fdutpa claim in Florida

2022Specifically, the court examined whether section 501.2105 “entitle[s] a prevailing defendant to an attorney’s fee award in a case in which a 5 plaintiff brings [a FDUTPA claim], but the district court decides that the substantive law of a different state governs the unfair trade practices claim, and the defendant ultimately prevails on that claim.” Id. at 366–67 (emphasis added).

2022Specifically, the court examined whether section 501.2105 “entitle[s] a prevailing defendant to an attorney’s fee award in a case in which a 5 plaintiff brings [a FDUTPA claim], but the district court decides that the substantive law of a different state governs the unfair trade practices claim, and the defendant ultimately prevails on that claim.” Id. at 366–67 (emphasis added).

2025Good Air alleged that Litecrete engaged in fraudulent billing practices, which was sufficient. 3 Next, Litecrete argues that Good Air did not allege facts satisfying the elements of a FDUTPA claim, specifically arguing that Good Air did not suffer “actual damages.” In the context of FDUTPA, “actual damages are ‘the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.’” Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Baker, 84 So. 3d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st D

2025Good Air alleged that Litecrete engaged in fraudulent billing practices, which was sufficient. 3 Next, Litecrete argues that Good Air did not allege facts satisfying the elements of a FDUTPA claim, specifically arguing that Good Air did not suffer “actual damages.” In the context of FDUTPA, “actual damages are ‘the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.’” Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Baker, 84 So. 3d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st D

2026See Dorestin v. Hollywood Imps., Inc., 45 So. 3d 819 , 824–25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("Proof of actual damages is necessary to sustain a FDUTPA claim.

2026See Dorestin v. Hollywood Imps., Inc., 45 So. 3d 819 , 824–25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("Proof of actual damages is necessary to sustain a FDUTPA claim.

2025As for the Mover Defendants’ argument that Thompson should not have been found liable in his individual capacity, this argument also lacks merit. “[I]t has long been the law in Florida that in order to proceed against an individual using a FDUTPA violation theory[,] an aggrieved party must allege that the individual was a direct participant in the improper dealings.” KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

2024Similarly, it has long been the law in Florida that in order to proceed against an individual using a FDUTPA violation theory an aggrieved party must allege that the individual was a direct participant in the improper dealings. 6 KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069 , 1073–74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citations omitted); see also Wyndham, 869 So. 2d at 598 .

2017Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

2017Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

2003NOTES [1] See Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So.2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reversing trial court's dismissal of a FDUTPA claim stemming from a single automobile purchase); Davich v. Norman Bros.

2003NOTES [1] See Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So.2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reversing trial court's dismissal of a FDUTPA claim stemming from a single automobile purchase); Davich v. Norman Bros.

2025See, e.g., Rustic Vill., Inc. v. Friedman, 417 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Brown v. Gardens by the Sea S. Condo.

2013See Rustic Village, 417 So.2d at 305-06 .

2024As to the remaining counts, we affirm the court's summary judgment as to the Tennis Club's FDUTPA claim, count II, under the authority of Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979).

2023As to the remaining counts, we affirm the court's summary judgment as to the Tennis Club's FDUTPA claim, count II, under the authority of Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979).

2013The Heindel court elaborated further that even if a FDUTPA claim is based on the same transaction as an alternative theory of recovery, a court may allocate attorney’s fees under section 501.2105 for only the FDUTPA portion of an action if either (1) counsel admits that the other services provided in that action were unrelated to the FDUTPA claim, or (2) a party establishes that the services related to non-FDUTPA claims “were clearly beyond the scope of a 501 proceeding.” Id. at 272 ; see also Mandel, 965 So.2d at 314 .

2013The Heindel court elaborated further that even if a FDUTPA claim is based on the same transaction as an alternative theory of recovery, a court may allocate attorney’s fees under section 501.2105 for only the FDUTPA portion of an action if either (1) counsel admits that the other services provided in that action were unrelated to the FDUTPA claim, or (2) a party establishes that the services related to non-FDUTPA claims “were clearly beyond the scope of a 501 proceeding.” Id. at 272 ; see also Mandel, 965 So.2d at 314 .

