7 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
May v. Figginsgreen2 sentences2008A forum selection clause is “unreasonable and unenforceable if the agreement is not ‘deliberately and understandingly made,’ and if the contractual language does not ‘clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver’ of personal jurisdiction.” Milanovich , ¶ 11 (citing May v. Figgins, 186 Mont. 383, 394 , 607 P.2d 1132, 1138-39 (1980)). 2008A forum selection clause is “unreasonable and unenforceable if the agreement is not ‘deliberately and understandingly made,’ and if the contractual language does not ‘clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver’ of personal jurisdiction.” Milanovich , ¶ 11 (citing May v. Figgins, 186 Mont. 383, 394 , 607 P.2d 1132, 1138-39 (1980)). | 1 | 2 |
Lendingtree, LLC v. Andersongreen1 sentence2023North Carolina courts “generally enforce mandatory forum selection clauses.” Lendingtree v. Anderson, 747 S.E.2d 292, 297 (N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Berg v. MTC Electronics Technologies Co.green1 sentence2014Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“ ‘The company [MTC] has expressly submitted to the jurisdiction of the State of California and United States Federal courts sitting in the City of Los Angeles, California, for the purpose of any suit, action or proceedings arising out of this Offering.’ ”). ¶17 We conclude that the preceding authority establishes that the forum selection clause contained in the Purchase Agreement is mandatory in nature. 1 NaturEner and the District Court incorrectly focus their respective analyses on the word “consent.” While they accurately conclude that c | 1 | 1 |
CQL Original Products, Inc. v. National Hockey League Players' Ass'ngreen2 sentences2014Hockey League Players’ Assn., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 418-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Hunt v. Super. 2014Ct., 207 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 648 fn.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“ ‘Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement ... shall be litigated either in a state court for Ingham County, Michigan, or in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan.’ ”); Lu, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907 (“ ‘[A]ny and all litigation that may arise as a result of this Agreement shall be litigated in Dade County, Florida.’ ”); CQL Original Prods., Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414 (“ ‘[A]ny claims arising hereunder shall, at the Licensor’s election, be prosecuted in the appropriate court of Ontario | 1 | 1 |
Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of California, Inc.green1 sentence2014Ct., 207 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 648 fn.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“ ‘Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement ... shall be litigated either in a state court for Ingham County, Michigan, or in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan.’ ”); Lu, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907 (“ ‘[A]ny and all litigation that may arise as a result of this Agreement shall be litigated in Dade County, Florida.’ ”); CQL Original Prods., Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414 (“ ‘[A]ny claims arising hereunder shall, at the Licensor’s election, be prosecuted in the appropriate court of Ontario | 1 | 1 |
Furda v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2014Ct., 207 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 648 fn.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“ ‘Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement ... shall be litigated either in a state court for Ingham County, Michigan, or in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan.’ ”); Lu, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907 (“ ‘[A]ny and all litigation that may arise as a result of this Agreement shall be litigated in Dade County, Florida.’ ”); CQL Original Prods., Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414 (“ ‘[A]ny claims arising hereunder shall, at the Licensor’s election, be prosecuted in the appropriate court of Ontario | 1 | 1 |
Danka Funding Co. v. Sky City Casinogreen2 sentences2003Ct. Law Div. 1999), 747 A.2d 837, 843 (holding forum and choice of law provision insufficient to waive tribal immunity and stating: “The court has not found any authority nor has any been cited by counsel to support a waiver of immunity based on a tribal member signing a contract containing a forum selection clause ... [unlike] a waiver of tribal immunity where an arbitration clause was contained in a disputed contract.”); American Indian Agric. 2003Ct. Law Div.1999), 329 N.J.Super. 357 , 747 A.2d 837, 843 (holding forum and choice of law provision insufficient to waive tribal immunity and stating: "The court has not found any authority nor has any been cited by counsel to support a waiver of immunity based on a tribal member signing a contract containing a forum selection clause ... [unlike] a waiver of tribal immunity where an arbitration clause was contained in a disputed contract."); American Indian Agric. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Polzin v. Appleway Equipment Leasing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Leasing, Inc., 2008 MT 300, ¶ 13 , 345 Mont. 508 , 191 P.3d 476 (citation omitted). 2014Leasing, Inc., 2008 MT 300, ¶ 13 , 345 Mont. 508 , 191 P.3d 476 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
