judgment maintaining exception in Louisiana

2018Spencer v. Burglass , 288 So.2d 68 (La.

1985Spencer v. Burglass, 288 So.2d 68 (La.App. 4th Cir.1974); Taylor v. Consol.

1967We fully concur in the opinion cited, but in that case and in Nicholas v. Maddox, 52 La.Ann. 496 , 26 So. 994 (1900), cited by the court, the judgment maintaining the exception of no cause of action also dismissed the plaintiffs suit.

1925Maddox, 52 La.

1941Homestead Ass'n, 1931, 17 La.App. 673 , 137 So. 223 ; Cornish v. Chaney, 1933, 177 La. 10 , 147 So. 363 ; Interdiction of Giacona, 158 La. 148 , 103 So. 721 .

1941Homestead Ass'n, 1931, 17 La.App. 673 , 137 So. 223 ; Cornish v. Chaney, 1933, 177 La. 10 , 147 So. 363 ; Interdiction of Giacona, 158 La. 148 , 103 So. 721 .

2020C.C.P. art. 2083, we find that the judgment maintaining the exception of venue in this matter is a final appealable judgment subject to our appellate review, as opposed to our supervisory jurisdiction. 7 record without deference to the legal conclusions of the [trial court].” Land v. Vidrine, 2010-1342, p. 3 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36, 39 (quoting Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04–0227, pp. 35–36 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809 , 836–37).

2013Id., p. 2, 631 So.2d at 505 .

2006See Furlow, 39,485 at p. 8, 900 So.2d at 340-341 ; Burks , 39,540 at p. 6, 899 So.2d at 779 ; and Henry, 39,442, 895 So.2d at 683 .

2006See Furlow, 39,485 at p. 8, 900 So.2d at 340-341 ; Burks , 39,540 at p. 6, 899 So.2d at 779 ; and Henry, 39,442, 895 So.2d at 683 .

2004Reeder v. North, 97-0239, p. 15 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, 1299 ; Chapital v. Guaranty Savings & Homestead Ass'n, 96-0244, *1062 pp. 4-6 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/2/96), 681 So.2d 1307, 1310 , writ denied, 96-2639 (La.12/13/96), 692 So.2d 1068 .

2004Reeder v. North, 97-0239, p. 15 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, 1299 ; Chapital v. Guaranty Savings & Homestead Ass'n, 96-0244, *1062 pp. 4-6 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/2/96), 681 So.2d 1307, 1310 , writ denied, 96-2639 (La.12/13/96), 692 So.2d 1068 .

2004Reeder v. North, 97-0239, p. 15 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, 1299 ; Chapital v. Guaranty Savings & Homestead Ass'n, 96-0244, *1062 pp. 4-6 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/2/96), 681 So.2d 1307, 1310 , writ denied, 96-2639 (La.12/13/96), 692 So.2d 1068 .

1999The only remaining question is whether the judgment maintaining the exception of no cause of action "unconditionally dismisse[d] the suit." Oster, 563 So.2d at 491 .

1996Without any discussion of the absence in Section 1032 or 1061 of any suggestion of a legislative intent to grant tort immunity to a principal, or of a principal's apparent ability to avoid any compensation liability, or of the question whether immunity should only apply if the principal actually pays compensation, this court in Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453 , 49 So.2d 852 (1950) rendered a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action and limiting the plaintiff's remedy against the principal to compensation under the Act.

1996Without any discussion of the absence in Section 1032 or 1061 of any suggestion of a legislative intent to grant tort immunity to a principal, or of a principal's apparent ability to avoid any compensation liability, or of the question whether immunity should only apply if the principal actually pays compensation, this court in Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453 , 49 So.2d 852 (1950) rendered a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action and limiting the plaintiff's remedy against the principal to compensation under the Act.

1996La.Code Civ.P. art. 2083(A); Metcalf v. Pool & Home Care, 467 So.2d 610 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985).

1990Williams v. City of Bastrop, 458 So.2d 221 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1984).

1987NOTES [1] La.R.S. 9:5628 provides in part: "No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, dentist, or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this state, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; provided, however, that even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims must be fil

1986The court however, did not discuss their previous decision in Fussell which held that a judgment sustaining the exception of prescription is a final judgment and two years after the Hankamer decision was rendered the first circuit reverted to their original position in Boudreaux v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 422 So.2d 1209 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982). [2] Because of our findings herein, we need not decide whether the amended petition relates back to the date of the filing of the original petition.

1986Since this appeal comes after a judgment maintaining an exception of prescription, the record does not contain the necessary evidentiary findings to clearly ascertain whether the facts fall within the narrow ambit of the recent Crier v. Whitecloud, 486 So.2d 713 (La.1986) decision.

1986Crier determined that “when injury does not immediately follow the act or omission, the statute [La.R.S. 9:5628] does not by its terms prevent the suspension of prescription during the period between the date of the act or omission and the date that injury first results from the act or omission.” Id. at 714 .

1985Dupont v. Dupont, 392 So.2d 158 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1980).

1982In Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans v. Sanders, 246 So.2d 734 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971), it was held that a judgment maintaining an exception of prescription is a final judgment.

1981App. 4th Cir. 1970), writs refused 256 La. 375 , 236 So.2d 503 (1970).

1981App. 4th Cir. 1970), writs refused 256 La. 375 , 236 So.2d 503 (1970).

1981Based on this failure to allege either physical contact or the identity of the operator of the alleged uninsured phantom vehicle, the defendant insurer claims, in the exception, the petition fails to allege a cause of action under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. [1] In the judgment maintaining the exception, the trial judge relied on a decision from this court in Collins v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 234 So.2d 270 (La.

1981The background of this protracted litigation is extensively set forth in our earlier decision in Kaplan, supra, and the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 381 So.2d 385 (La.1980).

1981This suit was recently before us in Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 394 So.2d 782 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981) where we reversed and set aside a judgment maintaining an exception of lis pendens and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

1981The background of this protracted litigation is extensively set forth in our earlier decision in Kaplan, supra, and the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 381 So.2d 385 (La.1980).

1979Thus, we are asked to decide if a lien or privilege created by LSA-R.S. 9:4861, et seq., requires recordation within a limited time period or, at least, prior to two years and three months after the work was performed. *894 Appellant contends that LSA-R.S. 9:4862 on its face does not require the lien to be recorded within 90 days of completion in order to be effective and cites Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 310 F.Supp. 1207 (D.C.La.1969), which observed: "The clear implication is that if you chose not to record you will lose that special ranking of your privilege bu

1979Plaintiff-appellant argues that the trial judge erroneously relied on the case of Wambles v. State, 283 So.2d 331 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), in dismissing his suit against the State.