Bivens claim in Iowa

2020As noted in Newell v. City of Elgin, the lack of exemplary damages against a municipality in a statutory scheme is a factor in permitting a Bivens claim. 340 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ill.

2020As noted in Newell v. City of Elgin, the lack of exemplary damages against a municipality in a statutory scheme is a factor in permitting a Bivens claim. 340 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ill.

2017In general, the Supreme Court has determined that “[s]o long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 , 122 S. Ct. at 520 ; see also Minneci, 565 U.S. at 129 , 132 S. Ct. at 625 (stating even though other remedies may be “prove less generous” by capping damages, forbidding emotional distress damages, or imposing procedural obstacles, it could not find a “sufficient basis to determine state law inadequate”); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 553 , 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (“In

2017In general, the Supreme Court has determined that “[s]o long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 , 122 S. Ct. at 520 ; see also Minneci, 565 U.S. at 129 , 132 S. Ct. at 625 (stating even though other remedies may be “prove less generous” by capping damages, forbidding emotional distress damages, or imposing procedural obstacles, it could not find a “sufficient basis to determine state law inadequate”); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 553 , 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (“In

2017In general, the Supreme Court has determined that “[s]o long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 , 122 S. Ct. at 520 ; see also Minneci, 565 U.S. at 129 , 132 S. Ct. at 625 (stating even though other remedies may be “prove less generous” by capping damages, forbidding emotional distress damages, or imposing procedural obstacles, it could not find a “sufficient basis to determine state law inadequate”); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 553 , 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (“In

2017In general, the Supreme Court has determined that “[s]o long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 , 122 S. Ct. at 520 ; see also Minneci, 565 U.S. at 129 , 132 S. Ct. at 625 (stating even though other remedies may be “prove less generous” by capping damages, forbidding emotional distress damages, or imposing procedural obstacles, it could not find a “sufficient basis to determine state law inadequate”); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 553 , 127 S. Ct. at 2600 (“In

2017Id.; see Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 , 133–36 (Mont. 2002).

2017Id.; see Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 , 133–36 (Mont. 2002).

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017McCabe v. Macaulay, 551 F. Supp. 2d 771, 785 (N.D.

2017McCabe v. Macaulay, 551 F. Supp. 2d 771, 785 (N.D.

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Straub, 354 S.W.3d 529 , 537–38 (Ky. 2011) (declining to create a Bivens remedy because adequate alternative remedies exist, but noting that the holding was limited to the facts of this case); Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting claim that state constitutional provision barring unreasonable search and seizure is “self-executing” such that the court should imply an action for damages); Rockhouse Mountain Prop.

2017Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Straub, 354 S.W.3d 529 , 537–38 (Ky. 2011) (declining to create a Bivens remedy because adequate alternative remedies exist, but noting that the holding was limited to the facts of this case); Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting claim that state constitutional provision barring unreasonable search and seizure is “self-executing” such that the court should imply an action for damages); Rockhouse Mountain Prop.

2017Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (no implied cause of action for damages under due process clause); State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290, 294 (Ga. 1993) (explaining court is not able to fashion a Georgia Bivens remedy because of sovereign immunity); Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205 (Haw. 1979) (refusing to recognize state Bivens action because state’s sovereign immunity would render any Bivens claim ineffective); St.

2017Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (no implied cause of action for damages under due process clause); State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290, 294 (Ga. 1993) (explaining court is not able to fashion a Georgia Bivens remedy because of sovereign immunity); Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205 (Haw. 1979) (refusing to recognize state Bivens action because state’s sovereign immunity would render any Bivens claim ineffective); St.

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 , 122 S. Ct. 515, 517, 523 (2001) (determining no Bivens remedy unavailable against a private corporation operating a halfway house under government contract); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 , 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) (declaring that no Bivens claim could be brought against a governmental agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 , 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (1988) (stating no Bivens claim available under Due Process clause for employees who were denied Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 , 107 S. Ct. 3054, 30

2017Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (no implied cause of action for damages under due process clause); State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290, 294 (Ga. 1993) (explaining court is not able to fashion a Georgia Bivens remedy because of sovereign immunity); Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205 (Haw. 1979) (refusing to recognize state Bivens action because state’s sovereign immunity would render any Bivens claim ineffective); St.