green
2 sentences2003Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374 , 1376 (8th Cir. 1985) (promissory note with choice of law provision and provision for attorney fees held insufficient to constitute waiver of tribal immunity). ¶35 To hold that waiver is “clear” from a contract such as the one here is to substantially eliminate the concept of tribal sovereign immunity by giving effect to any standard form contract with a choice of law provision. 2003Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374 , 1376 (8th Cir. 1985) (promissory note with choice of law provision and provision for attorney fees held insufficient to constitute waiver of tribal immunity). ¶ 35 To hold that waiver is "clear" from a contract such as the one here is to substantially eliminate the concept of tribal sovereign immunity by giving effect to any standard form contract with a choice of law provision. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State Ex Rel. Polaris Industries, Inc. v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District
green
2 sentences1998In each case, the forum selection clause was held to constitute “an improper restraint upon the [party’s] exercise of its rights to enforce the... contract by a ‘usual proceeding" in the ‘ordinary tribunals’ of Montana.” Rindal, 786 F. Supp. at 894 (citing Polaris, 215 Mont. at 111 , 695 P.2d at 472 ). ¶ 19 Although neither Rindal nor Polaris dealt with an arbitration agreement, Keystone maintains that the interest which § 28-2-708, MCA, was intended to protect, as applied in those cases, is as applicable to arbitration provisions as to contracts in general and, therefore, that we should apply 1998In each case, the forum selection clause was held to constitute “an improper restraint upon the [party’s] exercise of its rights to enforce the... contract by a ‘usual proceeding" in the ‘ordinary tribunals’ of Montana.” Rindal, 786 F. Supp. at 894 (citing Polaris, 215 Mont. at 111 , 695 P.2d at 472 ). ¶ 19 Although neither Rindal nor Polaris dealt with an arbitration agreement, Keystone maintains that the interest which § 28-2-708, MCA, was intended to protect, as applied in those cases, is as applicable to arbitration provisions as to contracts in general and, therefore, that we should apply | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Rindal v. Seckler Co. Inc.
green
1 sentence1998In each case, the forum selection clause was held to constitute “an improper restraint upon the [party’s] exercise of its rights to enforce the... contract by a ‘usual proceeding" in the ‘ordinary tribunals’ of Montana.” Rindal, 786 F. Supp. at 894 (citing Polaris, 215 Mont. at 111 , 695 P.2d at 472 ). ¶ 19 Although neither Rindal nor Polaris dealt with an arbitration agreement, Keystone maintains that the interest which § 28-2-708, MCA, was intended to protect, as applied in those cases, is as applicable to arbitration provisions as to contracts in general and, therefore, that we should apply | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1985Whereas formerly, a state could not make a binding judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state had no contacts, ties or relations ( Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 ), with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court beginning in 1945 ( International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ), it became recognized that due process is provided non-state residents if traditional notions of justice and fair play made them amenable to state jurisdictions away from home. 1985Whereas formerly, a state could not make a binding judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state had no contacts, ties or relations (Pehnoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed 565), with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court beginning in 1945 (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed 95), it became recognized that due process is provided non-state residents if traditional notions of justice and fair play made them amenable to state jurisdictions away from home. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1985Whereas formerly, a state could not make a binding judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state had no contacts, ties or relations (Pehnoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed 565), with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court beginning in 1945 (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed 95), it became recognized that due process is provided non-state residents if traditional notions of justice and fair play made them amenable to state jurisdictions away from home. 1985Whereas formerly, a state could not make a binding judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state had no contacts, ties or relations (Pehnoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed 565), with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court beginning in 1945 (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed 95), it became recognized that due process is provided non-state residents if traditional notions of justice and fair play made them amenable to state jurisdictions away from home. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.