De Bour analysis in New York

2024Our De Bour test, in which constitutional law and common law both played a part, is more protective of the rights of individuals to be free from aggressive governmental interference" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; see also People v Gates , 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [2018] [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach"]; People v Mundo , 99 NY2d 55, 58 [2002]; People v Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 24 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991] ["in the past this Court has not hesitated to interpret article

2024Our De Bour test, in which constitutional law and common law both played a part, is more protective of the rights of individuals to be free from aggressive governmental interference" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; see also People v Gates , 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [2018] [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach"]; People v Mundo , 99 NY2d 55, 58 [2002]; People v Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 24 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991] ["in the past this Court has not hesitated to interpret article

2025We begin by noting that, when examining canine sniff searches performed in various settings, from a vehicle's exterior to a shipping facility to an apartment building hallway, the Court of Appeals has applied the four-tiered De Bour framework ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) of graduated levels of suspicion corresponding with levels of permissible police intrusion ( see People v Devone , 15 NY3d 106, 113 [2010]; People v Offen , 78 NY2d 1089, 1091 [1991]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]).

2025As indicated in [*2]that seminal case, the De Bour analysis "requires a weighing of the government's interest against the encroachment involved with respect to an individual's right to privacy and personal security" ( People v De Bour , 40 NY2d at 215 ; see People v Davis , 204 AD3d 1072, 1074 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1032 [2022]).

2025The De Bour framework applies equally to street encounters and traffic stops ( People v Garcia , 20 NY3d 317, 324 [2012]).

2025The De Bour framework applies equally to street encounters and traffic stops ( People v Garcia , 20 NY3d 317, 324 [2012]).

2021The Court of Appeals has held that an officer's instruction to a pedestrian to "stop" requires only a common-law right of inquiry and does not constitute a seizure ( see People v Bora , [*3] 83 NY2d 531, 533 ).

2018The People correctly concede, however, that the officer's encounter with defendant constituted a level three forcible detention under the four-tiered De Bour framework ( 40 NY2d at 223 ; see generally People v Bora , 83 NY2d 531, 535 [1994]), and thus required "a reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was involved in a felony or misdemeanor" ( People v Moore , 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]).

2024Our De Bour test, in which constitutional law and common law both played a part, is more protective of the rights of individuals to be free from aggressive governmental interference" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; see also People v Gates , 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [2018] [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach"]; People v Mundo , 99 NY2d 55, 58 [2002]; People v Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 24 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991] ["in the past this Court has not hesitated to interpret article

2024Our De Bour test, in which constitutional law and common law both played a part, is more protective of the rights of individuals to be free from aggressive governmental interference" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; see also People v Gates , 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [2018] [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach"]; People v Mundo , 99 NY2d 55, 58 [2002]; People v Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 24 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991] ["in the past this Court has not hesitated to interpret article

2018The People correctly concede, however, that the officer's encounter with defendant constituted a level three forcible detention under the four-tiered De Bour framework ( 40 NY2d at 223 ; see generally People v Bora , 83 NY2d 531, 535 [1994]), and thus required "a reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was involved in a felony or misdemeanor" ( People v Moore , 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]).

2016Had the legislature intended to include violation level offenses, it most certainly would have done so, as it did in CPL 140.10 (1), which states: “[A] police officer may arrest a person for: “(a) Any offense when he or she has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such offense in his or her presence; and “(b) A crime when he or she has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his or her presence or otherwise.” 1 In People v Moore ( 6 NY3d 496 [2006]), the Court of Appeals reiterated the requirements necessary to justify a forcible

2018Even under our established De Bour standard, the Trooper "can ask about" that ( id. ; see also Moore, 47 N.Y.2d at 912 , 419 N.Y.S.2d 495 , 393 N.E.2d 489 ).

2018Even under our established De Bour standard, the Trooper "can ask about" that ( id. ; see also Moore, 47 N.Y.2d at 912 , 419 N.Y.S.2d 495 , 393 N.E.2d 489 ).

2014“Regardless of whether . . . the citizen-informant’s basis of knowledge was sufficiently established . . . , the combination of his report to the police and the officers’ observation^] . . . provided the requisite reasonable suspicion” (Matter of Shallany S., 11 AD3d 414, 414 [2004]; see People v Gresty, 237 AD2d 931, 932 [1997]).

