Oklahoma rule in Oklahoma

1990Counsel, David Brown, Asst., Paul Porter, Oklahoma City, for appellant. *960 SIMMS, Justice: The single issue to be decided is whether a district court, on appeal of a decision by an Administrative Agency in an individual proceeding, correctly entered an award of attorney fees against that agency based upon a finding that the agency acted unconscionably in defending the action, based upon the Oklahoma exception to the American Rule as stated in City National Bank and Trust Company v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4 (1977).

1990Counsel, David Brown, Asst., Paul Porter, Oklahoma City, for appellant. *960 SIMMS, Justice: The single issue to be decided is whether a district court, on appeal of a decision by an Administrative Agency in an individual proceeding, correctly entered an award of attorney fees against that agency based upon a finding that the agency acted unconscionably in defending the action, based upon the Oklahoma exception to the American Rule as stated in City National Bank and Trust Company v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4 (1977).

2010However, every Oklahoma defendant who is indicted by a grand jury has a right to a subsequent preliminary hearing, where he is granted the right to confront witnesses. 22 O.S.2001, § 524; Stone v. Hope, 1971 OK CR 302 , 488 P.2d 616, 618 .

2010However, every Oklahoma defendant who is indicted by a grand jury has a right to a subsequent preliminary hearing, where he is granted the right to confront witnesses. 22 O.S.2001, § 524; Stone v. Hope, 1971 OK CR 302 , 488 P.2d 616, 618 .

2009See Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77 , 743 P.2d 1053 ; Bishop v. Carroll, 1994 OK CIV APP 87 , 872 P.2d 407 ; Robison v. Stokes, 1994 OK CIV APP 85 , 882 P.2d 1105 .

2009See Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77 , 743 P.2d 1053 ; Bishop v. Carroll, 1994 OK CIV APP 87 , 872 P.2d 407 ; Robison v. Stokes, 1994 OK CIV APP 85 , 882 P.2d 1105 .

2009See Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77 , 743 P.2d 1053 ; Bishop v. Carroll, 1994 OK CIV APP 87 , 872 P.2d 407 ; Robison v. Stokes, 1994 OK CIV APP 85 , 882 P.2d 1105 .

2009See Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77 , 743 P.2d 1053 ; Bishop v. Carroll, 1994 OK CIV APP 87 , 872 P.2d 407 ; Robison v. Stokes, 1994 OK CIV APP 85 , 882 P.2d 1105 .

2009See Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77 , 743 P.2d 1053 ; Bishop v. Carroll, 1994 OK CIV APP 87 , 872 P.2d 407 ; Robison v. Stokes, 1994 OK CIV APP 85 , 882 P.2d 1105 .

2009See Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77 , 743 P.2d 1053 ; Bishop v. Carroll, 1994 OK CIV APP 87 , 872 P.2d 407 ; Robison v. Stokes, 1994 OK CIV APP 85 , 882 P.2d 1105 .

2008Thus, In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate does not present an applicable fact situation, such as here, where either the Husband-Davis relationship was fully consistent with a common-law marriage during the six-month period or a determination of the relationship's void-voidable status as a common-law marriage was necessary. 21 Subsequently, the Court of Civil Appeals in the case of In re Estate of Rogers, 1977 OK CIV APP 9 , ¶ 11, 569 P.2d 536, 538 , expressed the view that Plummer was overruled by In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate 9 In Rogers, the Court found the Oklahoma rule to be that a voidable marriage

2008Thus, In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate does not present an applicable fact situation, such as here, where either the Husband-Davis relationship was fully consistent with a common-law marriage during the six-month period or a determination of the relationship's void-voidable status as a common-law marriage was necessary. 21 Subsequently, the Court of Civil Appeals in the case of In re Estate of Rogers, 1977 OK CIV APP 9 , ¶ 11, 569 P.2d 536, 538 , expressed the view that Plummer was overruled by In re Mo-se-che-he's Estate 9 In Rogers, the Court found the Oklahoma rule to be that a voidable marriage

2008Griffin v. Mullinix, 1997 OK 120 , 947 P.2d 177 .

2008Griffin v. Mullinix, 1997 OK 120 , 947 P.2d 177 .

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Commissioners of Land Office, 1947 OK 49 , ¶ 25, 177 P.2d 503 , 507 for an explanation of the rule “... that where a judgment is rendered without service or notice to defendants, who thereafter file a motion to vacate the same, alleging both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional grounds thereby making a general appearance, the effect of which waives all defects in the citation or notice, and cures any defect in the judgment existing by reason of lack of service of summons or other notice.

2006Richardson Machinery Co. v. Scott, 276 U.S. 128, 133 , 48 S.Ct. 264 , 72 L.Ed. 497 (1928), for Oklahoma’s rule that since its founding: ... it has been the settled law of Oklahoma that, where a person against whom a judgment is rendered files a petition to vacate the judgment upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant, and the petition is based also on nonjurisdictional grounds, such as those mentioned in subparagraphs fourth and seventh of section 810, the filing of the petition operates as a voluntary general appearance, with the same effect as if such appearance had

2006Richardson Machinery Co. v. Scott, 276 U.S. 128, 133 , 48 S.Ct. 264 , 72 L.Ed. 497 (1928), for Oklahoma’s rule that since its founding: ... it has been the settled law of Oklahoma that, where a person against whom a judgment is rendered files a petition to vacate the judgment upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant, and the petition is based also on nonjurisdictional grounds, such as those mentioned in subparagraphs fourth and seventh of section 810, the filing of the petition operates as a voluntary general appearance, with the same effect as if such appearance had

