Jackson reasonable doubt standard in Louisiana

2011State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987). 98-0011 at pp. 18-14, 744 So.2d at 106-107 , quoting State v. Egana, 97-0318, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/3/97), 703 So.2d 223, 227-228 .

2009State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987). 98-0011 at pp. 13-14, 744 So.2d at 106-107 , quoting State v. Egana, 97-0318, pp. 5-6 (La. *896 App. 4 Cir. 12/3/97), 703 So.2d 223, 227-228 .

2015Ragas , 98-0011, p. 14, 744 So.2d at 107 . “[W]here circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, ‘assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove.’ ” State v. Draughn, 05-1825, p. 7 (La.1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 592 (quoting La.

2014This is not a separate test from Jackson v. Virginia, ... but rather an evidentiary guideline to facilitate appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard. [Internal citations omitted.] Id., quoting State v. Ragas, 98-0011, pp. 13-14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/28/99) , 744 So.2d 99, 106-107 . |inThe testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is ordinarily sufficient to support a conviction.

1989State v. Porretto, supra ; State v. Wright, supra .

1988State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142 (1985); State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984); Bunch, supra. In the instant case, direct and circumstantial evidence are in the record.

2026State v. Jacobs, 504 So. 2d 817 (La. 1987); State v. Copes, 566 So. 2d 652 (La.

2022State v. Jacobs, 504 So. 2d 817 (La. 1987); State v. Copes, 566 So. 2d 652 (La.

2018Id. (citing State v. Rosiere , 488 So.2d 965 , 968 (La. 1986) ).

2018Id. (citing State v. Rosiere , 488 So.2d 965 , 968 (La. 1986) ).

2018Id. (citing State v. Rosiere , 488 So.2d 965 , 968 (La. 1986) ).

2018Id. (citing State v. Rosiere , 488 So.2d 965 , 968 (La. 1986) ).

2013State v. Williams, 2007-0700, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101, 1108 .

2012State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987); State v. Williams, 2007-0700, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101, 1108 .

1999State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987). 98-0670, pp. 8-9, 729 So.2d at 136-137 .

1999State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987). 98-0670, pp. 8-9, 729 So.2d at 136-137 .

1993State v. Jacobs, supra. In State v. Wilson, 544 So.2d 1300 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), this Court considered whether the fact that the defendant was in a car with a broken steering column and door lock was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant knew or should have known that the car was stolen and concluded that it was sufficient.

1991State v. Jacobs, supra . *1199 In State v. Wilson, 544 So.2d 1300 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), the court considered whether the fact that the defendant was a willing passenger in a car with a broken steering column and a damaged passenger door lock was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant knew or should have known that the car was stolen and concluded that it was sufficient.

1981State v. Morgan, 389 So.2d 364 (La.1980); State v. Harveston, 389 So.2d 63 (La.1980); State v. Hartman, 388 So.2d 688 (La.1980); State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248 (La.1980); State v. Landry, 381 So.2d 462 (La.1980); State v. Mathews, 375 So.2d 1165 (La.1979).

1981State v. Morgan, 389 So.2d 364 (La.1980); State v. Harveston, 389 So. 63 (La.1980); State v. Hartman, 388 So.2d 688 (La.1980).

1981State v. Morgan, 389 So.2d 364 (La.1980); State v. Harveston, 389 So.2d 63 (La.1980); State v. Hartman, 388 So.2d 688 (La.1980); State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248 (La.1980); State v. Landry, 381 So.2d 462 (La.1980); State v. Mathews, 375 So.2d 1165 (La.1979).

1981State v. Morgan, 389 So.2d 364 (La.1980); State v. Harveston, 389 So. 63 (La.1980); State v. Hartman, 388 So.2d 688 (La.1980).

2017State v. Jackson, 15-0809, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/16), 193 So.3d 425, 433 , citing State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987).

2014This is not a separate test from Jackson v. Virginia, ... but rather an evidentiary guideline to facilitate appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard. [Internal citations omitted.] Id., quoting State v. Ragas, 98-0011, pp. 13-14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/28/99) , 744 So.2d 99, 106-107 . |inThe testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is ordinarily sufficient to support a conviction.

2014State v. Wells, 10-1338, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306 .

2012Mus-sall; Green, supra. “[A] reviewing |7court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La.1992) at 1324. [[Image here]] All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard.

2012Mus-sall; Green, supra. “[A] reviewing |7court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La.1992) at 1324. [[Image here]] All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard.

2009State v. Brown, 43,916 (La.App. 2d Cir.02/25/08), 4 So.3d 301 ; State v. Mitchell, 99-3342 (La.10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 86 (Lemmon, J, concurring).

2002State v. Matthews, 95 1245, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So.2d 977, 988 . “[W]hen circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.” Id. (citing State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982)).

2002State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Owens, supra .

2002State v. Matthews, 95 1245, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So.2d 977, 988 . “[W]hen circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.” Id. (citing State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982)).

2002State v. Matthews, 95 1245, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So.2d 977, 988 . “[W]hen circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.” Id. (citing State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982)).

2000State v. Hearold, supra .

1999“Stated another way, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, if it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, a rational juror cannot find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without violating constitutional due process safeguards.” State v. Camp, 92-1842, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/94); 641 So.2d 702, 707 ., writ denied, 94-2215 (La.2/17/95); 650 So.2d 250 , citing State v. Monds, 91-589 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/14/94) ; 631 So.2d 536, 539-540 , writ denied, 94-0626 (La.4/22/94); 637 So.2d 164 .

1999The owner testified that she purchased her car ten (10) years earlier for $25,000, that it was mechanically deficient, and that she intended to trade it in soon.” Hoskin, 605 So.2d at 652 .

1999“Stated another way, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, if it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, a rational juror cannot find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without violating constitutional due process safeguards.” State v. Camp, 92-1842, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/94); 641 So.2d 702, 707 ., writ denied, 94-2215 (La.2/17/95); 650 So.2d 250 , citing State v. Monds, 91-589 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/14/94) ; 631 So.2d 536, 539-540 , writ denied, 94-0626 (La.4/22/94); 637 So.2d 164 .

1999“Stated another way, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, if it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, a rational juror cannot find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without violating constitutional due process safeguards.” State v. Camp, 92-1842, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/94); 641 So.2d 702, 707 ., writ denied, 94-2215 (La.2/17/95); 650 So.2d 250 , citing State v. Monds, 91-589 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/14/94) ; 631 So.2d 536, 539-540 , writ denied, 94-0626 (La.4/22/94); 637 So.2d 164 .