pure foreseeability analysis (Maine) · Go Syfert
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pure foreseeability analysis in Maine

7 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Cameron v. Pepingreen
me · 1992 · cited in 5 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1998–2015
2 sentences

2015In Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982.), the Law Court held that "a bystander may recover damages for serious mental distress foreseeably resulting from witnessing another person harmed by the tortfeasor's negligent act." In Cameron v. Pepin, the court found that liability for indirect victims should be limited based upon policy considerations and rejected a pure foreseeability standard. 610 A.2d 279, 283-84 (Me. 1992).

1998See Nelson, 677 A.2d at 548 ; Cameron, 610 A.2d at 283-84 (rejecting a pure foreseeability test and explaining that circumscribed duty of care in the context of claims made by bystanders for psychic injury reflects policy considerations). [¶ 14] It is undisputed that Champagne did not witness Makita being nursed by the wrong mother and that she did not learn about the incident until about one hour *847 afterward.

55
Nelson v. Flanagangreen
me · 1996 · cited in 2 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1998–2015
2 sentences

2015In Nelson v. Flanagan, the Law Court described its rejection of a pure foreseeability standard noting "the need for courts to consider competing policy arguments in their determinations of the extent of a defendant's duty." 677 A.2d 545, 547-548 (Me. 1996).

1998See Nelson, 677 A.2d at 548 ; Cameron, 610 A.2d at 283-84 (rejecting a pure foreseeability test and explaining that circumscribed duty of care in the context of claims made by bystanders for psychic injury reflects policy considerations). [¶ 14] It is undisputed that Champagne did not witness Makita being nursed by the wrong mother and that she did not learn about the incident until about one hour *847 afterward.

22
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc.green
me · 1982 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015In Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982.), the Law Court held that "a bystander may recover damages for serious mental distress foreseeably resulting from witnessing another person harmed by the tortfeasor's negligent act." In Cameron v. Pepin, the court found that liability for indirect victims should be limited based upon policy considerations and rejected a pure foreseeability standard. 610 A.2d 279, 283-84 (Me. 1992).

11
Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc.green
me · 1987 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001Although our earlier cases discussed the claim in terms of foreseeability of psychic harm, see Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me.1987), we have since expressly declined to apply a pure foreseeability analysis to determine whether a duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm exists.

11
Devine v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc.green
me · 1994 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999See id. [¶ 31] In examining the scope of this tort, we have declined to apply a pure foreseeability analysis to determine when a duty arises.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Curtis v. Porter green
me · 2001
2 sentences

2011The Court has "since expressly declined to apply a pure foreseeability analysis to determine whether a duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm exists." Curtis, 2001 ME 158 , ~ 18 n. 15, 784 A.2d at 25 n. 15.

2011The Court has "since expressly declined to apply a pure foreseeability analysis to determine whether a duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm exists." Curtis, 2001 ME 158 , ~ 18 n. 15, 784 A.2d at 25 n. 15.

22011–2013
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. green
me · 1999
2 sentences

2009Bryan R., 1999 ME 144 , en 31, 738 A.2d at 848 ; Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279,282 (Me. 1992).

2001Bryan R., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 31 , 738 A.2d at 848 ; Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 282 (Me.1992). .

22001–2009
Rubin v. Matthews International Corp. green
me · 1986
1 sentence

2011Whether one party owes a duty of care to another is also "informed by 'the hand of history, our ideals of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.'" Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57 , ~ 3 The Law Court has previously noted that a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may exist in the cases of "negligent transmission of death messages and the negligent mishandling of corpses." Rubin v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 503 A.2d 694 , 699 n. 5 (Me. 1986) (untimely delivery of a me

12011–2011
Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland green
me · 2005
1 sentence

2011Whether one party owes a duty of care to another is also "informed by 'the hand of history, our ideals of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.'" Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57 , ~ 3 The Law Court has previously noted that a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may exist in the cases of "negligent transmission of death messages and the negligent mishandling of corpses." Rubin v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 503 A.2d 694 , 699 n. 5 (Me. 1986) (untimely delivery of a me

12011–2011

Where else courts name it

ME 7 (1998–2015) CT 4 (1990–1996) MO 3 (1993–1994) CA 2 (1989–1990)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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