54 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Higbee Co. v. Evattgreen2 sentences2015Corp. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 11 , 16, 764 N.E.2d 1015 (2002), citing Higbee Co. v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 325 , 332, 43 N.E.2d 273 (1942) (“The BTA hearing is de novo”). 2015Corp. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 11 , 16, 764 N.E.2d 1015 (2002), citing Higbee Co. v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 325 , 332, 43 N.E.2d 273 (1942) (“The BTA hearing is de novo”). | 2 | 4 |
Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2018See Terraza 8 , 150 Ohio St.3d 527 , 2017-Ohio-4415 , 83 N.E.3d 916 , at ¶ 27 (BTA required to consider appraisal evidence along with sale-price evidence when valuing the unencumbered fee simple). {¶ 12} More specifically, Hilliard Station contends that although Sprout's appraisal explicitly states that it is valuing the fee-simple estate as if unencumbered, Sprout did not make adequate adjustments to leased comparables or adequately explain his adjustments at the BTA hearing. 2018See Terraza 8 , 150 Ohio St.3d 527 , 2017-Ohio-4415 , 83 N.E.3d 916 , at ¶ 27 (BTA required to consider appraisal evidence along with sale-price evidence when valuing the unencumbered fee simple). {¶ 12} More specifically, Hilliard Station contends that although Sprout's appraisal explicitly states that it is valuing the fee-simple estate as if unencumbered, Sprout did not make adequate adjustments to leased comparables or adequately explain his adjustments at the BTA hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Satullo v. Wilkinsgreen2 sentences2022The BTA applied the principle that “[e]xclusions are ‘strictly construed,’ ” id. at *3, quoting Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399 , 2006-Ohio- 5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 15 , and concluded that Cincinnati Federal’s claim must be denied under the principle that exemptions must be denied when “exemption is ‘doubtful,’ ” id. at *4. {¶ 8} Next, the BTA addressed Cincinnati Federal’s claim that the services Fiserv provides the bank constitute “accounting services,” which are tax exempt under R.C. 5739.01(Y)(2)(a). 2022The BTA applied the principle that “[e]xclusions are ‘strictly construed,’ ” id. at *3, quoting Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399 , 2006-Ohio- 5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 15 , and concluded that Cincinnati Federal’s claim must be denied under the principle that exemptions must be denied when “exemption is ‘doubtful,’ ” id. at *4. {¶ 8} Next, the BTA addressed Cincinnati Federal’s claim that the services Fiserv provides the bank constitute “accounting services,” which are tax exempt under R.C. 5739.01(Y)(2)(a). | 1 | 3 |
Brown v. Levingreen2 sentences2018Thus, neither statute nor BTA rule requires the hearing that Greenway asserts was required. {¶ 24} Indeed, we have even held that despite R.C. 5717.02(E), which states that "upon the application of any interested party the board shall order the hearing of additional evidence," the BTA is justified in denying a hearing and summarily disposing of a claim when, by the nature of the claim, "there [is] nothing to accomplish by holding a hearing and taking additional evidence." Brown v. Levin , 119 Ohio St.3d 335 , 2008-Ohio-4081 , 894 N.E.2d 35 , ¶ 15, 23-24. 2018Thus, neither statute nor BTA rule requires the hearing that Greenway asserts was required. {¶ 24} Indeed, we have even held that despite R.C. 5717.02(E), which states that "upon the application of any interested party the board shall order the hearing of additional evidence," the BTA is justified in denying a hearing and summarily disposing of a claim when, by the nature of the claim, "there [is] nothing to accomplish by holding a hearing and taking additional evidence." Brown v. Levin , 119 Ohio St.3d 335 , 2008-Ohio-4081 , 894 N.E.2d 35 , ¶ 15, 23-24. | 1 | 2 |
Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington County Board of Revisiongreen2 sentences2017Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268 , 2009-Ohio-4975 , 915 N.E.2d 1196 , ¶ 18-19 (property owner subpoenaed county’s consultant to testify on cross examination at the BTA hearing). 2017Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268 , 2009-Ohio-4975 , 915 N.E.2d 1196 , ¶ 18-19 (property owner subpoenaed county’s consultant to testify on cross examination at the BTA hearing). | 1 | 2 |
Columbus Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revisiongreen2 sentences2016Bd. of Revision, 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 16 , 665 N.E.2d 1098 (1996) (“Because these documents were not part of the original record from the BOR and were submitted after the BTA hearing, they must be disregarded by the BTA”); accord Fogg-Akron Assocs., L.P. v. Summit Cty. 2016Bd. of Revision, 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 16 , 665 N.E.2d 1098 (1996) (“Because these documents were not part of the original record from the BOR and were submitted after the BTA hearing, they must be disregarded by the BTA”); accord Fogg-Akron Assocs., L.P. v. Summit Cty. | 1 | 2 |
