7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences1986This presumption of insanity canceled the previously existing presumption of sanity and made it necessary for the state to rebut that presumption, Butler v. State, supra, 252 Ga. at 137-138 , by producing evidence, inter alia, "of the mental condition of the accused at the time of the offense, or that before and after the offense which tends to show his or her mental condition at the time of the offense. [Cit.]" Id. at 138 . 1986This presumption of insanity canceled the previously existing presumption of sanity and made it necessary for the state to rebut that presumption, Butler v. State, supra, 252 Ga. at 137-138 , by producing evidence, inter alia, "of the mental condition of the accused at the time of the offense, or that before and after the offense which tends to show his or her mental condition at the time of the offense. [Cit.]" Id. at 138 . | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences1984The question before us, as in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 69 (c) ( 295 SE2d 727 ) (1982), is "on whom the burden of proof lay in this case. . . ." The majority holds that "an order of the Probate Court finding one a `mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment,' OCGA § 37-3-1 (12) (Code Ann. § 88-501), cancels a previously existing presumption of sanity and raises a presumption of insanity." (Opinion, p. 137) In Brown , we recognized that "`special plea of insanity' is a misnomer because the issue is one of incompetence [to stand trial] rather than insanity. 1984The question before us, as in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 69 (c) ( 295 SE2d 727 ) (1982), is "on whom the burden of proof lay in this case. . . ." The majority holds that "an order of the Probate Court finding one a `mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment,' OCGA § 37-3-1 (12) (Code Ann. § 88-501), cancels a previously existing presumption of sanity and raises a presumption of insanity." (Opinion, p. 137) In Brown , we recognized that "`special plea of insanity' is a misnomer because the issue is one of incompetence [to stand trial] rather than insanity. | 1 | 1 |
State of Georgia v. Campgreen2 sentences1984See State of Ga. v. Camp, 189 Ga. 209, 210 (2) ( 6 SE2d 299 ) (1939); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 799 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944). 1984See State of Ga. v. Camp, 189 Ga. 209, 210 (2) ( 6 SE2d 299 ) (1939); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 799 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Sinclair v. Friedlandergreen2 sentences1984See State of Ga. v. Camp, 189 Ga. 209, 210 (2) ( 6 SE2d 299 ) (1939); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 799 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944). 1984See State of Ga. v. Camp, 189 Ga. 209, 210 (2) ( 6 SE2d 299 ) (1939); Sinclair v. Friedlander, 197 Ga. 797, 799 ( 30 SE2d 398 ) (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Stategreen2 sentences1984In Gilbert v. State, 235 Ga. 501, 502 ( 220 SE2d 262 ) (1975), we held that a defendant's administrative release from hospitalization under (OCGA § 37-3-85 (Code Ann. § 88-506.6)) cancelled a previously existing presumption of insanity. 1984In Gilbert v. State, 235 Ga. 501, 502 ( 220 SE2d 262 ) (1975), we held that a defendant's administrative release from hospitalization under (OCGA § 37-3-85 (Code Ann. § 88-506.6)) cancelled a previously existing presumption of insanity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McNair v. Haley
green
1 sentence2000Id. at 1276 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
FRED F. FRENCH MANAGEMENT CO. v. Long
green
2 sentences1987Co. v. Long, 169 Ga. App. 702 (1) *42 ( 314 SE2d 666 ) (1984), I would hold that the trial court's refusal to give the appellants' requested instruction on accident establishes ground for a new trial. 1987Co. v. Long, 169 Ga. App. 702 (1) *42 ( 314 SE2d 666 ) (1984), I would hold that the trial court's refusal to give the appellants' requested instruction on accident establishes ground for a new trial. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Echols v. State
green
2 sentences1984Echols v. State, 149 Ga. App. 620 ( 255 SE2d 92 ) (1979). 1984Echols v. State, 149 Ga. App. 620 ( 255 SE2d 92 ) (1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Meriwether v. Bird
neutral
1 sentence1931Its power to do this can not ordinarily be traced to any particular statute, and exists by virtue of its general equitable authority over its officers and suitors, though in some States the matter is regulated by statute, which', however, would not seem to materially change the previously existing doctrine, except perhaps to make set-off more a matter of right.” The author cites in note 3, among other authorities, Meriwether v. Bird, 9 Ga. 594 , and Langston v. Roby, 68 Ga. 406 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Langston v. Roby
green
1 sentence1931Its power to do this can not ordinarily be traced to any particular statute, and exists by virtue of its general equitable authority over its officers and suitors, though in some States the matter is regulated by statute, which', however, would not seem to materially change the previously existing doctrine, except perhaps to make set-off more a matter of right.” The author cites in note 3, among other authorities, Meriwether v. Bird, 9 Ga. 594 , and Langston v. Roby, 68 Ga. 406 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.