Schoo test in Kentucky

2025Zuckerman, 565 S.W.3d at 605-06 (Minton, C.J., concurring).

2025Zuckerman, 565 S.W.3d at 605-06 (Minton, C.J., concurring).

2023The Court held that the Pharmacy Scholarship Program was special legislation which violates Section 59, based on “the inescapable conclusion . . . that the Pharmacy Scholarship Program was intended only for students attending the anticipated UC Pharmacy School.” Id. at 683-84 . -22- Of key importance is the Woodall Court’s statement that even though the Pennybacker Court applied the superseded Schoo test in determining that the legislation at issue was unconstitutional, it “reached [the] correct result since the statute applied to [a] particular object.” Woodall, 607 S.W.3d at 573 n.19.

2020See Univ. of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. 2010) (act to create a scholarship program which had clearly been drafted to provide scholarships to an equally unconstitutionally funded pharmacy school at a private, religious university; the Court applied the Schoo test but reached correct result since the statute applied to particular object); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. McCoun, 313 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1958) (joint resolution authorizing two named individuals to pursue claims against the Department of Highways); Dep’t of Conservation v. Sowders, 244 S.W.2d 464 (1951) (resoluti

2020The majority asserts that the shift permits too much discretion on the part of jurists because “[n]o one 90 Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 145 S.W.2d 1067, 1070 (Ky. 1940). 91 186 S.W. 648, 654 (Ky. 1916). 40 knows or can possibly know when a given statute will strike any judge, or four justices of this court, as worthy of the heightened standard.” F. The majority’s test is no more objective than Schoo’s test.

2020The majority asserts that the shift permits too much discretion on the part of jurists because “(n]o one 90 Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 145 S.W.2d 1067, 1070 (Ky. 1940). 91186 S.W. 648 , 654 (Ky. 1916). 40 knows or can possibly know when a given statute will strike any judge, or four justices of this court, as worthy of the heightened standard.” F. The majority’s test is no more objective than Schoo’s test.

2020See Univ. of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. 2010) (act to create a scholarship program which had clearly been drafted to provide scholarships to an equally unconstitutionally funded pharmacy school at a private, religious university; the Court applied the Schoo test but reached correct result since the statute applied to particular object); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. McCoun, 313 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1958) (joint resolution authorizing two named individuals to pursue claims against the Department of Highways); Dep’t of Conservation v. Sowders, 244 S.W.2d 464 (1951) (resoluti

2020See Univ. of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. 2010) (act to create a scholarship program which had clearly been drafted to provide scholarships to an equally unconstitutionally funded pharmacy school at a private, religious university; the Court applied the Schoo test but reached correct result since the statute applied to particular object); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. McCoun, 313 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1958) (joint resolution authorizing two named individuals to pursue claims against the Department of Highways); Dep’t of Conservation v. Sowders, 244 S.W.2d 464 (1951) (resoluti

2020As we stated in 1941, 106Zuckerman, 565 S.W.3d at 616 (Minton, C.J. concurring) (citing Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 469 ). 107 Id. 108 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 109 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (Ky. 1941) (emphasis added). 44 absent a constitutional amendment, “to change the interpretation of the present constitution which has been consistently adhered to ..., would be to upset governmental policy followed since the foundation of the Commonwealth 150 years ago.”110 If we are to throw sixty-five years of our judicial philosophy to the wind, let us at least do so in a case where such dif

2020As we stated in 1941, 106Zuckerman, 565 S.W.3d at 616 (Minton, C.J. concurring) (citing Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 469 ). 107 Id. 108 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 109 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (Ky. 1941) (emphasis added). 44 absent a constitutional amendment, “to change the interpretation of the present constitution which has been consistently adhered to ..., would be to upset governmental policy followed since the foundation of the Commonwealth 150 years ago.”110 If we are to throw sixty-five years of our judicial philosophy to the wind, let us at least do so in a case where such dif

2020Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (citing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). 32 Id. 33 270 S.W.2d 940 . 34 Id. at 941 . 35 Id. at 942 . 29 test states, “[I]n order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.”36 This Court provided additional clarification to the Schoo test in Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board.37 In Yeoman, a group of doctors sued t

2020Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (citing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). 32 Id. 33 270 S.W.2d 940 . 34 Id. at 941 . 35 Id. at 942 . 29 test states, “[I]n order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.”36 This Court provided additional clarification to the Schoo test in Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board.37 In Yeoman, a group of doctors sued t

2020Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (citing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). 32 Id. 33 270 S.W.2d 940 . 34 Id. at 941 . 35 Id. at 942 . 29 test states, “[I]n order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.”36 This Court provided additional clarification to the Schoo test in Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board.37 In Yeoman, a group of doctors sued t

