party offering instruction in Missouri

1995Rogue v. Kaw Transport Co., 697 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Mo.App.W.D.1985).

1994Roque v. Kaw Transport Co., 697 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Mo.App.1985).

2001Id.; Grindstaff v. Tygett, 655 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo.App.1983).

1999Id.; Grindstaff v. Tygett, 655 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo.App.1983).

1986Commerford v. Kreitler, 462 S.W.2d 726, 728 [1] (Mo.1971); Finninger v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 390, 394 [9] (Mo.App.1985).

1977Considering the evidence and inferences favorable to the party offering the instruction [Commerford v. Kreitler, 462 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo.1971)], each of the disjunctive submissions of theories of recovery was supported by substantial evidence.

2014In considering whether the evidence supported Defendant’s affirmative converse instruction, “we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party offering the instruction, and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably drawn therefrom and disregard evidence to the contrary.” Maxwell v. City of Hayti, 985 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo.App.S.D.1999).

2005See Maxwell v. City of Hayti, 985 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo.App.

1992Gottlieb v. Szajnfeld, 550 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Mo.App.1977).

1987Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Mo. banc 1973); Gottlieb v. Szajnfeld, 550 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Mo.App.1977).

1991Edgewater Health Care, Inc. v. Health Systems Management, Inc., 752 S.W.2d 860, 868 (Mo.App.1988).

1991“In determining whether an instruction should have been given or withheld based on the evidence presented, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party offering the instruction giving the party the benefit of all favorable inferences and disregarding the contrary evidence.” Edgewater Health Care v. Health Systems, 752 S.W.2d 860, 868 (Mo.App.1988).

1987Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Mo. banc 1973); Gottlieb v. Szajnfeld, 550 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Mo.App.1977).

1977Worley v. Tucker Nevils, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 417, 421 [3] (Mo. banc 1973); Middleman v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 456, 460-461 [4] (Mo. banc 1972); Page v. Baxter, 503 S.W.2d 32, 33 [1] (Mo.App.1973); Hood v. Heppler, 503 S.W.2d 452, 455 [4] (Mo.App.1973).

1983Murphy v. Land, 420 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Mo.1967).

1980Louis Public Service Co., 421 S.W.2d 255, 259 [3] (Mo.banc 1967), and in Murphy v. Land, 420 S.W.2d 505, 507 [3-7] (Mo.1967), adopted the rule regarding deviations from the straight and narrow path prescribed by MAI that “prejudicial error will be presumed unless it is made perfectly clear by the proponent of the instruction that no prejudice could have resulted from the deviation.” The requirements of MAI are mandatory.

2024“The ultimate fact is the act or omission (required to be stated by the expert) that constitutes negligence.” Ostrander v. O’Banion, 152 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).

2014Id. at 336 . 61 Rule 70.02(b) mandates that when an Missouri Approved Instruction is modified, as was the case here, then “such modifications or such instructions shall be simple, brief, impartial, free from argument, and shall not submit to the jury or require findings of detailed evidentiary facts.” 134 Although the purpose of MAI is to hypothesize the ultimate issue without evidentiary detail, the submission must not be so barren of fact that it allows the jury “unbridled power to speculate and find liability based on a vague, abstract ‘roving commission’ that lacks sufficient clarity to as

1997Hartenbach, 628 S.W.2d at 688 .

1985Hartenbach v. Johnson, 628 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Mo.App.1982).

1987Id.

1987Id.

1986See Conger v. Queen City Food & Vending, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Mo.App.1979); and McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.App.1980).

1986Conger v. Queen City Food & Vending, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 161 (Mo.App.1979) [1, 2]; McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160 (Mo.App.1980) [2].

1986See Conger v. Queen City Food & Vending, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Mo.App.1979); and McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.App.1980).

1986Conger v. Queen City Food & Vending, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 161 (Mo.App.1979) [1, 2]; McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160 (Mo.App.1980) [2].

1985Watterson, supra. In determining whether instructions that are submitted were supported by sufficient evidence, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party offering the instruction.

1978Watterson v. Portas, 466 S.W.2d 129, 132 [5, 6] (Mo.App.1971); S.Ct.Rule 70.01(c).

2007Corbin v. Wennerberg, 459 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Mo.App.1970). “[T]he alleged negligent failure to keep a careful lookout is not to be *182 submitted to the jury unless there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find that in the exercise of the highest degree of care, the allegedly negligent party, had he kept a careful lookout, could have seen the other vehicle in time thereafter to have taken precautionary action.” Hill v. Barton, 579 S.W.2d 121, 128 (Mo.App.1979).

2007Corbin v. Wennerberg, 459 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Mo.App.1970). “[T]he alleged negligent failure to keep a careful lookout is not to be *182 submitted to the jury unless there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find that in the exercise of the highest degree of care, the allegedly negligent party, had he kept a careful lookout, could have seen the other vehicle in time thereafter to have taken precautionary action.” Hill v. Barton, 579 S.W.2d 121, 128 (Mo.App.1979).

1999Kilgore v. Linville, 733 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo.App.

1996Wilkes v. Group Underwriters Mutual, 715 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo.App.1986).

1995Jones v. Freese, 743 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo.App.1987).

1994Manufacturers American Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 67 [1] (Mo.App.1986).

1994Manufacturers American Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 67 [1] (Mo.App.1986).