Miller-based challenge in Illinois

2026The court distinguished its decisions in Harris and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 115151 , by stating that they “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . ¶ 20 Further, our supreme court has concluded that “[a]s Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 .

2026Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 87, 88 . - 12 - No. 1-24-0760 ¶ 43 This court similarly recognized in Buford that nearly all of the cases that the defendant cited in support of his Miller-based claim that “his de facto life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because his brain was akin to that of a juvenile when he committed the offenses at age 22,” were “advanced by defendants who were 18 or 19 years old at the time they committed the offenses, rather than 22 years old.” Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176, ¶ 45 .

2025Moore reasoned that, “As Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 40. ¶ 57 Lastly, People v. Hilliard repeated the supreme court’s narrow view of Thompson and Harris by stating, “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 ). ¶ 58 We recently had

2025The Clark court specified that case law related to emerging adult offenders “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 ; see Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 31 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition”); see also, People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶27 .

2025And “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1 , 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ).

2025(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 93. ¶ 56 In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, our supreme court in Clark further explained that its prior decisions in Thompson and Harris opening the door for young adult offenders to raise Miller- based proportionate penalties challenges to their sentences, “addressed the possibility of *** a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶ 48). ¶ 57 Shortly after Clark, in Moore, 2023 IL 126461,

2025And “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1 , 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ).

2025(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 93. ¶ 56 In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, our supreme court in Clark further explained that its prior decisions in Thompson and Harris opening the door for young adult offenders to raise Miller- based proportionate penalties challenges to their sentences, “addressed the possibility of *** a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶ 48). ¶ 57 Shortly after Clark, in Moore, 2023 IL 126461,

2026The court distinguished its decisions in Harris and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 115151 , by stating that they “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . ¶ 20 Further, our supreme court has concluded that “[a]s Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 .

2025Distinguishing prior decisions, including Harris, the court explained those cases “addressed the possibility of a -6- No. 1-23-1499 defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 88. ¶ 21 Likewise, two defendants who committed murder at age 19 failed to satisfy the cause prong for Miller-based proportionate penalties claims in successive petitions in People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461 .

2021In Illinois, Miller’s holding and rationale have been extended to cases in which juvenile offenders are sentenced to de facto mandatory life sentences, i.e., sentences greater than 40 years (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 , 63 N.E.3d 884 ; Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42 ), and “to - 14 - discretionary sentences of life without parole” (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 , 91 N.E.3d 849 ). ¶ 40 Ultimately, to establish a Miller-based claim, “a defendant sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or d

2021In Illinois, Miller’s holding and rationale have been extended to cases in which juvenile offenders are sentenced to de facto mandatory life sentences, i.e., sentences greater than 40 years (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 , 63 N.E.3d 884 ; Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42 ), and “to - 14 - discretionary sentences of life without parole” (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 , 91 N.E.3d 849 ). ¶ 40 Ultimately, to establish a Miller-based claim, “a defendant sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or d

2022Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42 . ¶ 19 For a young adult defendant to sufficiently allege prejudice in a successive petition for a young adult Miller-based claim, the defendant must demonstrate “how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the Miller decision applies to [his] specific facts and circumstances.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46 (emphasis added).

2022In sum, to prevail on a Miller-based claim, “a defendant sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , ¶ 27.

2025He also concedes that he waived any constitutional challenge to his attempted murder sentence by pleading guilty (see Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 20 ) and that the doctrine of res judicata bars his Miller-based claim because he raised it - 10 - No. 1-23-2204 in a prior postconviction petition (see Willis, No. 1-14-2006 (2016) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)); see also Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 31 ). ¶ 20 In spite of these concessions, defendant nonetheless argues that the record rebuts the presumption that postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c), as cou

2022See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61 (finding that Miller does not apply to 18-year-olds); People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 27 (finding a juvenile sentenced pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea has waived any Miller-based challenge).

2026“Mandatory-life-sentencing statutes are constitutionally flawed, according to Miller, because they remove consideration of youth from the determination of whether to impose the harshest sentence and pose too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. [Citation.] But Miller did not foreclose the possibility of discretionary life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 38 .

