7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2025–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wasserman v. Franklin Countygreen2 sentences2026See Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc., 313 Ga. at 382-83 (1)(a) (“[T]he fact that BVMF’s corporate mission includes an interest in advocating for the rights of Georgia voters by engaging in litigation does not, in and of itself, give it direct standing to challenge SB 9, as if it were a voter.”) Moreover, the doctrine of organizational standing does not exempt TAI from “[t]he requirement that a plaintiff must assert a violation of her rights to maintain an action in Georgia courts ... [which] is the bedrock requirement for invoking the judicial power granted by the Georgia Constitution.” Wasserma 2026See also Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 640 (II)(A)(2) ( 911 SE2d 583 ) (2025) (“The requirement that a plaintiff must assert a violation of her rights to maintain an action in Georgia courts ... is the bedrock requirement for invoking the judicial power granted by the Georgia Constitution.”). (a) Associational standing. | 6 | 6 |
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. ETERNAL VIGILANCE ACTION, INC. (Two Cases)green2 sentences2026A plaintiff must assert the violation of his own rights and cannot merely vindicate the rights of another. has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.” 11 Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Eternal Vigilance Action (hereafter, “RNC”), 321 Ga. 771, 775 (2) ( 917 SE2d 125 ) (2025) (citation modified). 2026See RNC, 321 Ga. at 775 (2) (“A plaintiff must assert the violation of his own rights and cannot merely vindicate the rights of another.”). | 3 | 3 |
Sjn Properties, LLC. v. Fulton County Board of Assessorsgreen2 sentences2025Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 799 (2) (b) (ii) n.7 ( 770 SE2d 832 ) (2015) (after noting precedent abrogating the ability to prosecute injunction actions against state officials, stating that “to the extent these cases simply confirmed a taxpayer’s standing to seek to enforce a public duty by way of some viable cause of action, they remain good law”). 30 requirement that a plaintiff must assert the violation of his own individual right, as opposed to a community-stakeholder right, to challenge actions by the State. 2025Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 799 (2) (b) (ii) n.7 ( 770 SE2d 832 ) (2015) (after noting precedent abrogating the ability to prosecute injunction actions against state officials, stating that “to the extent these cases simply confirmed a taxpayer’s standing to seek to enforce a public duty by way of some viable cause of action, they remain good law”). 30 requirement that a plaintiff must assert the violation of his own individual right, as opposed to a community-stakeholder right, to challenge actions by the State. | 2 | 2 |
BLACK VOTERS MATTER FUND, INC. v. KEMP, GOVERNOR (Five Cases)green1 sentence2026See Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc., 313 Ga. at 382-83 (1)(a) (“[T]he fact that BVMF’s corporate mission includes an interest in advocating for the rights of Georgia voters by engaging in litigation does not, in and of itself, give it direct standing to challenge SB 9, as if it were a voter.”) Moreover, the doctrine of organizational standing does not exempt TAI from “[t]he requirement that a plaintiff must assert a violation of her rights to maintain an action in Georgia courts ... [which] is the bedrock requirement for invoking the judicial power granted by the Georgia Constitution.” Wasserma | 1 | 1 |
COBB COUNTY v. FLOAMgreen2 sentences2025See also Floam, 319 Ga. at 94 (1). 8 2. 2025See also Floam, 319 Ga. at 94 (1).8 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'n
green
2 sentences2026The trial court concluded that GAHBA had standing to sue under the federal doctrine of associational standing, as set forth in Aldridge v. Ga. Hospitality & Travel Association, 251 Ga. 234 ( 304 SE2d 708 ) (1983).9 However, the Supreme Court of 9 “Associational standing is essentially a less-demanding version of third-party standing, permitting a plaintiff to sue to vindicate the rights of someone else, even if the plaintiff has suffered no injury.” RNC, 321 Ga. at 777 (2)(b). 2026The trial court concluded that GAHBA had standing to sue under the federal doctrine of associational standing, as set forth in Aldridge v. Ga. Hospitality & Travel Association, 251 Ga. 234 ( 304 SE2d 708 ) (1983).9 However, the Supreme Court of 9 “Associational standing is essentially a less-demanding version of third-party standing, permitting a plaintiff to sue to vindicate the rights of someone else, even if the plaintiff has suffered no injury.” RNC, 321 Ga. at 777 (2)(b). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Powers v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2025Those terms are shorthand for the basic standing rule that we identified there and here — that a plaintiff must assert a violation of her legal rights — and distinct from the Article III standing re- quirement that a plaintiff must assert an “injury in fact” to sue in federal court. 35 standing.” As we explained above, the federal doctrine of third-party standing allows a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting that rights of another person who is not a party to the litigation have been violated, as long as he can establish an “injury in fact,” a “close relation to the third party,” and s 2025Those terms are shorthand for the basic standing rule that we identified there and here — that a plaintiff must assert a violation of her legal rights — and distinct from the Article III standing re- quirement that a plaintiff must assert an “injury in fact” to sue in federal court. 35 relation to the third party,” and some “hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 - 411 (III). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.