In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co.green2 sentences2014Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284 , 2009-Ohio-6764 , 921 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 53 (takings claim was “effectively waived” where “[n]o argument is supplied regarding whether the relevant case law, applied to the facts of this case, justifies a decision in [the appellant’s] favor”); In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 271 , 2011-Ohio-2638 , 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19 (“it is not generally the proper role of this court to develop a party’s arguments”). {¶ 39} It was particularly important to present a developed argument in this case, given that Squire Hill held no interest in the property at th 2014Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284 , 2009-Ohio-6764 , 921 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 53 (takings claim was “effectively waived” where “[n]o argument is supplied regarding whether the relevant case law, applied to the facts of this case, justifies a decision in [the appellant’s] favor”); In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 271 , 2011-Ohio-2638 , 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19 (“it is not generally the proper role of this court to develop a party’s arguments”). {¶ 39} It was particularly important to present a developed argument in this case, given that Squire Hill held no interest in the property at th | 1 | 2 |
Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Lindleygreen1 sentence2017According to the plurality, "[t]here is * * * no merit to an interpretation of R.C. 5717.02 which, for jurisdictional purposes, conclusively presumes that a corporate officer or an attorney is always competent to sign a corporation's notice of appeal but that any other corporate agent is never competent." Jemo at 368, 415 N.E.2d 292 . | 1 | 1 |
Fogg-Akron Associates, L.P. v. Summit County Board of Revisiongreen2 sentences2016Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 112 , 2009-Ohio-6412 , 919 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 14 (BTA justified in not considering evidence submitted not only after hearing but after decision); AP Hotels of Illinois, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. 2016Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 112 , 2009-Ohio-6412 , 919 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 14 (BTA justified in not considering evidence submitted not only after hearing but after decision); AP Hotels of Illinois, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. | 1 | 1 |
North Royalton City School District Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revisiongreen2 sentences2016Bd. of Revision, 129 Ohio St.3d 172 , 2011-Ohio-3092 , 950 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 19 (for purposes of property valuation, “the transfer is an essential element and the sale has not occurred until the property has been transferred”). {¶ 20} Emerson does not dispute that the BTA hearing had ended and the record had closed by the time of the alleged sale, but argues that the BTA should have considered the evidence of the transfer once Emerson had alleged that the sale had been consummated. 2016Bd. of Revision, 129 Ohio St.3d 172 , 2011-Ohio-3092 , 950 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 19 (for purposes of property valuation, “the transfer is an essential element and the sale has not occurred until the property has been transferred”). {¶ 20} Emerson does not dispute that the BTA hearing had ended and the record had closed by the time of the alleged sale, but argues that the BTA should have considered the evidence of the transfer once Emerson had alleged that the sale had been consummated. | 1 | 1 |
| Utility Service Partners, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Castillo v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| HealthSouth Corp. v. Levingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ohio Apartment Ass'n v. Levingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Key Services Corp. v. Zaino
green
2 sentences2016Corp. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St.3d 11, 16 , 764 N.E.2d 1015 (2002). {¶ 27} Here, the tax commissioner’s reliance on the Krehnbrinks’ Ohio residency was not raised until the commissioner’s counsel notified the Krehnbrinks by email just over one month before the second BTA hearing. 2016Corp. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St.3d 11, 16 , 764 N.E.2d 1015 (2002). {¶ 27} Here, the tax commissioner’s reliance on the Krehnbrinks’ Ohio residency was not raised until the commissioner’s counsel notified the Krehnbrinks by email just over one month before the second BTA hearing. | 5 | 2011–2016 |
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach
green
