Constitution precludes any inquiry in New York

1962The legend “ unclaimed ”, stamped by the postal authorities on registered mail returned to a sender, does not necessarily exclude the possibility that such defendant somehow knew that the contents of the envelope might be a legal noticel 11 [T]he full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based. * * * Whatever mistakes of law may underlie the judgment * * it is ‘ conclusive as to all the media concludendi.’” (Milliken v.

1958It is well settled that where a court of a sister State has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, and the decree is substantially responsive to the issues presented by the pleadings “ the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment was based.” (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 462 .) Accordingly, the court is constrained to dismiss the complaint solely upon the ground that by her voluntary appearance plaintif

1945Such a result would only tend to promote wholesale disregard of North Carolina’s divorce laws by its citizens, thus putting an end to ‘ the existence of all efficacious power on the subject of divorce. ’ ” Thus, by unequivocal fiat of the United States Supreme Court, in every case involving the extraterritorial validity of an ex parte divorce decree the issue of jurisdiction is excepted from the general rule that “ * * * the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of

1943Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 ; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 ; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 .” The petitioner contends that the respondent, in addition to setting up the decree of divorce as part of her defense, has the burden of proof to show that the decedent acquired a genuine residence in Florida.

1955The rule invoked by the defendants to defeat recognition of the present judgment is that enunciated in Reynolds v. Stockton ( 140 U. S. 254, 271 ) to the effect that: “ when a complaint tenders one cause of action, and in that suit service on, or appearance of, the defendant is made, a subsequent judgment therein, rendered in the absence of the defendant, upon another and different cause of action than that stated in the complaint, is without binding force within the courts of the same State; and, of course, notwithstanding the constitutional provision heretofore quoted, has no better standing

1953(See Wehrhane v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486 .) Accordingly, except as to Bechtel who is neither party nor privy to the actions in this State, the motion for a temporary injunction is granted pending the determination of the appeal by the Court of Appeals.

1943Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 ; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 ; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 .” The petitioner contends that the respondent, in addition to setting up the decree of divorce as part of her defense, has the burden of proof to show that the decedent acquired a genuine residence in Florida.

1943Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 ; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 ; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 .” The petitioner contends that the respondent, in addition to setting up the decree of divorce as part of her defense, has the burden of proof to show that the decedent acquired a genuine residence in Florida.