reasonable assistance standard in Illinois

2017See People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 358 (2000) (reviewing retained counsel’s performance under the reasonable assistance standard).

2017See People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 358 (2000) (reviewing retained counsel’s performance under the reasonable assistance standard).

2026This is so, because “[c]ounsel is appointed not to protect postconviction petitioners from the prosecutorial forces of the State but to shape their complaints into the proper legal form and to present those complaints to the court.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19 . ¶ 37 The reasonable assistance standard applies regardless of “whether the attorney is appointed or retained and whether the proceedings are at the first, second, or third stage.” Urzua, 2023 IL 127789, ¶ 51 ; Williams, 2025 IL 129718, ¶ 43 ; Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 42 .

2025This reasonable-assistance requirement applies to both appointed and retained counsel (Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 42) and to both initial and successive postconviction petitions (see, e.g., id. (initial petition); People v. Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 26 (successive petition)).

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .

2016See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007) (stating “[t]he Act provides for a ‘reasonable’ level of assistance”).

2020In Cotto, the supreme court stated, “Rule 651(c) ‘is merely a vehicle for ensuring a reasonable level of assistance’ [citation] and should not be viewed as the only guarantee of reasonable assistance in postconviction proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Anguiano, 2013 IL App (1st) 113458, ¶ 37 ).

2016See Anguiano, 2013 IL App (1st) 113458, ¶¶ 19-22 (detailing the development of this court’s jurisprudence on the standards applicable to postconviction counsel’s performance). ¶ 31 This court has broadly rejected any distinction between appointed and retained counsel for purposes of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c).

2025People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1990). - 14 - 1-23-2103 ¶ 44 Postconviction counsel’s duties to a petitioner are set forth in Supreme Court Rule 651.

2025People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1990). ¶ 19 Postconviction counsel’s duties to a petitioner are set forth in Supreme Court Rule 651.

2025The reasonable level of assistance standard is “significantly lower than the one mandated at trial by our state and federal constitutions,” see People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30 . ¶ 20 To ensure the reasonable assistance standard is met, Rule 651(c) imposes three duties on postconviction counsel.

2024“Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in postconviction proceedings, [Rule 651(c)] sharply limits the requisite duties of postconviction counsel.” Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 32 .

2022Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472 . ¶ 48 Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in postconviction proceedings, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 (eff.

2020“The required quantum of assistance has been judicially deemed to be a ‘reasonable level,’ a standard that is significantly lower than the one mandated at trial by our state and federal constitutions.” People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30 (quoting Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472 ). ¶ 72 As our supreme court has recently observed: “Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in postconviction proceedings, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 *** sharply limits the requisite duties of postconviction counsel.” Id. ¶ 32.

2026People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 41-42 (2007).

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .

2022Postconviction counsel is obligated under Rule 651(c) to attempt to obtain affidavits from witnesses identified in the postconviction petition “for the purpose of shaping the allegations in the post-conviction petition into appropriate legal form.” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 247 (1993).

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .

2023“This is because the right to counsel in postconviction proceeds is statutorily rather than constitutionally derived.” People v Smith, 2022 IL 126940 , ¶ 13 (citing People v. Turner, 187 Ill.2d 406, 410 (1999)). ¶ 21 “Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in postconviction proceedings, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 (eff.

2021This court found that where the circuit court appointed counsel solely -3- in an exercise of its discretion, counsel had failed to provide adequate assistance under either the reasonable assistance standard applicable to postconviction proceedings or the due diligence standard set forth by the supreme court in Tedder v. Fairman, 92 Ill. 2d 216, 227 (1982).

2019This court found that where the circuit court appointed counsel solely in an exercise of its discretion, counsel had failed to provide adequate assistance under either the reasonable assistance standard applicable to postconviction proceedings or the due diligence standard set forth by the supreme court in Tedder v. Fairman, 92 Ill. 2d 216, 227 (1982).

2020People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 204 (2004). ¶ 32 Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in postconviction proceedings, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 (eff.

2019People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 204 (2004). ¶ 32 Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in postconviction proceedings, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 (eff.

2017Therefore, we find that any right to reasonable assistance of counsel that the Mitchell petitioner may have had at the first stage of proceedings does not apply to the defendant in the instant case, who had no statutory right to counsel at the first stage of proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014); Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d at 70 (“The Act does not authorize appointment of counsel at the first stage of the proceedings for a petitioner who is not under a sentence of death.”). ¶ 30 The dissent takes a contrary view, asserting that the application of the reasonable assistance standard at the

2017Therefore, we find that any right to reasonable assistance of counsel that the Mitchell petitioner 9 may have had at the first stage of proceedings does not apply to the defendant in the instant case, who had no statutory right to counsel at the first stage of proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014); Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d at 70 (“The Act does not authorize appointment of counsel at the first stage of the proceedings for a petitioner who is not under a sentence of death.”). ¶ 30 The dissent takes a contrary view, asserting that the application of the reasonable assistance standard at t

2026This is so, because “[c]ounsel is appointed not to protect postconviction petitioners from the prosecutorial forces of the State but to shape their complaints into the proper legal form and to present those complaints to the court.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19 . ¶ 37 The reasonable assistance standard applies regardless of “whether the attorney is appointed or retained and whether the proceedings are at the first, second, or third stage.” Urzua, 2023 IL 127789, ¶ 51 ; Williams, 2025 IL 129718, ¶ 43 ; Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 42 .

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .

2025This reasonable-assistance requirement applies to both appointed and retained counsel (Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 42) and to both initial and successive postconviction petitions (see, e.g., id. (initial petition); People v. Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 26 (successive petition)).

2025This reasonable-assistance requirement applies to both appointed and retained counsel (Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 42) and to both initial and successive postconviction petitions (see, e.g., id. (initial petition); People v. Perry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150587, ¶ 26 (successive petition)).

2023People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 58 .

2020See People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 59 .

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .

2025See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007), Addison, 2023 IL 127119 , People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006), People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523 , People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851 , People v. Tillery, 2022 IL App (1st) 200045-U , and People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 210909-U .