FRO hearing in New Jersey

2026See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 479 (2011) ("[P]laintiffs seeking protection under the [PDVA] often file complaints that reveal limited information about the prior history between the parties, only to expand upon that history of prior disputes when appearing " for an FRO hearing.).

2026See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 479 (2011) ("[P]laintiffs seeking protection under the [PDVA] often file complaints that reveal limited information about the prior history between the parties, only to expand upon that history of prior disputes when appearing " for an FRO hearing.).

2026Before us, defendant argues: (1) the judge effectively amended the complaint without providing him an opportunity to address same warranting a remand for a new FRO hearing before a different judge; (2) the judge's attempt to validate the photographs without his participation raised more questions than it answered; (3) the denial of his adjournment request constituted an abuse of discretion; (4) he was denied a meaningful opportunity to cross- examine plaintiff; and (5) the judge's findings were insufficient to justify the entry of the FRO. 3 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.

2026Before us, defendant argues: (1) the judge effectively amended the complaint without providing him an opportunity to address same warranting a remand for a new FRO hearing before a different judge; (2) the judge's attempt to validate the photographs without his participation raised more questions than it answered; (3) the denial of his adjournment request constituted an abuse of discretion; (4) he was denied a meaningful opportunity to cross- examine plaintiff; and (5) the judge's findings were insufficient to justify the entry of the FRO. 3 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.

2026In H.E.S., our Supreme Court held the defendant's due process rights were also A-1232-24 7 violated when he was forced to proceed with the FRO hearing, even "after [the] plaintiff alleged an incident of domestic violence not contained in the complaint." 175 N.J. at 324 .

2026In H.E.S., our Supreme Court held the defendant's due process rights were also A-1232-24 7 violated when he was forced to proceed with the FRO hearing, even "after [the] plaintiff alleged an incident of domestic violence not contained in the complaint." 175 N.J. at 324 .

2026See R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 306 (2009) ("Because the trial court previously made credibility findings, we deem it appropriate that the matter be assigned to a different trial court.") Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new FRO hearing before a different trial court.

2026See R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 306 (2009) ("Because the trial court previously made credibility findings, we deem it appropriate that the matter be assigned to a different trial court.") Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new FRO hearing before a different trial court.

2026A purpose of the good cause requirement for dissolving an FRO is to prevent one party from "relitigat[ing] the FRO hearing." Id. at 16.; see also Kanaszka, 313 N.J.

2026A purpose of the good cause requirement for dissolving an FRO is to prevent one party from "relitigat[ing] the FRO hearing." Id. at 16.; see also Kanaszka, 313 N.J.

2017See N.T.B. v. D.B.B., 442 N.J.

2017See N.T.B. v. D.B.B., 442 N.J.

2016See H.E.S., supra, 175 N.J. at 323 , 815 A.2d 405 (citing H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 349 N.J.Super. 332, 342-43 , 793 A.2d 780 (App. Div. 2002)).

2016See H.E.S., supra, 175 N.J. at 323 , 815 A.2d 405 (citing H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 349 N.J.Super. 332, 342-43 , 793 A.2d 780 (App. Div. 2002)).

2021In this ensuing appeal, defendant, who is now represented by counsel, contends his "waiver of his right to be represented by counsel" at the FRO hearing "was not clear and knowing and a violation of his due process rights." Relying on D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J.

2021In this ensuing appeal, defendant, who is now represented by counsel, contends his "waiver of his right to be represented by counsel" at the FRO hearing "was not clear and knowing and a violation of his due process rights." Relying on D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J.

2025Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J.

2025Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J.

2024In L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J.

2024In L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J.

2024We begin by acknowledging that the purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J.

2024We begin by acknowledging that the purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J.

2024State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 590 (1997) ("The primary purpose for tying the contempt conviction to criminal conduct is to elevate the seriousness of the contempt from a A-3899-22 11 disorderly persons offense to a fourth-degree crime.") Thus, an FRO hearing is distinguishable from other civil proceedings.

2024State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 590 (1997) ("The primary purpose for tying the contempt conviction to criminal conduct is to elevate the seriousness of the contempt from a A-3899-22 11 disorderly persons offense to a fourth-degree crime.") Thus, an FRO hearing is distinguishable from other civil proceedings.

2024See Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J.

2022See N.J.R.E. 611(c); see also L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J.

2022See N.J.R.E. 611(c); see also L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J.

2022Findings by a trial court are generally binding on appeal, provided they are "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs.

2022Findings by a trial court are generally binding on appeal, provided they are "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs.

2022We cannot discern from the record whether defendant had been arrested, charged, or indicted at the time of the FRO hearing. 14 A-1382-20 It is well-established that an individual invoking the Fifth Amendment "privilege against self-incrimination may do so 'in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'" State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101 (1997) (first alteration in original) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 456 U.S. 420 , 426 (1984)).

2022We cannot discern from the record whether defendant had been arrested, charged, or indicted at the time of the FRO hearing. 14 A-1382-20 It is well-established that an individual invoking the Fifth Amendment "privilege against self-incrimination may do so 'in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . where the answers might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'" State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101 (1997) (first alteration in original) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 456 U.S. 420 , 426 (1984)).

2021A-0635-19T1 6 In support of her argument, plaintiff relies on Nufrio v. Nufrio, in which we commented that the prime [criterion] for establishing a joint legal custodial relationship between divorced or separated parents centers on the ability of those parents to agree, communicate[,] and cooperate in matters relating to the health, safety[,] and welfare of the child[,] notwithstanding animosity or acrimony they may harbor towards each other. [ 341 N.J.

2021A-0635-19T1 6 In support of her argument, plaintiff relies on Nufrio v. Nufrio, in which we commented that the prime [criterion] for establishing a joint legal custodial relationship between divorced or separated parents centers on the ability of those parents to agree, communicate[,] and cooperate in matters relating to the health, safety[,] and welfare of the child[,] notwithstanding animosity or acrimony they may harbor towards each other. [ 341 N.J.

2020The same is true here. [D.N., 216 N.J. at 589 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).] J.H. never requested the Family Part judge to adjourn the FRO hearing to permit her to consult with an attorney nor requested the court to appoint counsel to represent her because she was indigent.

2020The same is true here. [D.N., 216 N.J. at 589 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).] J.H. never requested the Family Part judge to adjourn the FRO hearing to permit her to consult with an attorney nor requested the court to appoint counsel to represent her because she was indigent.

2019Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J.

2019Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J.

2017"As a general rule, admission or exclusion of proffered evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge whose ruling is not disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J.

2017"As a general rule, admission or exclusion of proffered evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge whose ruling is not disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J.

2014While plaintiff asserted she misled the chiropractor in order to conceal the fact she was a victim of domestic abuse, the chiropractor's report, if available at the FRO hearing, would have provided defendant with cross- examination material to test plaintiff's credibility. 13 A-2422-12T1 proved that the alleged assaults were the proximate cause of her injuries, plaintiff would then be required to prove "'by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a want

2014While plaintiff asserted she misled the chiropractor in order to conceal the fact she was a victim of domestic abuse, the chiropractor's report, if available at the FRO hearing, would have provided defendant with cross- examination material to test plaintiff's credibility. 13 A-2422-12T1 proved that the alleged assaults were the proximate cause of her injuries, plaintiff would then be required to prove "'by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a want