abnormal working conditions test in Pennsylvania

2025While Pennsylvania case law emphasizes psychological injury cases are highly fact dependent in conjunction with a claimant’s particular occupation, the Supreme Court has also indicated this “does not mean that the abnormal-working-conditions analysis ends when it is established that the claimant generically belongs to a profession that involves certain levels or types of stress.” Payes, 79 A.3d at 555 .

2015I write separately to emphasize that, as recognized by the Majority, in Payes v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Commonwealth PA State Police), 621 Pa. 564 , 79 A.3d 543 (2013) our Supreme Court clarified the abnormal working conditions standard.

2011The Supreme Court rejected our reliance upon its holding in Davis and stated that “given the facts in Davis , that case only stands for the proposition that where a claimant suffers a psychic injury with attendant physical symptoms, the claimant must meet the abnormal working relations test.” Id. at 322, 888 A.2d at 731 . 8 The Supreme Court made clear that when a claimant asserts that he sustained a physical injury because of a psychic reaction to working conditions, the abnormal working conditions test does not apply.

2011However, our current recognition that Davis did not address psychic/physical injuries makes plain that our mere citation to Davis in Erie Bolt could not have expanded the abnormal working conditions test to cover such injuries ... (although an unexplained per cu-riam reversal establishes the law of the case, “by definition it establishes no precedent beyond the authority cited in the order.”) Id., 585 Pa. at 323 , 888 A.2d at 732 n. 10. .

2015The more fact intensive the inquiry, the more deference a reviewing court should give to the [WCJ’s] findings below.’ ” Payes II, 79 A.3d at 549 n. 3 (quoting Gentex Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Morack), 611 Pa. 38 , 23 A.3d 528 , 534 n. 10 (2011) (emphases omitted)).

2015The more fact intensive the inquiry, the more deference a reviewing court should give to the [WCJ’s] findings below.’ ” Payes II, 79 A.3d at 549 n. 3 (quoting Gentex Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Morack), 611 Pa. 38 , 23 A.3d 528 , 534 n. 10 (2011) (emphases omitted)).

2011Rather, a claimant’s burden is simply to prove that (1) he is “suffering from an objectively verifiable physical injury; and (2) ‘the injury arose in the course of employment and was related thereto.’ ” Id. at 323 , 888 A.2d at 732 (quoting Krawchuk, 497 Pa. at 121 , 439 A.2d at 630 ).

2011Rather, a claimant’s burden is simply to prove that (1) he is “suffering from an objectively verifiable physical injury; and (2) ‘the injury arose in the course of employment and was related thereto.’ ” Id. at 323 , 888 A.2d at 732 (quoting Krawchuk, 497 Pa. at 121 , 439 A.2d at 630 ).

2005That said, I respectfully differ with the majority’s approach to the per curiam Order in Erie Bolt Corp. v. WCAB (Elderkin), 562 Pa. 175 , 753 A.2d 1289 (2000), which heralded the undue extension of the abnormal working conditions requirement.

2005That said, I respectfully differ with the majority’s approach to the per curiam Order in Erie Bolt Corp. v. WCAB (Elderkin), 562 Pa. 175 , 753 A.2d 1289 (2000), which heralded the undue extension of the abnormal working conditions requirement.

2000In our recent decision in Daneker v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (White Haven Center), 757 A.2d 429 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), we addressed a case with very similar facts.

1992The abnormal working conditions test is a deduction from other facts and is purely the result of legal reasoning: therefore, this Court may judge the correctness of the decision below and draw its own conclusions upon appel late review. 2 City of Scranton v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hart), 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 483, 583 A.2d 852 (1990), appeal denied, 528 Pa. 625 , 597 A.2d 1154 (1991).