fair and unbiased hearing in New Jersey

2026Rule 1:12-1(g) directs judges not to sit in any matter "when there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." The standard for determining whether judicial disqualification is proper is: "Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?" DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517 .

2026Conduct r. 2.1 cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008).] A-3891-24 5 While judges are required to recuse themselves for any reason "which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment" of a party's case, R. 1:12-1(g), "[i]t is improper for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that [he or she] is disqualified 'unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by [the judge] to exist or is shown to be true in fact.'" Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J.

2026Conduct r. 2.1 cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008).] A-3891-24 5 While judges are required to recuse themselves for any reason "which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment" of a party's case, R. 1:12-1(g), "[i]t is improper for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that [he or she] is disqualified 'unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by [the judge] to exist or is shown to be true in fact.'" Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J.

2024This proscription shall extend to the partners, employers, employees or office associates of any such attorney except where the Chief Justice for good cause otherwise permits; (c) has been attorney of record or counsel in the action; (d) has given an opinion upon a matter in question in the action; (e) is interested in the event of the action; A-0323-23 13 (f) has discussed or negotiated his or her post- retirement employment with any party, attorney or law firm involved in the matter; or (g) when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which

2026An appearance of impropriety exists if "a reasonable, fully informed person [would] have doubts about the judge's impartiality." DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517 . "[T]he mere appearance of bias may require disqualification." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997) (citing R. 1:12-1(f)).

2024Additionally, a judge shall recuse themselves sua sponte "when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). "'[I]t is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court' to establish an appearance of impropriety; an 'objectively reasonable' belief that the proceedings were unfair is sufficient." DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517 (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 , 118 (1997)).

2019Pursuant to Rule 1:12-1(g), a judge is disqualified from presiding of a case "when there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." Our Supreme Court has adopted the following standard to assess whether a judge's personal behavior creates an appearance of impropriety: "Would an individual who observes the judge's personal conduct have a reasonable basis to doubt the judge's integrity and impartiality?" In re Reddin, 221 N.J. 221, 223 (2015).

2018Defendant cites Rule 1:12-1(g), which provides that a judge shall be disqualified and precluded from sitting on certain matters, including those in which there is "any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." He relies upon In re Reddin, 221 N.J. 221, 223 (2015), where the Court recognized that under the rule, a judge is disqualified from a matter if an 4 The judge's representation dates back to 1992.

2025The trial court suggested that Sam was "forum shopping" and "seeking to delay the proceedings." Rule 1:12-1(g) states that a judge should recuse "when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." "Motions for disqualification must be made directly to the judge presiding over the case." State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010).

2022Pursuant to Rule 1:12-1(a), a judge is disqualified from sitting in any matter if the judge "is by blood or marriage the second cousin of or is more closely related to any party to the action[.]" Under Rule 1:12-1(g), the judge is disqualified "when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned .

2022The standard for recusal is whether "a reasonable, fully informed person [would] have doubts about the judge's impartiality." State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601, 607 (2015) (quoting DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008)).

2021As explained by the Court in State v. Dalal: Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Likewise, Rule 1:12- 1(g) directs that judges shall not sit in any matter "when there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." The rules, thus, "address actual conflicts and bias as well as the appearance of impropriety." McCabe, 201 N.J. at 43 . [ 221

2025The only relevant circumstance here is subsection (g): "when there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." Because "[a] judge must act in a way that 'promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,'" the aforementioned standards cover the "'appearance of impropriety.'" Goldfarb, 460 N.J.

2024Disqualification is proper if, among other reasons, "there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). "[J]udges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be perceived as partial," Goldfarb, 460 N.J.

2025Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J.

2024Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J.

2007In the course of that decision, we stated: A trial judge "not only has the right but, moreover, has the obligation to recuse himself on his own motion if he is satisfied that there is good cause for believing that his not doing so `might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or . . . might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so.'" State v. Utsch, 184 N.J.Super. 575, 581 , 446 A. 2d 1236 (App.Div.1982) (quoting R. 1:12-1(f)); see also James v. State, 56 N.J.Super. 213, 217 , 152 A. 2d 386 (App.Div.1959).

2007In the course of that decision, we stated: A trial judge "not only has the right but, moreover, has the obligation to recuse himself on his own motion if he is satisfied that there is good cause for believing that his not doing so `might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or . . . might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so.'" State v. Utsch, 184 N.J.Super. 575, 581 , 446 A. 2d 1236 (App.Div.1982) (quoting R. 1:12-1(f)); see also James v. State, 56 N.J.Super. 213, 217 , 152 A. 2d 386 (App.Div.1959).

1999See, e.g., Carmichael v. Bryan, 310 N.J.Super. 34, 49 , 707 A. 2d 1357 (App.Div.1998). [Pressler, Current N.J.

1999See, e.g., Carmichael v. Bryan, 310 N.J.Super. 34, 49 , 707 A. 2d 1357 (App.Div.1998). [Pressler, Current N.J.

2025To that end, Rule 1:12-1(g) instructs that a judge shall not sit in any matter if there is any "reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." Indeed, judges must A-3249-22 5 "refrain . . . from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question." State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961).

2018"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." State v. Deutsch , 34 N.J. 190 , 206, 168 A.2d 12 (1961) (quoting Offutt v. United States , 348 U.S. 11 , 14, 75 S.Ct. 11 , 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) ).

2013See State v. Tucker, 264 N.J.Super. 549, 554 , 625 A.2d 34 (App.Div.1993) (“The situations in which a judge should grant a motion for recusal are varied____”), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 , 640 A.2d 850 (1994).

2013See State v. Tucker, 264 N.J.Super. 549, 554 , 625 A.2d 34 (App.Div.1993) (“The situations in which a judge should grant a motion for recusal are varied____”), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 , 640 A.2d 850 (1994).

2020Motions for recusal must be made "directly to the judge presiding over the case." State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010) (citing R. 1:12-2; Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J.

2019Similarly, Canon 3, Rule 3.17(B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states "[a] judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." "However, before the court may be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable." State v. Presley, 436 N.J.

2018A-0425-16T3 17 individual, who observes the judge's conduct, would have "a reasonable basis to doubt the judge's integrity and impartiality[.]" Defendant also points out that our legal system is framed by our federal constitution, and strives to avoid situations where a judge makes decisions in a case "in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (citation omitted).

2017"The disqualification decision is initially left to the discretion of the trial court." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 275-76 (1997). "[J]udges are not 5 A-4942-15T3 free to err on the side of caution; it is improper for a court to recuse itself unless the factual bases for its disqualification are shown by the movant to be true or are already known by the court." Id. at 276; see also State v. De Maio, 70 N.J.L. 220, 222 (E. & A. 1904).

2017Rule 1:12-1(g) states that a judge should be disqualified on the court's own motion "when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." Our Supreme Court has stated that the applicable standard in determining whether disqualification is necessary is: "Would a reasonable, fully[-]informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?" DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008). "[A] judge need not 'withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that he is disqualified unless the alle

2014State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 511 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145 , 125 S. Ct. 2973 , 162 L.

2013See State v. Tucker, 264 N.J.Super. 549, 554 , 625 A.2d 34 (App.Div.1993) (“The situations in which a judge should grant a motion for recusal are varied____”), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468 , 640 A.2d 850 (1994).