child custody hearing in Michigan

2023“Where the trial court has failed to analyze the issue of child custody in accord with the mandates of MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 56 ; 475 NW2d 394 (1991).

2023“Where the trial court has failed to analyze the issue of child custody in accord with the mandates of MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 56 ; 475 NW2d 394 (1991).

2026When this type of error occurs, “the proper remedy is reversal and a remand for a new child-custody hearing.” Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327, 330 ; 750 NW2d 603 (2008).

2026When this type of error occurs, “the proper remedy is reversal and a remand for a new child-custody hearing.” Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327, 330 ; 750 NW2d 603 (2008).

2009However, the record must be sufficient for this Court to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s findings. [MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449, 452 ; 705 NW2d 144 (2005) (citations omitted).] “Where a trial court fails to consider custody issues in accordance with the mandates set forth in MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475 ; 730 NW2d 262 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2009However, the record must be sufficient for this Court to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s findings. [MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449, 452 ; 705 NW2d 144 (2005) (citations omitted).] “Where a trial court fails to consider custody issues in accordance with the mandates set forth in MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a new child custody hearing.” Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475 ; 730 NW2d 262 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2003This rationale does not run afoul of Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17 ; 614 NW2d 183 (2000), as that case holds that in a postjudgment change of custody, the court must make an independent determination that the proposed change (agreed to by the parties) is in the “best interest of the child” through a review of the child-custody factors.

2003This rationale does not run afoul of Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17 ; 614 NW2d 183 (2000), as that case holds that in a postjudgment change of custody, the court must make an independent determination that the proposed change (agreed to by the parties) is in the “best interest of the child” through a review of the child-custody factors.

1991Id., at 567 .

1981In Lewis, supra, 567 , this Court discussed the various remedies available where a trial court fails to make adequate findings of fact on the "best interest” factor: "Where the trial court has failed to analyze the issue of child custody in accord with the mandates of MCLA 722.23; MSA 25.312(3) and to make reviewable findings of fact under GCR 1963, 517.1, the proper remedy is to *219 remand for a new child custody hearing.

2018Fletcher v Fletcher (After Remand), 229 Mich App 19 , 25- 26; 581 NW2d 11 (1998).

2018Fletcher v Fletcher (After Remand), 229 Mich App 19 , 25- 26; 581 NW2d 11 (1998).

2017See Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 355-357 ; 683 NW2d 250 (2004) (upholding a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to limit evidence to the incidences, occurrences, and events that took place after the entry of a prior temporary custody order).

2017See Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 355-357 ; 683 NW2d 250 (2004) (upholding a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to limit evidence to the incidences, occurrences, and events that took place after the entry of a prior temporary custody order).

2015Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 184 ; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). 3.

2015Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 184 ; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). 3.

2009Schlender v Schlender, 235 Mich App 230, 233 ; 596 NW2d 643 (1999). 7 The trial court never made any determination regarding whether an established custodial environment existed with either party or both parties.

2009Schlender v Schlender, 235 Mich App 230, 233 ; 596 NW2d 643 (1999). 7 The trial court never made any determination regarding whether an established custodial environment existed with either party or both parties.

2003Cochrane v. Brown, 234 Mich.App. 129, 132-133 , 592 N.W.2d 123 (1999); Constantini v. Constantini, 171 Mich.App. 466, 468-469 , 430 N.W.2d 748 (1988). [5] This rationale does not run afoul of Phillips v. Jordan, 241 Mich.App. 17 , 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000), as that case holds that in a postjudgment change of custody, the court must make an independent determination that the proposed change (agreed to by the parties) is in the "best interest of the child" through a review of the child-custody factors.

2003Cochrane v. Brown, 234 Mich.App. 129, 132-133 , 592 N.W.2d 123 (1999); Constantini v. Constantini, 171 Mich.App. 466, 468-469 , 430 N.W.2d 748 (1988). [5] This rationale does not run afoul of Phillips v. Jordan, 241 Mich.App. 17 , 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000), as that case holds that in a postjudgment change of custody, the court must make an independent determination that the proposed change (agreed to by the parties) is in the "best interest of the child" through a review of the child-custody factors.

2006It therefore follows as a corollary that where the party seeking to change custody has not carried the initial burden of establishing either proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an otherwise valid prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best interest factors. ’ [Emphasis added.]” These initial steps to changing custody — finding a “change of circumstance or proper cause” and not changing an “established custodial environment” without clear and convincing evidence — are intended to “erect a barrier aga

2006It therefore follows as a corollary that where the party seeking to change custody has not carried the initial burden of establishing either proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an otherwise valid prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best interest factors. ’ [Emphasis added.]” These initial steps to changing custody — finding a “change of circumstance or proper cause” and not changing an “established custodial environment” without clear and convincing evidence — are intended to “erect a barrier aga

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

2006Specifically, MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that if a child custody dispute has arisen from another action in the circuit court, the court may “[mjodify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances ....” On the basis of this language, this Court held in Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163, 165 ; 559 NW2d 59 (1996), quoting Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458 ; 522 NW2d 874 (1994), that if the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing: “ ‘The plain a

1981Zawisa v Zawisa [ 61 Mich App 1 ; 232 NW2d 275 (1975)].

