7 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 2020–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.green2 sentences2023Furthermore, the entire purpose of Arlington Heights and its progeny is to empower plaintiffs alleging equal protection claims against legislation which appears neutral on its face to put forward “such circumstantial and direct evidence . . . as may be available” across a range of factors that the Supreme Court of the United States has deemed probative on the question of discriminatory intent. 429 U.S. at 266 .6 By the very nature of such claims, the evidence presented by plaintiffs 6 Although the majority does not specifically state that its new legal framework disfavors the Arlington Heights 2023Furthermore, the entire purpose of Arlington Heights and its progeny is to empower plaintiffs alleging equal protection claims against legislation which appears neutral on its face to put forward “such circumstantial and direct evidence . . . as may be available” across a range of factors that the Supreme Court of the United States has deemed probative on the question of discriminatory intent. 429 U.S. at 266 .6 By the very nature of such claims, the evidence presented by plaintiffs 6 Although the majority does not specifically state that its new legal framework disfavors the Arlington Heights | 5 | 7 |
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrorygreen2 sentences2023MOORE Morgan, J., dissenting other words, whether the law actually “produces disproportionate effects.” Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227 ;8 see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he district court’s findings that African Americans . . . disproportionately lacked the photo ID required by SL 2013- 381, if supported by the evidence, establishes sufficient disproportionate impact for an Arlington Heights analysis.”). 2023MOORE Morgan, J., dissenting other words, whether the law actually “produces disproportionate effects.” Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227 ;8 see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he district court’s findings that African Americans . . . disproportionately lacked the photo ID required by SL 2013- 381, if supported by the evidence, establishes sufficient disproportionate impact for an Arlington Heights analysis.”). | 3 | 3 |
Hunter v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2023MOORE Morgan, J., dissenting other words, whether the law actually “produces disproportionate effects.” Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227 ;8 see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he district court’s findings that African Americans . . . disproportionately lacked the photo ID required by SL 2013- 381, if supported by the evidence, establishes sufficient disproportionate impact for an Arlington Heights analysis.”). 2023MOORE Morgan, J., dissenting other words, whether the law actually “produces disproportionate effects.” Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227 ;8 see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he district court’s findings that African Americans . . . disproportionately lacked the photo ID required by SL 2013- 381, if supported by the evidence, establishes sufficient disproportionate impact for an Arlington Heights analysis.”). | 2 | 3 |
Pullman-Standard v. Swintgreen2 sentences2022Corp., 429 U.S. 252 , 265–68 (1977); see also, Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (a finding of purposeful racial discrimination is a finding of fact not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous and “[t]reating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”) We hold that the three-judge panel’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence showing that the statute was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, and that the trial court correctly applied the Arlington Heights factors to the specific facts of this case. 2022Corp., 429 U.S. 252 , 265–68 (1977); see also, Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (a finding of purposeful racial discrimination is a finding of fact not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous and “[t]reating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”) We hold that the three-judge panel’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence showing that the statute was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, and that the trial court correctly applied the Arlington Heights factors to the specific facts of this case. | 2 | 2 |
Perez v. Abbottgreen2 sentences2023See Perez, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 648 . 2023See Perez, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 648 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abbott v. Perez
green
2 sentences2023In addition, a proper review of the trial court’s order requires a thorough analysis of Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) and Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 . 5 Our holding does not mean that the Arlington Heights test will not be appropriate in other circumstances in which the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not apply. 2023In addition, a proper review of the trial court’s order requires a thorough analysis of Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) and Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 . 5 Our holding does not mean that the Arlington Heights test will not be appropriate in other circumstances in which the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not apply. | 3 | 2022–2023 |
NC NAACP State Conference v. Ken Raymond
green
2 sentences2023In addition, a proper review of the trial court’s order requires a thorough analysis of Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) and Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 . 5 Our holding does not mean that the Arlington Heights test will not be appropriate in other circumstances in which the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not apply. 2023In addition, a proper review of the trial court’s order requires a thorough analysis of Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) and Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 . 5 Our holding does not mean that the Arlington Heights test will not be appropriate in other circumstances in which the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not apply. | 3 | 2022–2023 |
Shaw v. Reno
green
2 sentences2022Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.” Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 . ¶4 The question before this Court is whether the three-judge panel’s finding that S.B. 824 was motivated by racial discrimination is supported by competent evidence in the record and whether the trial court correctly applied the Arlington Heights factors when it found S.B. 824 was enacted at least in part with racially discriminatory intent. 2022Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.” Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 . ¶4 The question before this Court is whether the three-judge panel’s finding that S.B. 824 was motivated by racial discrimination is supported by competent evidence in the record and whether the trial court correctly applied the Arlington Heights factors when it found S.B. 824 was enacted at least in part with racially discriminatory intent. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State of South Carolina v. United States of America
green
2 sentences2020When analyzing the plaintiffs’ discriminatory-intent claim against Virginia’s voter-ID law, the Fourth Circuit contrasted the passage of Virginia’s law against the facts in McCrory and observed “the legislative process contained no events that would ‘spark suspicion[,]’ ” the Virginia legislature did not depart from the normal legislative process and allowed “full and open debate[,]” the legislature did not use racial data 10 Under the legislative-purpose prong of Section Five, the South Carolina Court utilized a limited Arlington Heights analysis and determined South Carolina’s voter-ID law w 2020When analyzing the plaintiffs’ discriminatory-intent claim against Virginia’s voter-ID law, the Fourth Circuit contrasted the passage of Virginia’s law against the facts in McCrory and observed “the legislative process contained no events that would ‘spark suspicion[,]’ ” the Virginia legislature did not depart from the normal legislative process and allowed “full and open debate[,]” the legislature did not use racial data 10 Under the legislative-purpose prong of Section Five, the South Carolina Court utilized a limited Arlington Heights analysis and determined South Carolina’s voter-ID law w | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.