2014“Regardless of whether . . . the citizen-informant’s basis of knowledge was sufficiently established . . . , the combination of his report to the police and the officers’ observation^] . . . provided the requisite reasonable suspicion” (Matter of Shallany S., 11 AD3d 414, 414 [2004]; see People v Gresty, 237 AD2d 931, 932 [1997]).

2024Our De Bour test, in which constitutional law and common law both played a part, is more protective of the rights of individuals to be free from aggressive governmental interference" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; see also People v Gates , 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [2018] [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach"]; People v Mundo , 99 NY2d 55, 58 [2002]; People v Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 24 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991] ["in the past this Court has not hesitated to interpret article

2024Our De Bour test, in which constitutional law and common law both played a part, is more protective of the rights of individuals to be free from aggressive governmental interference" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; see also People v Gates , 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [2018] [Garcia, J., dissenting] ["The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach"]; People v Mundo , 99 NY2d 55, 58 [2002]; People v Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 24 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991] ["in the past this Court has not hesitated to interpret article

2014“Regardless of whether . . . the citizen-informant’s basis of knowledge was sufficiently established . . . , the combination of his report to the police and the officers’ observation^] . . . provided the requisite reasonable suspicion” (Matter of Shallany S., 11 AD3d 414, 414 [2004]; see People v Gresty, 237 AD2d 931, 932 [1997]).

2014“Regardless of whether . . . the citizen-informant’s basis of knowledge was sufficiently established . . . , the combination of his report to the police and the officers’ observation^] . . . provided the requisite reasonable suspicion” (Matter of Shallany S., 11 AD3d 414, 414 [2004]; see People v Gresty, 237 AD2d 931, 932 [1997]).

2026Insofar as any additional investigation occurs, it is directed at establishing the subject's whereabouts ( see People v Ebron , 275 AD2d 490, 491 [3d Dept 2000] [holding De Bour inapplicable when "the arresting officer approached defendant to execute a concededly valid arrest warrant" after searching for and finding him during patrol]). [*5]Because probable cause to arrest had already been established here, the intricacies of graduated De Bour analysis of observed criminality are simply not relevant.

2026Insofar as any additional investigation occurs, it is directed at establishing the subject's whereabouts ( see People v Ebron , 275 AD2d 490, 491 [3d Dept 2000] [holding De Bour inapplicable when "the arresting officer approached defendant to execute a concededly valid arrest warrant" after searching for and finding him during patrol]). [*5]Because probable cause to arrest had already been established here, the intricacies of graduated De Bour analysis of observed criminality are simply not relevant.

2025We begin by noting that, when examining canine sniff searches performed in various settings, from a vehicle's exterior to a shipping facility to an apartment building hallway, the Court of Appeals has applied the four-tiered De Bour framework ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) of graduated levels of suspicion corresponding with levels of permissible police intrusion ( see People v Devone , 15 NY3d 106, 113 [2010]; People v Offen , 78 NY2d 1089, 1091 [1991]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]).

2025We begin by noting that, when examining canine sniff searches performed in various settings, from a vehicle's exterior to a shipping facility to an apartment building hallway, the Court of Appeals has applied the four-tiered De Bour framework ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) of graduated levels of suspicion corresponding with levels of permissible police intrusion ( see People v Devone , 15 NY3d 106, 113 [2010]; People v Offen , 78 NY2d 1089, 1091 [1991]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]).

2020With respect to the initial encounter, unlike a stop of a moving vehicle — which must be based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ( see People v Ocasio , 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995]) or probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred ( see People v Hinshaw , 35 NY3d 427 , 434 [2020]) — "[a] police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis" and is justified if "supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality" ( People v Stover , 181 AD3d at 1062 [internal quotation marks and cit

2020With respect to the initial encounter, unlike a stop of a moving vehicle — which must be based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ( see People v Ocasio , 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995]) or probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred ( see People v Hinshaw , 35 NY3d 427 , 434 [2020]) — "[a] police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis" and is justified if "supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality" ( People v Stover , 181 AD3d at 1062 [internal quotation marks and cit

2020A police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis ( see People v Stevenson , 149 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1134 [2017]; People v Boler , 106 AD3d 1119, 1121 [2013]). [FN2] Thus, police officers were authorized to approach defendant's vehicle and ask him "briefly about his . . . identity, destination, or reason for being in the area" only if this intrusion was "supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality" ( People v Grays , 179 AD3d 1149 , ___, 2020 NY Slip Op 00002, *1 [2020] [int

