retrospective fitness hearing in Illinois

2022In such circumstances, “ ‘[I]t appears that retrospective fitness hearings are now the norm.’ ” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 38 (quoting People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 339 (2000)); see also Smith, 2017 IL App (1st) 143728, ¶ 81 (“the appropriate remedy would be a retrospective fitness hearing”).

2000The court points out that, although in 1995 this court rejected any notion of retrospective fitness hearings as being reliable, two years later in 1997, "we saw no problem with a retrospective fitness hearing conducted 15 years after defendant's trial and sentencing." 189 Ill.2d at 338 , 245 Ill.Dec. at 17 , 727 N.E.2d at 270 , citing Neal, 179 Ill.2d at 553-56 , 228 Ill.Dec. 619 , 689 N.E.2d 1040 .

2018The Neal court determined that the procedural context of a retrospective fitness hearing did not matter, i.e. , whether it was pursuant to a remand order on direct review or in postconviction proceedings, but that the passage of time could matter. *669 *969 Neal , 179 Ill. 2d at 553 , 228 Ill.Dec. 619 , 689 N.E.2d 1040 .

2018The Neal court determined that the procedural context of a retrospective fitness hearing did not matter, i.e. , whether it was pursuant to a remand order on direct review or in postconviction proceedings, but that the passage of time could matter. *669 *969 Neal , 179 Ill. 2d at 553 , 228 Ill.Dec. 619 , 689 N.E.2d 1040 .

2026At the retrospective fitness hearing, “[i]f the [trial] court determines that evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the defendant was unfit, defendant is entitled to a new trial.” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 38 .

2026At the retrospective fitness hearing, “If the [trial] court determines that evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the defendant was unfit, defendant is entitled to a new trial.” People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 38 . ¶ 18 III.

2026We agree. ¶ 38 “Rather than automatic reversal, ‘retrospective fitness hearings are now the norm.’ ” Payne, 2018 IL App (3d) 160105, ¶ 14 (quoting Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 38 ).

2025“A retrospective fitness hearing requires the same active role of the court in assessing the defendant’s fitness as an original fitness *** hearing.” People v. Payne, 2018 IL App (3d) 160105, ¶ 15 .

2025“The court must state on the record the factual basis for its finding, which must be more than a mere acceptance of a stipulation that the defendant is fit or that an expert found the defendant fit.” Cook, 2014 IL App (2d) 130545, ¶ 20 . ¶ 53 At the retrospective fitness hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was fit at the time of trial. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(c) (West 2024); People v. McDurmon, 2022 IL App (1st) 181259-U , ¶¶ 65-67.

2023However, if the court determines at the retrospective fitness hearing that defendant’s fitness at his prior trial can be “accurately assessed and confirmed, his conviction may be affirmed.” Id.; see also Cook, 2014 IL App (2d) 130545, ¶ 22 . ¶ 36 B.

1999JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court: The sole issue to be addressed in this matter is whether the record supports a remand for a retrospective fitness hearing in accordance with the language of the 1994 version of the psychotropic medication statute, section 104—21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/104—21(a) (West 1994)) and the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d 316 (1998) (Kinkead II).

1998Rather, it concurred in the result because it believed that, based on Neal, defendant was entitled to a remand for a new trial because a retrospective fitness hearing could not protect defendant’s due process rights, in light of the facts that more than a year had elapsed since the conviction and sentencing and the case was not one in which the court could “say that the medication could not possibly have had any effect on defendant’s fitness.” Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d at 349 (Harrison, J., specially concurring).

2024Following the retrospective fitness hearing, if the trial court concludes that the defendant’s fitness at the time of his guilty plea can be accurately assessed and confirmed, then pursuant to our reasoning in People v. Moore, 408 Ill.

2024We expressly note that if the retrospective fitness hearing in the trial court results in a finding that the defendant was fit for trial, then pursuant to our reasoning in People v. Moore, 408 Ill.

2000The State argued that this court’s prior order was based on Brandon, but that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 , 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997), decided after this court’s order in this case, was controlling and did not require a new trial.

1998In the alternative, the State submits that if this matter is remanded, the appropriate procedure would be to conduct a retrospective fitness hearing, if possible, pursuant to People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997).

