright-line test is not ‘unworkable,’ neither is the alternative—applying the familiar and usual rules of evidence, which trial courts routinely do every day.”); Flowers, 300 Ga. at 833 (“[A]lthough the local-ordinance requirement is not unworkable, it is not as workable as the correct rule.”); Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291, 298 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014) (“[T]he usual rule in habeas cases—that the 68 In that vein, the dissent compares the current out-of-time appeal system to a world in which only habeas exists and argues that the current out-of-time appeal system

2018The Supreme Court then stated, "it is not clear that conditional and special use permit cases are meaningfully different from variance cases in [the local-ordinance requirement] context, at least in cases where the zoning board must apply a set of factors set out in the zoning ordinance to the specific facts of the conditional or special use request." Id.

2017We consider first the most important of these factors — the soundness of the precedent’s reasoning — and we conclude that it “cuts most strongly against retaining [the local-ordinance requirement].” Woodard, 296 Ga. at 813 . (a) The local-ordinance requirement conflicts with OCGA § 5-4-1 and this Court’s interpretation and application of that statute in non-zoning contexts.

2017We turn next to the remaining stare decisis factors — the age of the precedent, the reliance it has induced, and its workability See Woodard, 296 Ga. at 812 . (a) First, the local-ordinance requirement is “ ‘neither ancient nor entrenched.’ ” Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) ( 796 SE2d 261 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2022Although [that precedent’s] bright-line test is not ‘unworkable,’ neither is the alternative—applying the familiar and usual rules of evidence, which trial courts routinely do every day.”); Flowers, 300 Ga. at 833 (“[A]lthough the local-ordinance requirement is not unworkable, it is not as workable as the correct rule.”); Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291, 298 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014) (“[T]he usual rule in habeas cases—that the 68 In that vein, the dissent compares the current out-of-time appeal system to a world in which only habeas exists and argues that the current out-of-time appeal system

2022Although [that precedent’s] bright-line test is not ‘unworkable,’ neither is the alternative—applying the familiar and usual rules of evidence, which trial courts routinely do every day.”); Flowers, 300 Ga. at 833 (“[A]lthough the local-ordinance requirement is not unworkable, it is not as workable as the correct rule.”); Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291, 298 ( 766 SE2d 803 ) (2014) (“[T]he usual rule in habeas cases—that the 68 In that vein, the dissent compares the current out-of-time appeal system to a world in which only habeas exists and argues that the current out-of-time appeal system

2018By the same token, since the decision-making process in Flowers is similar to the process used here, we find that Flowers is applicable. 7 ( 249 SE2d 38 ) (1978) (same); Rogers v. Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 121-122 (4) ( 137 SE2d 668 ) (1964) (“A governmental agency entrusted with the licensing power functions as a legislature when it prescribes these standards, but the same agency acts as a judicial body when it makes a determination that a specific applicant has or has not satisfied them.”).

2018By the same token, since the decision-making process in Flowers is similar to the process used here, we find that Flowers is applicable. 7 ( 249 SE2d 38 ) (1978) (same); Rogers v. Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 121-122 (4) ( 137 SE2d 668 ) (1964) (“A governmental agency entrusted with the licensing power functions as a legislature when it prescribes these standards, but the same agency acts as a judicial body when it makes a determination that a specific applicant has or has not satisfied them.”).

2017Although the City and Kerley defendants point to this distinction as a reason to abandon the local-ordinance requirement, it is not clear that conditional and special use permit cases are meaningfully different from variance cases in this context, at least in cases where the zoning board must apply a set of factors set out in the zoning ordinance to the specific facts of the conditional or special use request. 15 (noting that “[t]he city does not argue that the [special use permit] decision of the city council was a judicial decision”); Pruitt v. Meeks, 226 Ga. 661, 662 ( 177 SE2d 41 ) (1970)

2017Although the City and Kerley defendants point to this distinction as a reason to abandon the local-ordinance requirement, it is not clear that conditional and special use permit cases are meaningfully different from variance cases in this context, at least in cases where the zoning board must apply a set of factors set out in the zoning ordinance to the specific facts of the conditional or special use request. 15 (noting that “[t]he city does not argue that the [special use permit] decision of the city council was a judicial decision”); Pruitt v. Meeks, 226 Ga. 661, 662 ( 177 SE2d 41 ) (1970)

2001See Karwoski, 226 Ga.App. at 63 , 486 S.E.2d 39 , and cases cited therein; Aetna Cas. &c., Co. v. Prather, 59 Ga.App. at 797(1), 2 S.E.2d 115 (1939). [2] For the purposes of this decision, the application of a local ordinance to determine employee/independent contractor status will be referred to as the local ordinance rule.

2001See Karwoski, 226 Ga.App. at 63 , 486 S.E.2d 39 , and cases cited therein; Aetna Cas. &c., Co. v. Prather, 59 Ga.App. at 797(1), 2 S.E.2d 115 (1939). [2] For the purposes of this decision, the application of a local ordinance to determine employee/independent contractor status will be referred to as the local ordinance rule.

2001See Karwoski, 226 Ga.App. at 63 , 486 S.E.2d 39 , and cases cited therein; Aetna Cas. &c., Co. v. Prather, 59 Ga.App. at 797(1), 2 S.E.2d 115 (1939). [2] For the purposes of this decision, the application of a local ordinance to determine employee/independent contractor status will be referred to as the local ordinance rule.

2001See Karwoski, 226 Ga.App. at 63 , 486 S.E.2d 39 , and cases cited therein; Aetna Cas. &c., Co. v. Prather, 59 Ga.App. at 797(1), 2 S.E.2d 115 (1939). [2] For the purposes of this decision, the application of a local ordinance to determine employee/independent contractor status will be referred to as the local ordinance rule.

1996As to proximate cause and AHA's claim of remoteness as a matter of law in this summary judgment posture of the case, "`(t)he inquiry is not whether the defendant's conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery.'" Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga.App. 672, 673 , 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985), quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, 168 Ga.App. 688, 689 , 309 S.E.2d 865 (1983).

1996As to proximate cause and AHA's claim of remoteness as a matter of law in this summary judgment posture of the case, "`(t)he inquiry is not whether the defendant's conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery.'" Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga.App. 672, 673 , 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985), quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, 168 Ga.App. 688, 689 , 309 S.E.2d 865 (1983).

1996As to proximate cause and AHA's claim of remoteness as a matter of law in this summary judgment posture of the case, "`(t)he inquiry is not whether the defendant's conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery.'" Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga.App. 672, 673 , 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985), quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, 168 Ga.App. 688, 689 , 309 S.E.2d 865 (1983).

1996As to proximate cause and AHA's claim of remoteness as a matter of law in this summary judgment posture of the case, "`(t)he inquiry is not whether the defendant's conduct constituted a cause in fact of the injury, but rather whether the causal connection between that conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery.'" Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga.App. 672, 673 , 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985), quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis, 168 Ga.App. 688, 689 , 309 S.E.2d 865 (1983).