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2006Co., 2005 OK 48, ¶ 55 , 121 P.3d 1080, 1102 . [32] Cimarron Feeders, 1991 OK 104, at ¶ 16 , 818 P.2d at 903 . [33] 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). [34] 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). [35] We reject plaintiff's argument that the Oklahoma defendants invited a large punitive damages award by telling the jury in closing argument in the punitive damages stage that it would have some discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages. [36] 14A O.S.2001, §§ 1-101 to 9-101. [37] 14A O.S.2001, § 6-111(1). [38] 23 O.S.Supp.2002, § 9.1. [39] We need

2000In Davis v. State, 1968 OK CR 23, ¶ 3 , 437 P.2d 271, 272 , the Court stated: "If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntary, then he must admit it for the jury's consideration and it then becomes the duty of the jury, if the evidence is conflicting, to determine the voluntary nature of the confession." Furthermore, Brewer v. State, 1966 OK CR 58, ¶ 14 , 414 P.2d 559, 563 , quoting from Williams v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 260 , 226 P.2d 989 (1951), set forth Oklahoma's rule as follows: Where the question arises as to whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary,

2000In Davis v. State, 1968 OK CR 23, ¶ 3 , 437 P.2d 271, 272 , the Court stated: "If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntary, then he must admit it for the jury's consideration and it then becomes the duty of the jury, if the evidence is conflicting, to determine the voluntary nature of the confession." Furthermore, Brewer v. State, 1966 OK CR 58, ¶ 14 , 414 P.2d 559, 563 , quoting from Williams v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 260 , 226 P.2d 989 (1951), set forth Oklahoma's rule as follows: Where the question arises as to whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary,

2000In Davis v. State, 1968 OK CR 23, ¶ 3 , 437 P.2d 271, 272 , the Court stated: "If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntary, then he must admit it for the jury's consideration and it then becomes the duty of the jury, if the evidence is conflicting, to determine the voluntary nature of the confession." Furthermore, Brewer v. State, 1966 OK CR 58, ¶ 14 , 414 P.2d 559, 563 , quoting from Williams v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 260 , 226 P.2d 989 (1951), set forth Oklahoma's rule as follows: Where the question arises as to whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary,

2000In Davis v. State, 1968 OK CR 23, ¶ 3 , 437 P.2d 271, 272 , the Court stated: "If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntary, then he must admit it for the jury's consideration and it then becomes the duty of the jury, if the evidence is conflicting, to determine the voluntary nature of the confession." Furthermore, Brewer v. State, 1966 OK CR 58, ¶ 14 , 414 P.2d 559, 563 , quoting from Williams v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 260 , 226 P.2d 989 (1951), set forth Oklahoma's rule as follows: Where the question arises as to whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary,

2000In Davis v. State, 1968 OK CR 23, ¶ 3 , 437 P.2d 271, 272 , the Court stated: "If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntary, then he must admit it for the jury's consideration and it then becomes the duty of the jury, if the evidence is conflicting, to determine the voluntary nature of the confession." Furthermore, Brewer v. State, 1966 OK CR 58, ¶ 14 , 414 P.2d 559, 563 , quoting from Williams v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 260 , 226 P.2d 989 (1951), set forth Oklahoma's rule as follows: Where the question arises as to whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary,

2000Matter of Reinstatement of Phillips, 1996 OK 62, ¶ 5 , 919 P.2d 419, 420 . 5 The applicant is a native of Muskogee, Oklahoma, received his law degree from Tulsa University in May 1960, and was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association in August 1960, after successful completion of the Oklahoma bar examination.

2000Matter of Reinstatement of Phillips, 1996 OK 62, ¶ 5 , 919 P.2d 419, 420 . 5 The applicant is a native of Muskogee, Oklahoma, received his law degree from Tulsa University in May 1960, and was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association in August 1960, after successful completion of the Oklahoma bar examination.

2000In Davis v. State, 1968 OK CR 23, ¶ 3 , 437 P.2d 271, 272 , the Court stated: "If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntary, then he must admit it for the jury's consideration and it then becomes the duty of the jury, if the evidence is conflicting, to determine the voluntary nature of the confession." Furthermore, Brewer v. State, 1966 OK CR 58, ¶ 14 , 414 P.2d 559, 563 , quoting from Williams v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 260 , 226 P.2d 989 (1951), set forth Oklahoma's rule as follows: Where the question arises as to whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary,

1999Matter of Page, 1993 OK 165, ¶ 3 , 866 P.2d 1207, 1209 . ¶3 The applicant is a native of Miami, Oklahoma, received her law degree from the University of Oklahoma in May of 1989, and was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association on September 13, 1993, after successful completion of the Oklahoma bar examination.

1999Matter of Page, 1993 OK 165, ¶ 3 , 866 P.2d 1207, 1209 . ¶3 The applicant is a native of Miami, Oklahoma, received her law degree from the University of Oklahoma in May of 1989, and was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association on September 13, 1993, after successful completion of the Oklahoma bar examination.

1999Oklahoma's standard of self-defense is a hybrid, combining both an objective and subjective standard. *904 Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, ¶ 33 , 840 P.2d 1, 11 .

1999Oklahoma's standard of self-defense is a hybrid, combining both an objective and subjective standard. *904 Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, ¶ 33 , 840 P.2d 1, 11 .