2001See Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d at 471 .

1999See People v. Nitz , 173 Ill. 2d 151, 164 (1996); Birdsall , 172 Ill. 2d at 479-80 ; Gevas , 166 Ill. 2d at 471 (1995); Brandon , 162 Ill. 2d at 461 .

2022See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 .

2022See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 .

2004While the State acknowledges that a defendant is entitled to a fitness hearing if there is a bona fide doubt concerning fitness ( People v. Johnson , 183 Ill. 2d 176, 193 (1998)), it denies any showing of bona fide doubt in this case and argues that the appellate court improperly mandated a retrospective fitness hearing.

2004While the State acknowledges that a defendant is entitled to a fitness hearing if there is a bona fide doubt concerning fitness (People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 193 (1998)), it denies any showing of bona fide doubt in this case and argues that the appellate court improperly mandated a retrospective fitness hearing.

2000Ed. 2d 479, 495 , 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1820 (1992), in which he pointed out that “[t]he side effects of antipsychotic drugs can hamper the attorney-client relation *** rendering the defendant less able or willing to take part in his defense [and] ‘can also lead to the defendant’s loss of self-determination undermining the desire for self-preservation which is necessary to engage the defendant in his own defense in preparation for his trial.’ ” Finally, the court concluded that remanding the matter for a retrospective fitness hearing would be inherently difficult.

2000In support of this statement, the court cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 , 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1820 , 118 L.Ed.2d 479, 495 (1992), in which he pointed out that "[t]he side effects of antipsychotic drugs can hamper the attorney-client relation * * * rendering the defendant less able or willing to take part in his defense [and] `can also lead to the defendant's loss of self-determination undermining the desire for self-preservation which is necessary to engage the defendant in his own defense in preparation for his trial.'" Finally, the court concluded that

1999See People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, 164 (1996); Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d at 479-80 ; Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d at 471 ; Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d at 461 .

1999See People v. Nitz , 173 Ill. 2d 151, 164 (1996); Birdsall , 172 Ill. 2d at 479-80 ; Gevas , 166 Ill. 2d at 471 (1995); Brandon , 162 Ill. 2d at 461 .

2022In such circumstances, “ ‘[I]t appears that retrospective fitness hearings are now the norm.’ ” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 38 (quoting People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 339 (2000)); see also Smith, 2017 IL App (1st) 143728, ¶ 81 (“the appropriate remedy would be a retrospective fitness hearing”).

2020The State concedes this issue, and we concur. -5- No. 1-17-1335 ¶ 17 “The fourteenth amendment's due process clause precludes the prosecution of a defendant who is unfit to stand trial.” People v. Smith, 2017 IL App (1st) 143728 , ¶ 84.

2014People v. Manning, 76 Ill. 2d 235, 239 (1979).

2013People v. Manning, 76 Ill.2d 235, 239 , 390 N.E.2d 903 (1979).

2026People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d 44, 56 (1984).

2025See McCain, 248 Ill.

2020A defendant can be fit for trial although his or her mind may be otherwise unsound.’ ” Garcia, 2015 IL App (1st) 131180, ¶ 52 (quoting People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (2000)). ¶ 67 Defendant argues that the interval of four months between the trial and the retrospective fitness hearing was problematic because Dr. Nadkarni’s diagnosis for the retrospective fitness hearing differed from Dr. Venable’s diagnosis for the pretrial fitness hearing.

2020A defendant can be fit for trial although his or her mind may be otherwise unsound.’ ” Garcia, 2015 IL App (1st) 131180, ¶ 52 (quoting People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (2000)). ¶ 67 Defendant argues that the interval of four months between the trial and the retrospective fitness hearing was problematic because Dr. Nadkarni’s diagnosis for the retrospective fitness hearing differed from Dr. Venable’s diagnosis for the pretrial fitness hearing.

2016The appellate court ultimately rejected that argument (id. at 779), which, incidentally, was untenable under the supreme court's recent decision in People v. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212, 214-15 (2004) ("[T]he grant of a defense motion for a psychological examination, without more, [does not create] a sufficient inference that the trial court found bona fide doubt of [the] defendant's fitness to stand trial to require a remand for a retrospective fitness hearing.").