2020A police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis ( see People v Stevenson , 149 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1134 [2017]; People v Boler , 106 AD3d 1119, 1121 [2013]). [FN2] Thus, police officers were authorized to approach defendant's vehicle and ask him "briefly about his . . . identity, destination, or reason for being in the area" only if this intrusion was "supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality" ( People v Grays , 179 AD3d 1149 , ___, 2020 NY Slip Op 00002, *1 [2020] [int

2015Moving to the next step of the De Bour analysis, we conclude that the deputy sheriffs questions of defendant were reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances that justified the interference (see id. at 215 ; see also People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1989]; People v Davis, 81 AD3d 1321, 1321-1322 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 858 [2011]).

2015Moving to the next step of the De Bour analysis, we conclude that the deputy sheriffs questions of defendant were reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances that justified the interference (see id. at 215 ; see also People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1989]; People v Davis, 81 AD3d 1321, 1321-1322 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 858 [2011]).

2015Our decision herein does not conflict with McIntosh ( 96 NY2d 521 ), which teaches that geography alone, that is, mere presence in a high-crime location, does not provide a predicate for even a level one De Bour inquiry (see id. at 526-527).

2015Our decision herein does not conflict with McIntosh ( 96 NY2d 521 ), which teaches that geography alone, that is, mere presence in a high-crime location, does not provide a predicate for even a level one De Bour inquiry (see id. at 526-527).

2005Under the first tier of the De Bour framework, police may approach an individual for the purpose of requesting information, the least intrusive level of police inquiry, in the absence of any indication of criminality, provided that there is an objective and credible reason for doing so ( People v De Bour at 213 ; People v Hollman at 189-190 ; People v Reyes , 83 NY2d 945, 946 [1994], cert denied 513 US 991 [1994]; People v Powell , 89 NY2d 1063, 1064 [1997]; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d 32, 33 [2005]).

2005Under the first tier of the De Bour framework, police may approach an individual for the purpose of requesting information, the least intrusive level of police inquiry, in the absence of any indication of criminality, provided that there is an objective and credible reason for doing so ( People v De Bour at 213 ; People v Hollman at 189-190 ; People v Reyes , 83 NY2d 945, 946 [1994], cert denied 513 US 991 [1994]; People v Powell , 89 NY2d 1063, 1064 [1997]; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d 32, 33 [2005]).

2005Under the first tier of the De Bour framework, police may approach an individual for the purpose of requesting information, the least intrusive level of police inquiry, in the absence of any indication of criminality, provided that there is an objective and credible reason for doing so ( People v De Bour at 213 ; People v Hollman at 189-190 ; People v Reyes , 83 NY2d 945, 946 [1994], cert denied 513 US 991 [1994]; People v Powell , 89 NY2d 1063, 1064 [1997]; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d 32, 33 [2005]).

2005Under the first tier of the De Bour framework, police may approach an individual for the purpose of requesting information, the least intrusive level of police inquiry, in the absence of any indication of criminality, provided that there is an objective and credible reason for doing so ( People v De Bour at 213 ; People v Hollman at 189-190 ; People v Reyes , 83 NY2d 945, 946 [1994], cert denied 513 US 991 [1994]; People v Powell , 89 NY2d 1063, 1064 [1997]; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d 32, 33 [2005]).

2005Under the first tier of the De Bour framework, police may approach an individual for the purpose of requesting information, the least intrusive level of police inquiry, in the absence of any indication of criminality, provided that there is an objective and credible reason for doing so ( People v De Bour at 213 ; People v Hollman at 189-190 ; People v Reyes , 83 NY2d 945, 946 [1994], cert denied 513 US 991 [1994]; People v Powell , 89 NY2d 1063, 1064 [1997]; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d 32, 33 [2005]).

2005Under the first tier of the De Bour framework, police may approach an individual for the purpose of requesting information, the least intrusive level of police inquiry, in the absence of any indication of criminality, provided that there is an objective and credible reason for doing so ( People v De Bour at 213 ; People v Hollman at 189-190 ; People v Reyes , 83 NY2d 945, 946 [1994], cert denied 513 US 991 [1994]; People v Powell , 89 NY2d 1063, 1064 [1997]; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d 32, 33 [2005]).

