7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Abeokuto v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The State points out that, besides the bottle found underneath the table in which methamphetamine was being “cooked,” two bottles were found on the back porch containing a “powder” and another bottle was found in the kitchen placed upside down in another container. 4 The State, therefore, maintains that “the two offenses did not grow out of the same act or transaction” and, as such, merger is not appropriate. “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause *416 of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state c 2015The State points out that, besides the bottle found underneath the table in which methamphetamine was being “cooked,” two bottles were found on the back porch containing a “powder” and another bottle was found in the kitchen placed upside down in another container. 4 The State, therefore, maintains that “the two offenses did not grow out of the same act or transaction” and, as such, merger is not appropriate. “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause *416 of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state c | 1 | 5 |
Dixon v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to merge the sentence for false imprisonment into the sentence for the second-degree sexual offenses was erroneous “because the facts supporting the false imprisonment claim were part and parcel of the evidence underlying the sexual assault conviction.” *98 “The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-53 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (cit 2008Appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to merge the sentence for false imprisonment into the sentence for the second-degree sexual offenses was erroneous “because the facts supporting the false imprisonment claim were part and parcel of the evidence underlying the sexual assault conviction.” *98 “The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-53 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (cit | 1 | 4 |
Jones-Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The State points out that, besides the bottle found underneath the table in which methamphetamine was being “cooked,” two bottles were found on the back porch containing a “powder” and another bottle was found in the kitchen placed upside down in another container. 4 The State, therefore, maintains that “the two offenses did not grow out of the same act or transaction” and, as such, merger is not appropriate. “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause *416 of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state c 2015The State points out that, besides the bottle found underneath the table in which methamphetamine was being “cooked,” two bottles were found on the back porch containing a “powder” and another bottle was found in the kitchen placed upside down in another container. 4 The State, therefore, maintains that “the two offenses did not grow out of the same act or transaction” and, as such, merger is not appropriate. “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause *416 of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state c | 1 | 3 |
Purnell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The Double Jeopardy Clause “provides the criminally accused with protection from, inter alia, multiple punishment stemming from the same offense.” Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 691 , 827 A.2d 68 (2003). 2015The Double Jeopardy Clause “provides the criminally accused with protection from, inter alia, multiple punishment stemming from the same offense.” Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 691 , 827 A.2d 68 (2003). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. HANDGUN PERMIT
green
2 sentences2015The State points out that, besides the bottle found underneath the table in which methamphetamine was being “cooked,” two bottles were found on the back porch containing a “powder” and another bottle was found in the kitchen placed upside down in another container. 4 The State, therefore, maintains that “the two offenses did not grow out of the same act or transaction” and, as such, merger is not appropriate. “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause *416 of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state c 2011It emphasizes that “[cjonspiracy ... is not ‘part and parcel’ of the substantive crime of murder.” Rather “[cjonspiracy to commit murder is a separate offense, for which the legislature intended a separate sentence.” The State argues that “[p]rin-ciples of fundamental fairness do not trump the clear legislative intent to permit separate sentences.” This Court recently addressed principles of merger in, Moore v. State, 198 Md.App. 655, 684-85 , 18 A.3d 981 (2011), where Judge Woodward explained: “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeop | 3 | 2011–2015 |
JUNGO v. State
green
2 sentences2015The State points out that, besides the bottle found underneath the table in which methamphetamine was being “cooked,” two bottles were found on the back porch containing a “powder” and another bottle was found in the kitchen placed upside down in another container. 4 The State, therefore, maintains that “the two offenses did not grow out of the same act or transaction” and, as such, merger is not appropriate. “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeopardy Clause *416 of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state c 2011It emphasizes that “[cjonspiracy ... is not ‘part and parcel’ of the substantive crime of murder.” Rather “[cjonspiracy to commit murder is a separate offense, for which the legislature intended a separate sentence.” The State argues that “[p]rin-ciples of fundamental fairness do not trump the clear legislative intent to permit separate sentences.” This Court recently addressed principles of merger in, Moore v. State, 198 Md.App. 655, 684-85 , 18 A.3d 981 (2011), where Judge Woodward explained: “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeop | 3 | 2011–2015 |
Moore v. State
green
2 sentences2011It emphasizes that “[cjonspiracy ... is not ‘part and parcel’ of the substantive crime of murder.” Rather “[cjonspiracy to commit murder is a separate offense, for which the legislature intended a separate sentence.” The State argues that “[p]rin-ciples of fundamental fairness do not trump the clear legislative intent to permit separate sentences.” This Court recently addressed principles of merger in, Moore v. State, 198 Md.App. 655, 684-85 , 18 A.3d 981 (2011), where Judge Woodward explained: “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeop 2011It emphasizes that “[cjonspiracy ... is not ‘part and parcel’ of the substantive crime of murder.” Rather “[cjonspiracy to commit murder is a separate offense, for which the legislature intended a separate sentence.” The State argues that “[p]rin-ciples of fundamental fairness do not trump the clear legislative intent to permit separate sentences.” This Court recently addressed principles of merger in, Moore v. State, 198 Md.App. 655, 684-85 , 18 A.3d 981 (2011), where Judge Woodward explained: “ ‘The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the Double Jeop | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences2007To determine whether one offense merges into another, Maryland courts apply the “required evidence” test derived from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). 2007To determine whether one offense merges into another, Maryland courts apply the “required evidence” test derived from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). | 1 | 2007–2007 |