sentencing court imposed standard in Pennsylvania

2022Further, “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a [PSI], we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating that “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code”).

2022Further, “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a pre-sentence [investigation] report [(“PSI”)], we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating that “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate - 19 - J-S15042-22 under the Sentencing Code”).

2022Further, “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a [PSI], we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating that “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code”).

2022Further, “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a pre-sentence [investigation] report [(“PSI”)], we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating that “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate - 19 - J-S15042-22 under the Sentencing Code”).

2021Under such circumstances, “we can assume the sentencing court ‘was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).

2019Under such circumstances, “we can assume the sentencing court ‘was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988)). -9- J-S76019-18 Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Bates.

2016In those circumstances, we can assume the sentencing court “was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988); see also Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 368 (Pa.Super. 2005) (if sentencing court has benefit of pre- sentence investigation, law expects court was aware of relevant information regarding defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors).

2016In those circumstances, we can assume the sentencing court “was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988); see also Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362 , -3- J-S78012-16 368 (Pa.Super.2005) (if sentencing court has benefit of pre- sentence investigation, law expects court was aware of relevant information regarding defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors).

2016This Court has previously held that “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted) (where trial court had benefit of PSI, “we can assume the [ ] court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”).

2015This court has previously held that “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa.Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa.Super. 2010) (stating that where the trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, “we can assume the [] court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”).

2021Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the court “considered all of the mitigating factors,” and explained, “while I do not believe that these factors would rise to the level of a mitigated sentence, I have considered the factors in imposing a sentence at the lowest end of the standard range.” See N.T., 6/2/20, at 79; see Fowler, 893 A.2d at 767 (“[T]he standard range [] is presumptively where a defendant should be sentenced.”); see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 600 A.2d 1289 , 1291- 92 (Pa. Super. 1991) (a trial court is not required to sentence in the mitigated or aggravated range, even when prese

2021Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the court “considered all of the mitigating factors,” and explained, “while I do not believe that these factors would rise to the level of a mitigated sentence, I have considered the factors in imposing a sentence at the lowest end of the standard range.” See N.T., 6/2/20, at 79; see Fowler, 893 A.2d at 767 (“[T]he standard range [] is presumptively where a defendant should be sentenced.”); see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 600 A.2d 1289 , 1291- 92 (Pa. Super. 1991) (a trial court is not required to sentence in the mitigated or aggravated range, even when prese

2020Moreover, where the court has the benefit of a pre- sentence investigation report, there is a presumption “that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along - 11 - J-S17022-20 with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2019In those circumstances, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 11 “[W]here the sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI] report, it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016). - 15 - J-S35040-19 factors.”) (some quotation marks omitted).

2016See Commonwealth v. Ratushny, 17 A.3d 1269, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2011) (finding substantial compliance although the statement was not labeled as a Rule 2119(f) statement). 8 Counsel notes that a claim that a sentence is “so manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment” does raise a substantial question.

2016See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 578 A.2d 523, 525 (Pa.Super. 1990) (stating that discretionary aspects of sentencing claims raised in an Anders brief must be addressed on appeal, despite procedural violations). -9- J-S27038-16 In conducting merits review of Appellant’s claim that his standard range sentence is excessive because of the trial court’s failure to consider properly his mitigating circumstances, his rehabilitative needs, and the threat he posed to public safety, we find guidance in the following precedent: As we indicated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010), whe

2015With regard to appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors such as his PTSD, an argument that the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors in favor of a lesser sentence does not present a substantial question appropriate for our review; as such, we need not address it.8 Hanson, 856 A.2d at 1257-1258 , citing Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 57 (Pa.Super. 2003).