right to pursue claim in New Jersey

2026"No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights," id. at 444 , but the arbitration clause A-3001-24 10 must explain the party is relinquishing the right to pursue a claim in court, id. at 447 . "[T]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue." Id. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).

2019In particular, a contractual waiver of the right to pursue a claim in court must be "clearly and unmistakably established." Id. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).

2026Just as we previously determined Article Seventeenth "fails to explain that [Richard] is relinquishing his right to bring a claim in court," id. at 18, we now similarly conclude the arbitration provision does not explain Sandra – or any other interested party under the 2002 LWT – relinquishes the right to pursue a claim in court, see Atalese, 219 N.J. at 447 .

2026Stated another way, although Article Seventeeth provides "[a]rbitration shall be the exclusive remedy for resolving disputes" under the 2002 LWT, the provision fails to adequately explain the interested parties "waiv[e] their time-honored right to sue" pursuant to Atalese's concern. 219 N.J. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132 ).

1996State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 , 117 A.2d 473 (1955). [Emphasis added.] [Maxwell, supra, 50 N.J.Super. at 307 , 142 A.2d 108 (emphasis added).] In the present case, the evidence which incriminated defendant came almost exclusively from Graham.

1996State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471 , 117 A.2d 473 (1955). [Emphasis added.] [Maxwell, supra, 50 N.J.Super. at 307 , 142 A.2d 108 (emphasis added).] In the present case, the evidence which incriminated defendant came almost exclusively from Graham.

2019Whether there is mutual assent to arbitrate depends on "the intent expressed or apparent in the writing," Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 300 (2003), considering "the contractual terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract." Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993).

2019Whether there is mutual assent to arbitrate depends on "the intent expressed or apparent in the writing," Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 300 (2003), considering "the contractual terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract." Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993).