1981Zawisa v Zawisa [ 61 Mich App 1 ; 232 NW2d 275 (1975)].

2025However, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant had “the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence as to each and every one of the child custody factors . . . ” Relying on this Court’s decisions in Howard v Howard, 310 Mich App 488, 496 ; 871 NW2d 739 (2015) and Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 28 ; 638 NW2d 123 (2001), the trial court concluded that it was not required “to award custody to the natural parent if the third 2 Following service of the complaint in this matter, defendant petitioned for temporary guardianship of the minor children in two separa

2025However, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant had “the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence as to each and every one of the child custody factors . . . ” Relying on this Court’s decisions in Howard v Howard, 310 Mich App 488, 496 ; 871 NW2d 739 (2015) and Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 28 ; 638 NW2d 123 (2001), the trial court concluded that it was not required “to award custody to the natural parent if the third 2 Following service of the complaint in this matter, defendant petitioned for temporary guardianship of the minor children in two separa

2025However, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant had “the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence as to each and every one of the child custody factors . . . ” Relying on this Court’s decisions in Howard v Howard, 310 Mich App 488, 496 ; 871 NW2d 739 (2015) and Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 28 ; 638 NW2d 123 (2001), the trial court concluded that it was not required “to award custody to the natural parent if the third 2 Following service of the complaint in this matter, defendant petitioned for temporary guardianship of the minor children in two separa

2025However, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant had “the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence as to each and every one of the child custody factors . . . ” Relying on this Court’s decisions in Howard v Howard, 310 Mich App 488, 496 ; 871 NW2d 739 (2015) and Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 28 ; 638 NW2d 123 (2001), the trial court concluded that it was not required “to award custody to the natural parent if the third 2 Following service of the complaint in this matter, defendant petitioned for temporary guardianship of the minor children in two separa

2019Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150 ; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).

2019Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150 ; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).

2016Id.; Parent v Parent, 282 Mich App 152, 157 ; 762 NW2d 553 (2009).

2016Id.; Parent v Parent, 282 Mich App 152, 157 ; 762 NW2d 553 (2009).

2004Those few published cases that do exist reveal that neither an intrastate change in domicile, Behring, supra at 165, and the cases cited therein, nor more *510 minor allegations of contempt or visitation complaints, Adams v Adams, 100 Mich App 1, 13 ; 298 NW2d 871 (1980), are sufficient to establish a change of circumstances or proper cause warranting the revisiting of the child custody factors.

2004Those few published cases that do exist reveal that neither an intrastate change in domicile, Behring, supra at 165, and the cases cited therein, nor more *510 minor allegations of contempt or visitation complaints, Adams v Adams, 100 Mich App 1, 13 ; 298 NW2d 871 (1980), are sufficient to establish a change of circumstances or proper cause warranting the revisiting of the child custody factors.

2003Cochrane v. Brown, 234 Mich.App. 129, 132-133 , 592 N.W.2d 123 (1999); Constantini v. Constantini, 171 Mich.App. 466, 468-469 , 430 N.W.2d 748 (1988). [5] This rationale does not run afoul of Phillips v. Jordan, 241 Mich.App. 17 , 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000), as that case holds that in a postjudgment change of custody, the court must make an independent determination that the proposed change (agreed to by the parties) is in the "best interest of the child" through a review of the child-custody factors.

2003Cochrane v. Brown, 234 Mich.App. 129, 132-133 , 592 N.W.2d 123 (1999); Constantini v. Constantini, 171 Mich.App. 466, 468-469 , 430 N.W.2d 748 (1988). [5] This rationale does not run afoul of Phillips v. Jordan, 241 Mich.App. 17 , 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000), as that case holds that in a postjudgment change of custody, the court must make an independent determination that the proposed change (agreed to by the parties) is in the "best interest of the child" through a review of the child-custody factors.

2001Were it not for the precedential effect of Hilliard, a majority of the Molloy panel would have reversed the trial court’s decision under the best interest factors and remanded for a new child custody hearing pursuant to Burghdoff v Burghdoff, 66 Mich App 608 ; 239 NW2d 679 (1976), which held that an in camera hearing should be confined to those matters reasonably necessary to enable the judge to determine the preference of the child. 2 We resolve this conflict by holding that the purpose and questioning of an in camera interview is limited to determining the child’s preference.

2001Were it not for the precedential effect of Hilliard, a majority of the Molloy panel would have reversed the trial court’s decision under the best interest factors and remanded for a new child custody hearing pursuant to Burghdoff v Burghdoff, 66 Mich App 608 ; 239 NW2d 679 (1976), which held that an in camera hearing should be confined to those matters reasonably necessary to enable the judge to determine the preference of the child. 2 We resolve this conflict by holding that the purpose and questioning of an in camera interview is limited to determining the child’s preference.