2 sentences2006Though this court is “ ‘not disposed to deny review by a hypertechnical reading of the notice,’ ” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 195, 197 , 625 N.E.2d 597 , quoting Buckeye Internatl., Inc. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 264, 268 , 595 N.E.2d 347 , the notice in this case, just like Cousino’s posthearing briefs, provided no indication that Cousino was seeking an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) exemption before the BTA. 2006Though this court is “ ‘not disposed to deny review by a hypertechnical reading of the notice,’ ” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 195, 197 , 625 N.E.2d 597 , quoting Buckeye Internatl., Inc. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 264, 268 , 595 N.E.2d 347 , the notice in this case, just like Cousino’s posthearing briefs, provided no indication that Cousino was seeking an R.C. 5739.02(B)(13) exemption before the BTA. | 3 | 2002–2006 |
Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2016Bd. of Revision, BTA No.2011-1760, 2014 WL 2708165 (Apr. 22, 2014), which the BTA decided the same day as this case. {¶ 3} Our decision in the Rite Aid appeal, issued today, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-371 , ___ N.E.3d ___, explains the significance of Meijer Stores, and reading the BTA decision here in light of that explanation pinpoints a significant omission in the BTA’s analysis. 2016Bd. of Revision, BTA No.2011-1760, 2014 WL 2708165 (Apr. 22, 2014), which the BTA decided the same day as this case. {¶ 3} Our decision in the Rite Aid appeal, issued today, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-371 , ___ N.E.3d ___, explains the significance of Meijer Stores, and reading the BTA decision here in light of that explanation pinpoints a significant omission in the BTA’s analysis. | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision
green
2 sentences2017Bd. of Revision , 90 Ohio St.3d 564 , 740 N.E.2d 276 (2001), does not hold that a party may supplement the record only before the close of the BTA hearing, because there was no BTA hearing in that case, see id. at 566 , 740 N.E.2d 276 . 2017Bd. of Revision , 90 Ohio St.3d 564 , 740 N.E.2d 276 (2001), does not hold that a party may supplement the record only before the close of the BTA hearing, because there was no BTA hearing in that case, see id. at 566 , 740 N.E.2d 276 . | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach
green
2 sentences2002Thereafter, pursuant to Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 229 , 520 N.E.2d 188 , and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 195 , 625 N.E.2d 597 , the BTA affirmed the commissioner’s determination based on its recognition that it lacked jurisdiction to determine GTE’s constitutional challenge. 2002Thereafter, pursuant to Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 229 , 520 N.E.2d 188 , and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 195 , 625 N.E.2d 597 , the BTA affirmed the commissioner’s determination based on its recognition that it lacked jurisdiction to determine GTE’s constitutional challenge. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Alliance Towers, Ltd. v. Stark County Board of Revision
green
2 sentences1996Bd. of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 16, 25 , 523 N.E.2d 826, 834 , wherein we stated that “[w]hile the decision of the board of revision should not be colored with partiality, the General Assembly recognized the possible conflict inherent in the roles of the board members as officials who conduct the affairs of the county, and provided for an appeal to the BTA or the court of common pleas.” As a result of the BTA’s presumption of validity, its decision was internally inconsistent. 1996Bd. of Revision (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 16, 25 , 523 N.E.2d 826, 834 , wherein we stated that “[w]hile the decision of the board of revision should not be colored with partiality, the General Assembly recognized the possible conflict inherent in the roles of the board members as officials who conduct the affairs of the county, and provided for an appeal to the BTA or the court of common pleas.” As a result of the BTA’s presumption of validity, its decision was internally inconsistent. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Blodgett v. Blodgett
green
2 sentences1996If it cannot be so established, then the Board must look to other evidence of value set forth in the record before it.” However, in considering whether the sale was an arm’s-length transaction, and in rejecting Lakeside’s contention that economic necessity had forced Lakeside to purchase the property at an excessive price, the BTA applied the test for economic coercion set forth in Blodgett, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d 243 , 551 N.E.2d 1249 . 1996If it cannot be so established, then the Board must look to other evidence of value set forth in the record before it.” However, in considering whether the sale was an arm’s-length transaction, and in rejecting Lakeside’s contention that economic necessity had forced Lakeside to purchase the property at an excessive price, the BTA applied the test for economic coercion set forth in Blodgett, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d 243 , 551 N.E.2d 1249 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Summit County Board of Revision