2025He also concedes that he waived any constitutional challenge to his attempted murder sentence by pleading guilty (see Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 20 ) and that the doctrine of res judicata bars his Miller-based claim because he raised it - 10 - No. 1-23-2204 in a prior postconviction petition (see Willis, No. 1-14-2006 (2016) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)); see also Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 31 ). ¶ 20 In spite of these concessions, defendant nonetheless argues that the record rebuts the presumption that postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c), as cou

2026Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 87, 88 . - 12 - No. 1-24-0760 ¶ 43 This court similarly recognized in Buford that nearly all of the cases that the defendant cited in support of his Miller-based claim that “his de facto life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because his brain was akin to that of a juvenile when he committed the offenses at age 22,” were “advanced by defendants who were 18 or 19 years old at the time they committed the offenses, rather than 22 years old.” Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176, ¶ 45 .

2024Therefore, any argument for extending Miller must go beyond simply citing scientific evidence and demonstrate that “our community’s evolving standard of decency” demands redefining when adulthood begins because the current line “shocks the moral sense of the community.” People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 340-41 (2002). ¶ 18 While our supreme court has never drawn a bright line that solidly defines the age at which a defendant can no longer attempt to bring an as-applied Miller-based claim, this court has repeatedly concluded that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21.” People v. Gree

2026The court reiterated that “ ‘the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21.’ ” Id. ¶ 49 (quoting People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42 ). ¶ 44 The court rejected Savage’s reliance on the prior decision in the instant case (Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 ) as support for particular “consideration of [his] age and its attendant characteristics” at sentencing where he was also 22 at the time of the offense and struggled with drug and alcohol abuse.

2022See People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61 (“Although defendant raises an as- applied challenge rather than a facial challenge, Illinois courts typically consider the sentencing claims of young adults under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment.”). ¶ 32 Defendant’s age serves as a barrier to his Miller-based claim.

2025A court reviews “the gravity of the defendant’s offense in connection with the severity of the statutorily mandated sentence within our community’s evolving standard of decency.” Id. at 340 . ¶ 23 Butler’s petition and his opening brief make a Miller-based claim that, as a young adult with characteristics like those of a juvenile, his sentence is wholly disproportionate to the offense.

2025A court reviews “the gravity of the defendant’s offense in connection with the severity of the statutorily mandated sentence within our community’s evolving standard of decency.” Id. at 340 . ¶ 23 Butler’s petition and his opening brief make a Miller-based claim that, as a young adult with characteristics like those of a juvenile, his sentence is wholly disproportionate to the offense.

2025The Clark court specified that case law related to emerging adult offenders “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 ; see Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 31 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition”); see also, People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶27 .

2025See id. ¶ 93 In doing so, defendant should be cognizant that his sentencing claim is not a Miller-based claim, but rather a claim based on the disproportionate nature of his 60-year de facto life sentence.

2025See id. ¶ 93 In doing so, defendant should be cognizant that his sentencing claim is not a Miller-based claim, but rather a claim based on the disproportionate nature of his 60-year de facto life sentence.

2024Accordingly, neither sentence alone is long enough to enable defendant to make the “threshold showing” that a juvenile offender is required to make to mount a Miller-based challenge under the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause, which is that “his or her sentence is a life sentence or de facto life sentence.” People v. Hill, 2022 IL App (1st) 171739-B, ¶ 42 ; accord People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 68 .

2024Accordingly, neither sentence alone is long enough to enable defendant to make the “threshold showing” that a juvenile offender is required to make to mount a Miller-based challenge under the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause, which is that “his or her sentence is a life sentence or de facto life sentence.” People v. Hill, 2022 IL App (1st) 171739-B, ¶ 42 ; accord People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 68 .

2024Accordingly, while “the legislature has the power to prescribe” mandatory minimum sentences, for adults, the penalty nonetheless “must satisfy constitutional requirements,” (Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 129 (2004)) and be determined “both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill.

2024Accordingly, while “the legislature has the power to prescribe” mandatory minimum sentences, for adults, the penalty nonetheless “must satisfy constitutional requirements,” (Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 129 (2004)) and be determined “both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill.

2024(Also see People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008) (the cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the test to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction petition).) Here, the defendant received a discretionary sentence which he seeks to challenge in a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism for defendants to raise claims of violations of their constitutional rights.

2024See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (“As Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults, it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in [the defendants’] proposed successive - 11 - No. 1-22-0587 postconviction petitions.”); People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 86 (“[N]othing in Moore suggested a distinction between discretionary and mandatory sentences.”).