due process vagueness doctrine in Washington

2021Limitations on constitutionally-protected conduct must be “narrowly tailored and directly related to the goals of protecting the public and promoting the defendant’s rehabilitation.” Id. 7 No. 80920-2-I/8 The due process vagueness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 3 of the state constitution requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct.

2020Vagueness challenges Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution, the due process vagueness doctrine “requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct.” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008).

2019Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I of the Washington Constitution, the due process vagueness doctrine requires statutes “provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid” and “protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement.”2 “[A] statute is void for vagueness if either: (1) the statute does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed; or (2) the statute does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrar

2019Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I of the Washington Constitution, the due process vagueness doctrine requires statutes “provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid” and “protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement.”2 “[A] statute is void for vagueness if either: (1) the statute does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed; or (2) the statute does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrar

2006State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998).

2005Id. ¶33 Challenges under the due process vagueness doctrine, which do not involve First Amendment rights, are evaluated under the facts of each case.

2006State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998).

2005Id. ¶ 33 Challenges under the due process vagueness doctrine, which do not involve First Amendment rights, are evaluated under the facts of each case.

2020Id.; State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448, 458 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2014Accomplice liability is simply not relevant to the enhancements at issue here. 11 Former RCW 9. 94A.535( 3)( e) has been revised, but the revision does not affect the subsection cited. 17 No. 43823 -2 -II Cons. w/ Nos. 43826 - -II, 43833 -0 -II, 43836 - -11) 7 4 The due process vagueness doctrine requires that the legislature draft criminal statutes to provide notice as to what conduct they proscribe and to provide " ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary arrest and prosecution." State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448, 458 , 78 P.3d 1005 ( 2003).

2020Id.; State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448, 458 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2014Accomplice liability is simply not relevant to the enhancements at issue here. 11 Former RCW 9. 94A.535( 3)( e) has been revised, but the revision does not affect the subsection cited. 17 No. 43823 -2 -II Cons. w/ Nos. 43826 - -II, 43833 -0 -II, 43836 - -11) 7 4 The due process vagueness doctrine requires that the legislature draft criminal statutes to provide notice as to what conduct they proscribe and to provide " ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary arrest and prosecution." State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448, 458 , 78 P.3d 1005 ( 2003).

2006State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998). ¶12 The terms “substantial pain” and “considerable suffering” as used in RCW 9A.36.031(l)(f) qualify the term “bodily harm,” which is defined as a matter of physical sensation.

2006State v. Lee, 135 Wash.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998). ¶ 12 The terms "substantial pain" and "considerable suffering" as used in RCW 9A.36.031(f) qualify the term "bodily harm," which is defined as a matter of physical sensation.

2006State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998). ¶12 The terms “substantial pain” and “considerable suffering” as used in RCW 9A.36.031(l)(f) qualify the term “bodily harm,” which is defined as a matter of physical sensation.

2006State v. Lee, 135 Wash.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998). ¶ 12 The terms "substantial pain" and "considerable suffering" as used in RCW 9A.36.031(f) qualify the term "bodily harm," which is defined as a matter of physical sensation.

2026App. 592, 599 , 132 P.3d 743 (2006).

2025App. 592, 599 , 132 P.3d 743 (2006).

2026“The due process vagueness doctrine seeks to ensure that the public has adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and to ensure that the public is 10 No. 87032-7-I/11 protected from arbitrary ad hoc enforcement.” State v. Saunders, 132 Wn.

2025“The due process vagueness doctrine seeks to ensure that the public has adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and to 3 No. 86208-1-I ensure that the public is protected from arbitrary ad hoc enforcement.” State v. Saunders, 132 Wn.

2006State v. Sansone, 127 Wash.App. 630, 638-39 , 111 P.3d 1251 (2005). [2] The due process vagueness doctrine under the United States Constitution has two purposes: first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement.

2006App. 630, 638-39 , 111 P.3d 1251 (2005). 2 The due process vagueness doctrine under the United States Constitution has two purposes: first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct; and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement.

2013"The due process vagueness doctrine 'serves two important purposes: first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement.'" State v. Sansone, 127 Wn.

2006State v. Sansone, 127 Wash.App. 630, 638-39 , 111 P.3d 1251 (2005). [2] The due process vagueness doctrine under the United States Constitution has two purposes: first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement.