2018Whereas federal law dictates that "mere police questioning" generally does not trigger constitutional protections ( see Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 ), the De Bour standard "forbids police officers to talk to people they meet in the street unless certain preconditions are met" ( Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d at 324 , 959 N.Y.S.2d 464 , 983 N.E.2d 259 [Smith, J., dissenting] ).

2018Whereas federal law dictates that "mere police questioning" generally does not trigger constitutional protections ( see Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 ), the De Bour standard "forbids police officers to talk to people they meet in the street unless certain preconditions are met" ( Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d at 324 , 959 N.Y.S.2d 464 , 983 N.E.2d 259 [Smith, J., dissenting] ).

2020A police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis ( see People v Stevenson , 149 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1134 [2017]; People v Boler , 106 AD3d 1119, 1121 [2013]). [FN2] Thus, police officers were authorized to approach defendant's vehicle and ask him "briefly about his . . . identity, destination, or reason for being in the area" only if this intrusion was "supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality" ( People v Grays , 179 AD3d 1149 , ___, 2020 NY Slip Op 00002, *1 [2020] [int

2020A police approach to an occupied, stationary vehicle is subject to the first level of the De Bour analysis ( see People v Stevenson , 149 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1134 [2017]; People v Boler , 106 AD3d 1119, 1121 [2013]). [FN2] Thus, police officers were authorized to approach defendant's vehicle and ask him "briefly about his . . . identity, destination, or reason for being in the area" only if this intrusion was "supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality" ( People v Grays , 179 AD3d 1149 , ___, 2020 NY Slip Op 00002, *1 [2020] [int

2018In a vehicle, a "driver can make unobserved movements," thereby increasing "the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault" ( Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 , 110, 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 [1977] [noting that "a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ] ).

2018In a vehicle, a "driver can make unobserved movements," thereby increasing "the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault" ( Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 , 110, 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 [1977] [noting that "a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ] ).

2018In particular, the Fourth Amendment recognizes that "a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest" is not required to "simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape" ( Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 [1972] ).

2018In particular, the Fourth Amendment recognizes that "a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest" is not required to "simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape" ( Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 [1972] ).

2018The De Bour framework applies not only to street encounters, but also to traffic stops ( see People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d 317 , 959 N.Y.S.2d 464 , 983 N.E.2d 259 [2012] )-encounters inherently "fraught *865 **472 with danger to police officers" ( Long, 463 U.S. at 1047 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 ; People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773 , 774, 545 N.Y.S.2d 90 , 543 N.E.2d 733 [1989] ).

2018The De Bour framework applies not only to street encounters, but also to traffic stops ( see People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d 317 , 959 N.Y.S.2d 464 , 983 N.E.2d 259 [2012] )-encounters inherently "fraught *865 **472 with danger to police officers" ( Long, 463 U.S. at 1047 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 ; People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773 , 774, 545 N.Y.S.2d 90 , 543 N.E.2d 733 [1989] ).

2025Where a car is parked, such an action generally requires at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. ( See, e.g. , People v. Rossetti , 148 AD2d 357, 358 [1st Dep't 1989] ["In the absence of any indication of criminal activity . . . there was no basis for opening the car doors."]). [FN1] Here, Officer Kim observed a car parked in a no-parking zone with a person in the driver's seat apparently asleep.

2025Where a car is parked, such an action generally requires at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. ( See, e.g. , People v. Rossetti , 148 AD2d 357, 358 [1st Dep't 1989] ["In the absence of any indication of criminal activity . . . there was no basis for opening the car doors."]). [FN1] Here, Officer Kim observed a car parked in a no-parking zone with a person in the driver's seat apparently asleep.

2025We begin by noting that, when examining canine sniff searches performed in various settings, from a vehicle's exterior to a shipping facility to an apartment building hallway, the Court of Appeals has applied the four-tiered De Bour framework ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) of graduated levels of suspicion corresponding with levels of permissible police intrusion ( see People v Devone , 15 NY3d 106, 113 [2010]; People v Offen , 78 NY2d 1089, 1091 [1991]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]).

2025We begin by noting that, when examining canine sniff searches performed in various settings, from a vehicle's exterior to a shipping facility to an apartment building hallway, the Court of Appeals has applied the four-tiered De Bour framework ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) of graduated levels of suspicion corresponding with levels of permissible police intrusion ( see People v Devone , 15 NY3d 106, 113 [2010]; People v Offen , 78 NY2d 1089, 1091 [1991]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]).