duplicative equivalent exception in New York

2000Our review of the record, including the voluminous materials furnished to the defense by the People prior to trial and provided to County Court in opposition to defendant’s motion, does not lead us to conclude that the materials are duplicative equivalents of any previously furnished documents nor beyond the scope of the direct testimony of the police officers in what the People’s brief characterizes as the People’s “very narrow case.” In People v Young ( 79 NY2d 365 ), the Court of Appeals reiterated that materials such as those at issue here are subject to a “ ‘strong presumption of * * * di

1997However, as the People concede, the duplicative equivalent analysis is inapplicable here because, inter alia, the two documents contained variations (see, People v Young, 79 NY2d 365, 370 ; People v Robinson, 133 AD2d 859 ).

1997However, as the People concede, the duplicative equivalent analysis is inapplicable here because, inter alia, the two documents contained variations (see, People v Young, 79 NY2d 365, 370 ; People v Robinson, 133 AD2d 859 ).

1992In People v Robinson ( 133 AD2d 859 [2d Dept 1987]), the prosecution argued that handwritten notes of an interview of a trial witness were the duplicative equivalent of another, timely disclosed, statement.

1995In light of the need for a precise correlation between the undisclosed and disclosed material, this Court has previously assumed without discussion that a visual inspection of both documents is necessary ( see , People v Adger , 75 N.Y.2d 723, 725 ; People v Quinones , 73 N.Y.2d 988, 989 ; People v Consolazio , supra , at 454).

1995In light of the need for a precise correlation between the undisclosed and disclosed material, this Court has previously assumed without discussion that a visual inspection of both documents is necessary (see, People v Adger, 75 NY2d 723, 725 ; People v Quinones, 73 NY2d 988, 989 ; People v Consolazio, supra, at 454 ).

1993(See, People v Quinones, 73 NY2d 988, 989 .) Since 1961, when the Court of Appeals decided People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286, 289 , cert denied 368 US 866 ), it has been the law of this State that a defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to examine, for use during cross-examination, any written or recorded statements, not confidential, of a prosecution witness relating to the subject matter of that witness’s testimony.

1992(Supra, at 454 .) 2 Recently in People v Young ( 79 NY2d 365 , supra), the Court of Appeals discussed the duplicative equivalent exception to the Rosario rule, emphasizing that since "there continues to be a 'strong presumption of * * * discoverability’ ” (supra, at 369, citing People v Ranghelle, 69 NY2d 56, 63 ) the exception must be narrowly circumscribed.

1995In light of the need for a precise correlation between the undisclosed and disclosed material, this Court has previously assumed without discussion that a visual inspection of both documents is necessary ( see , People v Adger , 75 N.Y.2d 723, 725 ; People v Quinones , 73 N.Y.2d 988, 989 ; People v Consolazio , supra , at 454).

1995In light of the need for a precise correlation between the undisclosed and disclosed material, this Court has previously assumed without discussion that a visual inspection of both documents is necessary (see, People v Adger, 75 NY2d 723, 725 ; People v Quinones, 73 NY2d 988, 989 ; People v Consolazio, supra, at 454 ).

1995(People v Consolazio, 40 NY2d 446, 454 [1976], cert denied 433 US 914 [1977].) The duplicative equivalent rule has been strictly interpreted by the Court of Appeals.

1993(See, People v Quinones, 73 NY2d 988, 989 .) Since 1961, when the Court of Appeals decided People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286, 289 , cert denied 368 US 866 ), it has been the law of this State that a defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to examine, for use during cross-examination, any written or recorded statements, not confidential, of a prosecution witness relating to the subject matter of that witness’s testimony.

1992(Supra, at 454 .) 2 Recently in People v Young ( 79 NY2d 365 , supra), the Court of Appeals discussed the duplicative equivalent exception to the Rosario rule, emphasizing that since "there continues to be a 'strong presumption of * * * discoverability’ ” (supra, at 369, citing People v Ranghelle, 69 NY2d 56, 63 ) the exception must be narrowly circumscribed.