neutral
2 sentences2018Bd. of Revision , 21 Ohio St.3d 17 , 487 N.E.2d 298 (1986). 2018Bd. of Revision , 21 Ohio St.3d 17 , 487 N.E.2d 298 (1986). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
J.M. Smucker, L.L.C. v. Levin
green
2 sentences2018Smucker, L.L.C. v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2007-Ohio-2073 , 865 N.E.2d 866, ¶ 16 . -8- The Evidence Presented at the BTA Hearing {¶ 16} Ryne and the Kettering BOE presented expert appraisers at the BTA hearing. 2018Smucker, L.L.C. v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2007-Ohio-2073 , 865 N.E.2d 866, ¶ 16 . -8- The Evidence Presented at the BTA Hearing {¶ 16} Ryne and the Kettering BOE presented expert appraisers at the BTA hearing. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cruz v. Testa (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2018Cruz v. Testa , 144 Ohio St.3d 221 , 2015-Ohio-3292 , 41 N.E.3d 1213 , ¶ 18. 2018Cruz v. Testa , 144 Ohio St.3d 221 , 2015-Ohio-3292 , 41 N.E.3d 1213 , ¶ 18. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Meijer Stores Ltd. Partnership v. Franklin County Board of Revision
green
2 sentences2018Bd. of Revision , 122 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2009-Ohio-3479 , 912 N.E.2d 560 , ¶ 24. {¶ 8} Hilliard Station cites Sprout's appraisal, which opines that a definition of "special-purpose property," derived from the Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal , "would apply to the subject property." At the BTA hearing, Sprout clarified that in his view, two of the three elements of that definition applied: the property at issue has "a unique physical design" in that it is laid out as a branch bank, and it has "a layout that particularly adapts its utility to the use for which it was built." {¶ 9} We find no me 2018Bd. of Revision , 122 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2009-Ohio-3479 , 912 N.E.2d 560 , ¶ 24. {¶ 8} Hilliard Station cites Sprout's appraisal, which opines that a definition of "special-purpose property," derived from the Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal , "would apply to the subject property." At the BTA hearing, Sprout clarified that in his view, two of the three elements of that definition applied: the property at issue has "a unique physical design" in that it is laid out as a branch bank, and it has "a layout that particularly adapts its utility to the use for which it was built." {¶ 9} We find no me | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Rural Health Collaborative of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Testa (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2017We discussed the relationship between R.C. 5709.12(B) and 5709.121 at greater length in Rural Health Collaborative, 145 Ohio St.3d 430 , 2016-Ohio-508 , 50 N.E.3d 486, at ¶ 20-22 , and we incorporate that discussion by reference into this opinion. 2017We discussed the relationship between R.C. 5709.12(B) and 5709.121 at greater length in Rural Health Collaborative, 145 Ohio St.3d 430 , 2016-Ohio-508 , 50 N.E.3d 486, at ¶ 20-22 , and we incorporate that discussion by reference into this opinion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision
green
2 sentences2017Bd. of Revision , 74 Ohio St.3d 415 , 416-417, 659 N.E.2d 1223 (1996). {¶ 12} We reject Buckeye Terminals argument that once the BTA hearing ended, the parties were bound by the record as it then existed. 2017Bd. of Revision , 74 Ohio St.3d 415 , 416-417, 659 N.E.2d 1223 (1996). {¶ 12} We reject Buckeye Terminals argument that once the BTA hearing ended, the parties were bound by the record as it then existed. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
The Chapel v. Testa
green
2 sentences2017The Chapel, 129 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2011-Ohio-545 , 950 N.E.2d 142 , ¶ 28. {¶ 35} Finally, the tax commissioner points out that his brief was not filed until after the BTA hearing, and he claims that it was Kinnear’s responsibility to develop the factual record at the BTA to refute the tax commissioner’s final determination. 2017The Chapel, 129 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2011-Ohio-545 , 950 N.E.2d 142 , ¶ 28. {¶ 35} Finally, the tax commissioner points out that his brief was not filed until after the BTA hearing, and he claims that it was Kinnear’s responsibility to develop the factual record at the BTA to refute the tax commissioner’s final determination. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2016Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342 , 74 S.Ct. 535 , 98 L.Ed. 744 (1954), quoting St. 2016Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342 , 74 S.Ct. 535 , 98 L.Ed. 744 (1954), quoting St. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Coats v. Limbach
green
