testimony given hearing in New York

1987But even assuming that such a request had been made, and refused, the defendant’s confessions would not be subject to suppression on that basis alone (see, People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91, 100 ; People v Casassa, 49 NY2d 668, 681 ; People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d 778, 779 ).

1987But even assuming that such a request had been made, and refused, the defendant’s confessions would not be subject to suppression on that basis alone (see, People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91, 100 ; People v Casassa, 49 NY2d 668, 681 ; People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d 778, 779 ).

1987But even assuming that such a request had been made, and refused, the defendant’s confessions would not be subject to suppression on that basis alone (see, People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91, 100 ; People v Casassa, 49 NY2d 668, 681 ; People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d 778, 779 ).

1986For this right to be meaningful, a defendant who cannot understand English has the right to have the testimony given at the hearing interpreted to him in a manner that enables him to effectively communicate with his attorney and assist in his own defense (see, People v Ramos, 26 NY2d 272, 274 ; People v De Armas, 106 AD2d 659, 660 ).

1986For this right to be meaningful, a defendant who cannot understand English has the right to have the testimony given at the hearing interpreted to him in a manner that enables him to effectively communicate with his attorney and assist in his own defense (see, People v Ramos, 26 NY2d 272, 274 ; People v De Armas, 106 AD2d 659, 660 ).

1986Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 ).

1977The argument that Special Term overlooked or misconstrued the testimony given at the hearing is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, since no appeal was taken from the order entered thereon (see Netchi v Bernard, 8 Misc 2d 1035 ).

1975Using similar reasoning as in Matter of Schmidt ( 171 Misc 95 ), it is the court’s opinion that the provision for the surviving spouse must be ascertainable from the language of the will itself (or trust instrument, as in this case) and not left to speculation as to the income yield.

1974The arguments against defendant’s application are that the disputed statements are exempt property pursuant to CPL 240.10 (subd. 3); and that although the rule of Brady v. Maryland ( 373 U. S. 83 ) requires the disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution, the presence1 of prior defense counsel at the interrogation of exculpatory 'witnesses satisfies the principle enunciated in Brady .

1936(Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93 ; Dougherty v. Salt, 227 N. Y. 200 .) In view of the wording of the instrument itself, it would appear that some of the testimony given on the hearing held in this proceeding was irrelevant.

1936(Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93 ; Dougherty v. Salt, 227 N. Y. 200 .) In view of the wording of the instrument itself, it would appear that some of the testimony given on the hearing held in this proceeding was irrelevant.