7 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2020–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bonagreen2 sentences2021See People v. Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, ¶ 32 (interpreting Elonis as implicitly holding that the intentional or knowing mental state would satisfy the minimum requirements of a “true threat”); People v. Khan, 2018 IL App (2d) 160724, ¶ 36 (same). ¶ 56 Under the guiding principles set forth in Black and Elonis, we construe the phrase “means to communicate” as requiring that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his or her speech, and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. 2020See People v. Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, ¶ 32 (interpreting Elonis as implicitly holding that the intentional or knowing mental state would satisfy the minimum requirements of a “true threat”); People v. Khan, 2018 IL App (2d) 160724, ¶ 36 (same). ¶ 56 Under the guiding principles set forth in Black and Elonis, we construe the phrase “means to communicate” as requiring that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his or her speech, and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. | 5 | 5 |
People v. Khangreen2 sentences2021See People v. Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, ¶ 32 (interpreting Elonis as implicitly holding that the intentional or knowing mental state would satisfy the minimum requirements of a “true threat”); People v. Khan, 2018 IL App (2d) 160724, ¶ 36 (same). ¶ 56 Under the guiding principles set forth in Black and Elonis, we construe the phrase “means to communicate” as requiring that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his or her speech, and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. 2020See People v. Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, ¶ 32 (interpreting Elonis as implicitly holding that the intentional or knowing mental state would satisfy the minimum requirements of a “true threat”); People v. Khan, 2018 IL App (2d) 160724, ¶ 36 (same). ¶ 56 Under the guiding principles set forth in Black and Elonis, we construe the phrase “means to communicate” as requiring that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his or her speech, and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. | 4 | 4 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Other decisions have concluded that Supreme Court precedent subsequent to Black has clarified that a “true threat” includes communication transmitted “ ‘for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, ¶ 30 (quoting Elonis v. U.S., 575 U.S. 723 , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015)). ¶ 34 Recently, our supreme court adopted the view espoused in Bona: -8- “Under the guiding principles set forth in Black and Elonis, we construe the phrase ‘means to communicate’ as requiring that the accused 2020Other decisions have concluded that Supreme Court precedent subsequent to Black has clarified that a “true threat” includes communication transmitted “ ‘for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, ¶ 30 (quoting Elonis v. U.S., 575 U.S. 723 , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015)). ¶ 34 Recently, our supreme court adopted the view espoused in Bona: -8- “Under the guiding principles set forth in Black and Elonis, we construe the phrase ‘means to communicate’ as requiring that the accused | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ashley
green
2 sentences2022For a communication of a defendant to be a “true threat,” the defendant must “be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his or her speech, and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state.” Ashley, 2020 IL 123989, ¶ 56 . 2022Accordingly, “the first amendment exception for a ‘true threat’ includes situations where the speaker understands - 13 - the threatening nature of his or her communication and the import of the words used.” Ashley, 2020 IL 123989, ¶ 56 . ¶ 33 We note some alleged “threats” made by defendant were vague. | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Simon v. Kaplan
neutral
1 sentence2023Moreover, both Simon, - 26 - 321 Ill. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.