2 sentences2016Coats v. Limbach, 47 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 , 548 N.E.2d 917 (1989); Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-16(B). 2016Coats v. Limbach, 47 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 , 548 N.E.2d 917 (1989); Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-16(B). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Strongsville Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision
green
2 sentences2016Bd. of Revision, 53 Ohio St.3d 254, 256 , 559 N.E.2d 1351 (1990). 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 25} Here, the parties received nearly six months’ notice of the BTA hearing date, time, and location. 2016Bd. of Revision, 53 Ohio St.3d 254, 256 , 559 N.E.2d 1351 (1990). 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 25} Here, the parties received nearly six months’ notice of the BTA hearing date, time, and location. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Parma Heights v. Wilkins
neutral
2 sentences2016Unlike the commissioner, the BTA properly cited R.C. 5709.121 as being relevant to determining “exclusive” use for a public purpose. 2 But like the tax commissioner, the BTA relied on the case law concerning leased property, particularly Parma Hts., 105 Ohio St.3d 463 , 2005- *162 Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998 . 2016Unlike the commissioner, the BTA properly cited R.C. 5709.121 as being relevant to determining “exclusive” use for a public purpose. 2 But like the tax commissioner, the BTA relied on the case law concerning leased property, particularly Parma Hts., 105 Ohio St.3d 463 , 2005- *162 Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa
green
2 sentences2016This language satisfies the criteria in WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa, 129 Ohio St.3d 256 , 2011-Ohio-3280 , 951 N.E.2d 421 , paragraph one of the syllabus, and as in WCI Steel, the notice here brings within the court’s jurisdiction all the relevant arguments that the tax commissioner advanced below, including the directory-versus-mandatory argument. 2016This language satisfies the criteria in WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa, 129 Ohio St.3d 256 , 2011-Ohio-3280 , 951 N.E.2d 421 , paragraph one of the syllabus, and as in WCI Steel, the notice here brings within the court’s jurisdiction all the relevant arguments that the tax commissioner advanced below, including the directory-versus-mandatory argument. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Nestle Co. v. Porterfield
neutral
2 sentences2015Also, “[t]he BTA may investigate to ascertain further facts and make its own findings independent of those of the Tax Commissioner.” Key Servs., id., citing Nestle Co., Inc. v. Porterfield, 28 Ohio St. 2d 190 , 193, 277 N.E.2d 222 (1971). 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 22} R.C. 5717.011 was enacted in 2003 and was numbered so as to fall between the statutes for appeals from decisions of boards of revision and the tax commissioner, R.C. 5717.01 and 5717.02. 2015Also, “[t]he BTA may investigate to ascertain further facts and make its own findings independent of those of the Tax Commissioner.” Key Servs., id., citing Nestle Co., Inc. v. Porterfield, 28 Ohio St. 2d 190 , 193, 277 N.E.2d 222 (1971). 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 22} R.C. 5717.011 was enacted in 2003 and was numbered so as to fall between the statutes for appeals from decisions of boards of revision and the tax commissioner, R.C. 5717.01 and 5717.02. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| MacDonald v. Shaker Hts. Bd. of Income Tax Rev. (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of East Cleveland v. Landingham green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Dayton Supply & Tool Co. v. Montgomery County Board of Revision green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Dublin City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| First Interstate Bank v. Department of Revenue green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Stanjim Co. v. Board of Revision green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| American Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Glander green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Toledo Edison Co. v. Galvin green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bloch v. Glander neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Parisi Transportation Co. v. Wilkins neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bedford Board of Education v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Lutz v. Evatt green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Zangerle v. Evatt green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Buckeye International, Inc. v. Limbach green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Cheery Street Corp. v. Porterfield green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese v. Kinney green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Moraine Heights Baptist Church v. Kinney green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Hatchadorian v. Lindley green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.