2020Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (citing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). 32 Id. 33 270 S.W.2d 940 . 34 Id. at 941 . 35 Id. at 942 . 29 test states, “[I]n order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.”36 This Court provided additional clarification to the Schoo test in Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board.37 In Yeoman, a group of doctors sued t

2020Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (citing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). 32 Id. 33 270 S.W.2d 940 . 34 Id. at 941 . 35 Id. at 942 . 29 test states, “[I]n order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.”36 This Court provided additional clarification to the Schoo test in Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board.37 In Yeoman, a group of doctors sued t

2020Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982) (citing City of Louisville v. Kuntz, 47 S.W. 592, 592-93 (1898)). 32 Id. 33 270 S.W.2d 940 . 34 Id. at 941 . 35 Id. at 942 . 29 test states, “[I]n order for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification.”36 This Court provided additional clarification to the Schoo test in Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board.37 In Yeoman, a group of doctors sued t

2020In fact, the Schoo test comes straight from Ecklar: “the true test whether a law is a general one, in the constitutional 7 Or a case which cited to Schoo as authority. 8 The court in Schoo included a citation to Droege v. McInerney, 120 Ky. 796 , 87 S.W. 1085, 1085 (1905).

2020In fact, the Schoo test comes straight from Ecklar: “the true test whether a law is a general one, in the constitutional 7 Or a case which cited to Schoo as authority. 8 The court in Schoo included a citation to Droege v. McInerney, 120 Ky. 796 , 87 S.W. 1085, 1085 (1905).

2018Yet the Schoo test, and really all our special legislation precedent, proves to be untenable in another way—by suggesting 43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 44 Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933); see also Jabez G.

2018Yet the Schoo test, and really all our special legislation precedent, proves to be untenable in another way—by suggesting 43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 44 Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933); see also Jabez G.

2018Yet the Schoo test, and really all our special legislation precedent, proves to be untenable in another way—by suggesting 43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 44 Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933); see also Jabez G.

2018Yet the Schoo test, and really all our special legislation precedent, proves to be untenable in another way—by suggesting 43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 44 Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933); see also Jabez G.

2025While there is no need to rehash these extended arguments here, I would briefly note the readily apparent flaws in the reasoning of Schoo amply justified its rejection by Woodall. 607 S.W.3d at 567. 41 In particular, the Schoo test, effectively restored by the new majority today, traces its lineage to Safety Building Loan Co. v. Ecklar, 50 S.W. 50 (Ky. 1899). 13 However, Ecklar was overruled in part by Linton v. Fulton Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 262 Ky. 198 , 90 S.W.2d 22, 25 (1936), because “the distinction between class legislation, special or local and general law was not at that time generally ob

2025While there is no need to rehash these extended arguments here, I would briefly note the readily apparent flaws in the reasoning of Schoo amply justified its rejection by Woodall. 607 S.W.3d at 567. 41 In particular, the Schoo test, effectively restored by the new majority today, traces its lineage to Safety Building Loan Co. v. Ecklar, 50 S.W. 50 (Ky. 1899). 13 However, Ecklar was overruled in part by Linton v. Fulton Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 262 Ky. 198 , 90 S.W.2d 22, 25 (1936), because “the distinction between class legislation, special or local and general law was not at that time generally ob

2020As we stated in 1941, 106Zuckerman, 565 S.W.3d at 616 (Minton, C.J. concurring) (citing Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 469 ). 107 Id. 108 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 109 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (Ky. 1941) (emphasis added). 44 absent a constitutional amendment, “to change the interpretation of the present constitution which has been consistently adhered to ..., would be to upset governmental policy followed since the foundation of the Commonwealth 150 years ago.”110 If we are to throw sixty-five years of our judicial philosophy to the wind, let us at least do so in a case where such dif

2020As we stated in 1941, 106Zuckerman, 565 S.W.3d at 616 (Minton, C.J. concurring) (citing Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 469 ). 107 Id. 108 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 109 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (Ky. 1941) (emphasis added). 44 absent a constitutional amendment, “to change the interpretation of the present constitution which has been consistently adhered to ..., would be to upset governmental policy followed since the foundation of the Commonwealth 150 years ago.”110 If we are to throw sixty-five years of our judicial philosophy to the wind, let us at least do so in a case where such dif

2020The majority asserts that the shift permits too much discretion on the part of jurists because “[n]o one 90 Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 145 S.W.2d 1067, 1070 (Ky. 1940). 91 186 S.W. 648, 654 (Ky. 1916). 40 knows or can possibly know when a given statute will strike any judge, or four justices of this court, as worthy of the heightened standard.” F. The majority’s test is no more objective than Schoo’s test.