Southern claim in Georgia

2017Riley 1 (“the Commissioner”) to recognize Southern as a “public utility” under OCGA § 48-5-511 and to accept Southern’s ad valorem property tax returns. 2 In Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 290 Ga. 204 ( 719 SE2d 473 ) (2011) (“Southern I”), we reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Southern’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Southern’s claim was not barred by sovereign immunity.

2017Riley 1 (“the Commissioner”) to recognize Southern as a “public utility” under OCGA § 48-5-511 and to accept Southern’s ad valorem property tax returns. 2 In Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 290 Ga. 204 ( 719 SE2d 473 ) (2011) (“Southern I”), we reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Southern’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Southern’s claim was not barred by sovereign immunity.

2023Under Massiah, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel “is violated by the admission of incriminating statements which a government agent deliberately elicits after indictment and in the absence of counsel.” Higuera-Hernandez v. State, 289 Ga. 553, 554 (2) ( 714 SE2d 236 ) (2011).

2023Under Massiah, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel “is violated by the admission of incriminating statements which a government agent deliberately elicits after indictment and in the absence of counsel.” Higuera-Hernandez v. State, 289 Ga. 553, 554 (2) ( 714 SE2d 236 ) (2011).

2021See Danjor, 272 Ga. App. at 698 (2); Feinour, 255 Ga. App. at 653 -654 14 (1); Clonts, 172 Ga. App. at 722 (1).

2021Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order holding that the statute of limitation had run on Southern’s claim for breach of contract under the express one-year warranty. (b) Southern next argues that the trial court erred in applying a “heightened standard” of fraud to rule that, as a matter of law, Tampa Tank and CCI had not committed fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitation. 16 Where “the gravamen of the underlying action is not a claim of fraud,” the statute of limitation “is tolled only upon a showing of a separate independent actual fraud involving moral turp

2021Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order holding that the statute of limitation had run on Southern’s claim for breach of contract under the express one-year warranty. (b) Southern next argues that the trial court erred in applying a “heightened standard” of fraud to rule that, as a matter of law, Tampa Tank and CCI had not committed fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitation. 16 Where “the gravamen of the underlying action is not a claim of fraud,” the statute of limitation “is tolled only upon a showing of a separate independent actual fraud involving moral turp

2021See Danjor, 272 Ga. App. at 698 (2); Feinour, 255 Ga. App. at 653 -654 14 (1); Clonts, 172 Ga. App. at 722 (1).

2021Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order holding that the statute of limitation had run on Southern’s claim for breach of contract under the express one-year warranty. (b) Southern next argues that the trial court erred in applying a “heightened standard” of fraud to rule that, as a matter of law, Tampa Tank and CCI had not committed fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitation. 16 Where “the gravamen of the underlying action is not a claim of fraud,” the statute of limitation “is tolled only upon a showing of a separate independent actual fraud involving moral turp

2021Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order holding that the statute of limitation had run on Southern’s claim for breach of contract under the express one-year warranty. (b) Southern next argues that the trial court erred in applying a “heightened standard” of fraud to rule that, as a matter of law, Tampa Tank and CCI had not committed fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitation. 16 Where “the gravamen of the underlying action is not a claim of fraud,” the statute of limitation “is tolled only upon a showing of a separate independent actual fraud involving moral turp

2014And as discussed above in footnote 5, Southern’s claim for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner, which might invoke this maxim, is not at issue in this appeal. 16 See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor a

2014And as discussed above in footnote 5, Southern’s claim for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner, which might invoke this maxim, is not at issue in this appeal. 16 See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor a

2014And as discussed above in footnote 5, Southern’s claim for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner, which might invoke this maxim, is not at issue in this appeal. 16 See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor a

2014And as discussed above in footnote 5, Southern’s claim for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner, which might invoke this maxim, is not at issue in this appeal. 16 See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor a

2014See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah to file a lawsuit to abate a public nuisance, where the plaintiff had standing to file such alawsuithimself); Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 508-509

2014See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah to file a lawsuit to abate a public nuisance, where the plaintiff had standing to file such alawsuithimself); Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 508-509

2014See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah to file a lawsuit to abate a public nuisance, where the plaintiff had standing to file such alawsuithimself); Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 508-509

2014See Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 524 ( 630 SE2d 384 ) (2006) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Governor to give the plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit against the Department of Human Resources, where the plaintiff did not need the Governor’s permission to do so); Ungar v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 613-615 ( 163 SE2d 814 ) (1968) (holding that mandamus was unavailable to compel the Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah to file a lawsuit to abate a public nuisance, where the plaintiff had standing to file such alawsuithimself); Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 508-509

2013A trial court may exercise its discretion to exclude “relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 8 Paggett v. The Kroger, Co., 311 Ga. App. 690, 692-693 (2) ( 716 SE2d 792 ) (2011).

2013A trial court may exercise its discretion to exclude “relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 8 Paggett v. The Kroger, Co., 311 Ga. App. 690, 692-693 (2) ( 716 SE2d 792 ) (2011).

1995See Six Flags Over Ga., supra. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Southern’s motion for directed verdict and j.n.o.v., as Southern failed to satisfy its burden of proof on the issue of Hand’s status as a borrowed servant. 2.