2017Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (no implied cause of action for damages under due process clause); State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290, 294 (Ga. 1993) (explaining court is not able to fashion a Georgia Bivens remedy because of sovereign immunity); Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205 (Haw. 1979) (refusing to recognize state Bivens action because state’s sovereign immunity would render any Bivens claim ineffective); St.

2017Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Straub, 354 S.W.3d 529 , 537–38 (Ky. 2011) (declining to create a Bivens remedy because adequate alternative remedies exist, but noting that the holding was limited to the facts of this case); Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting claim that state constitutional provision barring unreasonable search and seizure is “self-executing” such that the court should imply an action for damages); Rockhouse Mountain Prop.

2017Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Straub, 354 S.W.3d 529 , 537–38 (Ky. 2011) (declining to create a Bivens remedy because adequate alternative remedies exist, but noting that the holding was limited to the facts of this case); Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting claim that state constitutional provision barring unreasonable search and seizure is “self-executing” such that the court should imply an action for damages); Rockhouse Mountain Prop.

2019Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions, as at common law, prosec

2019Hence, immunity attaches." (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853 , 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford , 13 F. App'x 405 , 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that "[p]rosecutors ... are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process"); *802 Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234 , 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks , 79 F.3d 372 , 376 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In Bivens -type actions, as at common

2019Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions, as at common law, prosec

2019Hence, immunity attaches." (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853 , 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford , 13 F. App'x 405 , 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that "[p]rosecutors ... are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process"); *802 Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234 , 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks , 79 F.3d 372 , 376 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In Bivens -type actions, as at common

2019Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions, as at common law, prosec

2019Hence, immunity attaches." (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853 , 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford , 13 F. App'x 405 , 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that "[p]rosecutors ... are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process"); *802 Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234 , 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks , 79 F.3d 372 , 376 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In Bivens -type actions, as at common

2019Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions, as at common law, prosec

2019Hence, immunity attaches." (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853 , 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford , 13 F. App'x 405 , 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that "[p]rosecutors ... are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process"); *802 Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234 , 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks , 79 F.3d 372 , 376 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In Bivens -type actions, as at common

2019Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions, as at common law, prosec

2019Hence, immunity attaches." (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853 , 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford , 13 F. App'x 405 , 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that "[p]rosecutors ... are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process"); *802 Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234 , 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks , 79 F.3d 372 , 376 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In Bivens -type actions, as at common

2019Hence, immunity attaches.” (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford, 13 F. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that “[p]rosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process”); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In Bivens-type actions, as at common law, prosec

2019Hence, immunity attaches." (Citations omitted.)); Blakely v. United States , 276 F.3d 853 , 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding absolute immunity barred Bivens claim); Benson v. Safford , 13 F. App'x 405 , 407 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding in Bivens action that "[p]rosecutors ... are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the criminal judicial process"); *802 Bolin v. Story , 225 F.3d 1234 , 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding absolute immunity applies to Bivens claims); Lyles v. Sparks , 79 F.3d 372 , 376 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In Bivens -type actions, as at common

2017Ct. 2006) (not recognizing a Bivens claim under state constitution for violation of search and seizure and arguing, among other reasons, enormous financial burden and chilling effect on state officials); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998) .(declining to find that a victims’ rights amendment to the state , constitution was self-executing); Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (summarily noting that Tennessee courts do not recognize state Bivens actions); Spackman ex rel.

2017Ct. 2006) (not recognizing a Bivens claim under state constitution for violation of search and seizure and arguing, among other reasons, enormous financial burden and chilling effect on state officials); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998) .(declining to find that a victims’ rights amendment to the state , constitution was self-executing); Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (summarily noting that Tennessee courts do not recognize state Bivens actions); Spackman ex rel.

2017Ct. 2006) (not recognizing a Bivens claim under state constitution for violation of search and seizure and arguing, among other reasons, enormous financial burden and chilling effect on state officials); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998) .(declining to find that a victims’ rights amendment to the state , constitution was self-executing); Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (summarily noting that Tennessee courts do not recognize state Bivens actions); Spackman ex rel.

2017Ct. 2006) (not recognizing a Bivens claim under state constitution for violation of search and seizure and arguing, among other reasons, enormous financial burden and chilling effect on state officials); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998) .(declining to find that a victims’ rights amendment to the state , constitution was self-executing); Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (summarily noting that Tennessee courts do not recognize state Bivens actions); Spackman ex rel.