state absolute immunity in Kentucky

2021“Sovereign immunity affords the state absolute immunity from suit and ‘extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party against which relief in such cases is sought.’” Cowan, 508 S.W.3d at 7 For the same reason, SouthPointe’s damage claims against Louisville Metro and the official- capacity defendants are precluded by KRS 100.347. -24- 109 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517-18 ).

2021“Sovereign immunity affords 8 the state absolute immunity from suit and ‘extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party against which relief in such cases is sought.’” Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t v. Cowan, 508 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Ky. App. 2016) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Ky. 2001)).

2024Where sovereign immunity applies, it “affords the state absolute immunity from suit[.]” Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Ky. App. 2013).

2024Where it applies, it “affords the state absolute immunity from suit[.]” Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Ky. App. 2013).

2020Similarly, “[c]ounties, which predate the existence of the state and are considered direct political subdivisions of it, enjoy the same immunity as the state itself.” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Ky. 2009) (citing Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2004)).

2016Governmental immunity is granted to agencies that have been established by an immune entity and that perform a “ ‘function integral to state government.’ ” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Ky.2009) (quoting Ky. Ctr. for the Arts v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Ky.1990)).

2016Governmental immunity is granted to agencies that have been established by an immune entity and that perform a “ ‘function integral to state government.’ ” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Ky.2009) (quoting Ky. Ctr. for the Arts v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Ky.1990)).

2013Governmental immunity is granted to agencies that have been established by an immune entity and that perform a “ ‘function integral to state government.’ ” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Ky.2009) (quoting Ky. Ctr. for the Arts v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Ky.1990)).

2024This means, rather than simply absolving the state from liability, the immune party is free “from the burden of defending oneself altogether.” Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d at 135 (quoting Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. Henrico Cnty., Va., 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.C.

2020Similarly, “[c]ounties, which predate the existence of the state and are considered direct political subdivisions of it, enjoy the same immunity as the state itself.” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Ky. 2009) (citing Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2004)).

2021“Sovereign immunity affords the state absolute immunity from suit and ‘extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party against which relief in such cases is sought.’” Cowan, 508 S.W.3d at 7 For the same reason, SouthPointe’s damage claims against Louisville Metro and the official- capacity defendants are precluded by KRS 100.347. -24- 109 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517-18 ).

2021“Sovereign immunity affords 8 the state absolute immunity from suit and ‘extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party against which relief in such cases is sought.’” Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t v. Cowan, 508 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Ky. App. 2016) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Ky. 2001)).

2024This means, rather than simply absolving the state from liability, the immune party is free “from the burden of defending oneself altogether.” Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d at 135 (quoting Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. Henrico Cnty., Va., 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.C.