2012See § 501.2015(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729, 737 (S.D.Fla.2007) (denying class certification in FDUTPA claim, where the plaintiffs theory of deception was based on omissions by Home Depot regarding its price calculations, which would require numerous mini-trials, and where attorney’s fees are awarded to the prevailing plaintiff, and finding that “even in cases where the damages are small, the cost of bringing a suit would not deter potential FDUTPA plaintiffs”).

2010See Black Diamond Props., Inc. v. Haines, 940 So.2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding that individual issues predominated where complaint was based upon allegation of misrepresentations in 500 separate oral contracts); Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729, 737 (S.D.Fla.2007) (denying certification of a FDUTPA class suit over carpet installation costs because such a class claim “would be an exercise in inefficiency, and the need for individualized determinations as to the existence of a deceptive act leads to the conclusion that common facts do not predominate as to Plaintiff

2006Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla., 429 Mich. 410 , 415 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1987)).

2006Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla., 429 Mich. 410 , 415 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1987)).

2025For example, in Heindel v. Southside Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the First District affirmed an attorney’s fee award to a FDUTPA defendant after the defendant (a sales representative) was found not liable on all counts, including the FDUTPA count. 476 So. 2d 266 , 271–72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

2016At a jury trial, after Heindel concluded his case-in-chief, Southside successfully moved for a directed verdict ás to the FDUTPA claim, arguing there was no “consumer transaction.” Id. at 267-68 .

2025In State, Office of Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs v. Wyndham International, Inc., 869 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the court applied Doe to a FDUTPA claim: “A deceptive or unfair trade practice constitutes a somewhat unique tortious act because, although it is similar to a claim of fraud, it is different in that, unlike fraud, a party asserting a deceptive trade practice claim need not show actual reliance on the representation or omission at issue.” Id. at 598 .

2025In State, Office of Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs v. Wyndham International, Inc., 869 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the court applied Doe to a FDUTPA claim: “A deceptive or unfair trade practice constitutes a somewhat unique tortious act because, although it is similar to a claim of fraud, it is different in that, unlike fraud, a party asserting a deceptive trade practice claim need not show actual reliance on the representation or omission at issue.” Id. at 598 .

2025Good Air alleged that Litecrete engaged in fraudulent billing practices, which was sufficient. 3 Next, Litecrete argues that Good Air did not allege facts satisfying the elements of a FDUTPA claim, specifically arguing that Good Air did not suffer “actual damages.” In the context of FDUTPA, “actual damages are ‘the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.’” Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Baker, 84 So. 3d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st D

2025Good Air alleged that Litecrete engaged in fraudulent billing practices, which was sufficient. 3 Next, Litecrete argues that Good Air did not allege facts satisfying the elements of a FDUTPA claim, specifically arguing that Good Air did not suffer “actual damages.” In the context of FDUTPA, “actual damages are ‘the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.’” Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Baker, 84 So. 3d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st D

2006The Third District disagreed, holding that in a FDUTPA claim, members of the class do not need to individually prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, and it "is sufficient if the class can establish that a reasonable person would have relied on the representations." Id. at 703 (quoting Dix v. Am.

2006The Third District disagreed, holding that in a FDUTPA claim, members of the class do not need to individually prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, and it "is sufficient if the class can establish that a reasonable person would have relied on the representations." Id. at 703 (quoting Dix v. Am.

2005Id. at 404 ; see also World Vacation Travel, S.A. de C.V. v. Brooker, 799 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that when FDUTPA claim arises solely out of parties' time-sharing contract, mandatory venue provision in purchase agreement is enforceable).

2004But in World Vacation Travel, S.A., de C.V. v. Brooker, 799 So.2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), rev. denied, 821 So.2d 292 (Fla.2002), the third district distinguished Management Computer as a case involving a FDUTPA claim which did not arise out of the parties' contract, and which was severable from the other claims.