2007App. 938, 947 , 146 P.3d 1215 (2006).

2007State v. Smith, 130 Wash.App. 721, 726-727 , 123 P.3d 896 (2005). ¶ 10 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: "first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement." *420 State v. Acrey, 135 Wash.App. 938, 947 , 146 P.3d 1215 (2006).

2007App. 721, 726-27 , 123 P.3d 896 (2005). ¶10 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: “first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct; and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement.” State v. Acrey, 135 Wn.

2007State v. Smith, 130 Wash.App. 721, 726-727 , 123 P.3d 896 (2005). ¶ 10 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: "first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement." *420 State v. Acrey, 135 Wash.App. 938, 947 , 146 P.3d 1215 (2006).

2007App. 721, 726-27 , 123 P.3d 896 (2005). ¶10 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: “first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct; and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement.” State v. Acrey, 135 Wn.

2007State v. Smith, 130 Wash.App. 721, 726-727 , 123 P.3d 896 (2005). ¶ 10 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: "first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement." *420 State v. Acrey, 135 Wash.App. 938, 947 , 146 P.3d 1215 (2006).

2003Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361 .

2003Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361 .

1996E.g., Myles, 127 Wn.2d at 811-12 ; State v. Maxfield, 125 Wn.2d 378, 394 , 886 P.2d 123 (1994).

1996E.g., Myles, 127 Wn.2d at 811-12 ; State v. Maxfield, 125 Wn.2d 378, 394 , 886 P.2d 123 (1994).

1996E.g., Myles, 127 Wn.2d at 811-12 ; State v. Maxfield, 125 Wn.2d 378, 394 , 886 P.2d 123 (1994).

1996E.g., Myles, 127 Wash.2d at 811-12 , 903 P.2d 979 ; State v. Maxfield, 125 Wash.2d 378, 394 , 886 P.2d 123 (1994).

2025App. 2d 352 , 360, 421 P.3d 969 (2018) (applying the due process vagueness doctrine to community custody conditions).

2022We hold that: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the deadly weapon alternative means of the first degree rape conviction based on the victim’s testimony, even though the testimony contradicted itself; (2) the first degree kidnapping conviction merged with the first degree rape conviction in violation of double jeopardy because the kidnapping had no independent purpose from the rape and did not result in a separate injury; No. 54512-8-II (3) there was sufficient evidence to show that Martinez Martinez knew or should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the v

2022We hold that: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the deadly weapon alternative means of the first degree rape conviction based on the victim’s testimony, even though the testimony contradicted itself; (2) the first degree kidnapping conviction merged with the first degree rape conviction in violation of double jeopardy because the kidnapping had no independent purpose from the rape and did not result in a separate injury; No. 54512-8-II (3) there was sufficient evidence to show that Martinez Martinez knew or should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the v

2015Instead, he argues that a due process vagueness challenge is possible in light of Blakelv v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2015Instead, he argues that a due process vagueness challenge is possible in light of Blakelv v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2014This doctrine, though, applies " only to laws that ` attempt to proscribe or prescribe conduct. "' Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 458 ( quoting State v. Jacobson, 92 Wn.

2014No. 71641-7-1/6 warning of proscribed conduct.'"3 A valid statute must be clear enough to provide fair warning of the proscribed conduct and also must have ascertainable standards of guilt to prevent arbitrary enforcement.4 In State v. Baldwin,5 our Supreme Court held that the sentencing guideline statutes at issue "are not subject to a vagueness analysis." In Baldwin, the defendant challenged former RCW 9.94A. 120(2) (2000),6 which required the court to impose a standard range sentence unless it found substantial and compelling reasons to impose an exceptional sentence, and former RCW 9.94A.3

2007State v. Smith, 130 Wash.App. 721, 726-727 , 123 P.3d 896 (2005). ¶ 10 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: "first, to provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, and second, to protect against arbitrary, ad hoc enforcement." *420 State v. Acrey, 135 Wash.App. 938, 947 , 146 P.3d 1215 (2006).

2006City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 28 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988). fl2 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: “first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement.” State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 117 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993).

2006City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 28 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988). fl2 The due process vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes: “first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement.” State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 117 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993).