2003Nissan, Inc., 739 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (vacating summary judgment on a FDUTPA claim based on a single transaction in which an automobile dealer allegedly concealed damage to the paint finish of a car purchased by the plaintiff); Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (reversing a directed verdict on a FDUTPA claim stemming from a single transaction in which the dealer allegedly misrepresented the price of the car being sold and the value of the consumer's trade-in); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So.2d 451, 453-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)

2003Nissan, Inc., 739 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (vacating summary judgment on a FDUTPA claim based on a single transaction in which an automobile dealer allegedly concealed damage to the paint finish of a car purchased by the plaintiff); Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (reversing a directed verdict on a FDUTPA claim stemming from a single transaction in which the dealer allegedly misrepresented the price of the car being sold and the value of the consumer's trade-in); Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So.2d 451, 453-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)

2026Corp. v. Butler, 985 So. 2d 1133, 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

2026Corp. v. Butler, 985 So. 2d 1133, 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

2025See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of Broward Cnty., 951 So. 2d at 971 (explaining that section 501.2105(1) gives the trial court discretion to withhold fees even from a prevailing defendant after weighing equitable factors); Chow v. Chak Yam Chau, 640 F. App’x 834, 841 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n the absence of a plaintiff’s success on some theory of 9 recovery, under Florida law, the lack of success by a defendant on a counterclaim does not disqualify a defendant from ‘prevailing party’ status in the litigation.”).

2025See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of Broward Cnty., 951 So. 2d at 971 (explaining that section 501.2105(1) gives the trial court discretion to withhold fees even from a prevailing defendant after weighing equitable factors); Chow v. Chak Yam Chau, 640 F. App’x 834, 841 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n the absence of a plaintiff’s success on some theory of 9 recovery, under Florida law, the lack of success by a defendant on a counterclaim does not disqualify a defendant from ‘prevailing party’ status in the litigation.”).

2025See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of Broward Cnty., 951 So. 2d at 971 (explaining that section 501.2105(1) gives the trial court discretion to withhold fees even from a prevailing defendant after weighing equitable factors); Chow v. Chak Yam Chau, 640 F. App’x 834, 841 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n the absence of a plaintiff’s success on some theory of 9 recovery, under Florida law, the lack of success by a defendant on a counterclaim does not disqualify a defendant from ‘prevailing party’ status in the litigation.”).

2025See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of Broward Cnty., 951 So. 2d at 971 (explaining that section 501.2105(1) gives the trial court discretion to withhold fees even from a prevailing defendant after weighing equitable factors); Chow v. Chak Yam Chau, 640 F. App’x 834, 841 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n the absence of a plaintiff’s success on some theory of 9 recovery, under Florida law, the lack of success by a defendant on a counterclaim does not disqualify a defendant from ‘prevailing party’ status in the litigation.”).

2025See Gonzalez v. Nobregas, 357 So. 3d 193 , 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Based on the record before us, the discretionary nature of prevailing party fees under FDUTPA, and the analytical framework described above, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of fees and costs to Gonzalez on the FDUTPA claim.”), reh’g denied (Feb. 15, 2023); Granoff v. Seidle, 915 So. 2d 674, 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting that prevailing-party finding is discretionary).

2025See Gonzalez v. Nobregas, 357 So. 3d 193 , 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Based on the record before us, the discretionary nature of prevailing party fees under FDUTPA, and the analytical framework described above, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of fees and costs to Gonzalez on the FDUTPA claim.”), reh’g denied (Feb. 15, 2023); Granoff v. Seidle, 915 So. 2d 674, 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting that prevailing-party finding is discretionary).

2024While it is true that “[a] FDUTPA claim cannot be stated based upon oral misrepresentations which are in contradiction of written terms of a contract,” Dorestin v. Hollywood Imports, Inc., 45 So. 3d 819, 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the agreements here only purport to release Simcenter itself from liability for JetU’s actions, not Simcenter’s officers. 8 “If the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by it.” Moor

2024While it is true that “[a] FDUTPA claim cannot be stated based upon oral misrepresentations which are in contradiction of written terms of a contract,” Dorestin v. Hollywood Imports, Inc., 45 So. 3d 819, 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the agreements here only purport to release Simcenter itself from liability for JetU’s actions, not Simcenter’s officers. 8 “If the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact to be determined by it.” Moor

2024Co., 425 So. 2d 636, 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“Individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable when they have committed a tort even if such acts are committed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers or agents.”); KC Leisure, 972 So. 2d at 1074 (finding FDUTPA claim sufficiently alleged that corporate defendant was “direct participant” in deceptive agreement to withhold disclosure requirements from prospective franchisees where “[t]he complaint alleged that the defendants, including Mr. Haber, collectively and unanimously cooked up the scheme” and that