legislature necessarily considered factors in Illinois

2026“The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004)).

2026“The prohibition against double enhancements is based on the assumption that, in - 16 - designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” Id. at 12 . ¶ 61 The State counters that Illinois courts have long recognized that a defendant’s entire criminal history may be considered at sentencing even when some of those offenses were statutorily applied to enhance the offense.

2023“This prohibition against double enhancements is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for an offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” Id. (citing People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995)). ¶ 154 Although a reviewing court typically reviews a sentence on a discretionary basis, if the trial court relied upon an improper factor at sentencing, the question presents a matter of law, and thus our review is de novo.

2022Id., citing People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). ¶ 40 Whether a trial court relied on an improper factor when sentencing a defendant is a question of law, subject to de novo review.

2024We recently explained the logic behind the rule in People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476 , ¶ 44: “A factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted generally cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise - 10 - have been imposed. [Citation.] The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in designating the a

2024We recently explained the logic behind the rule in People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476 , ¶ 44: “A factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted generally cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise - 10 - have been imposed. [Citation.] The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in designating the a

2023“However, an exception to the prohibition against double enhancement occurs where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some aspect of the crime and that intention is clearly expressed.” People v. Powell, 2012 IL App (1st) 102363, ¶ 8 , 970 N.E.2d 539 . ¶ 70 This court considered an argument identical to defendant’s in People v. O’Neal, 2021 IL App (4th) 170682 , 196 N.E.3d 95 .

2021An exception to this general rule arises where “the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some aspect of the crime and that intention is clearly expressed.” People v. Powell, 2012 IL App (1st) 102363, ¶ 8 , 970 N.E.2d 539 .

2024We recently explained the logic behind the rule in People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476, ¶ 44 , 232 N.E.3d 1062 : “A factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted generally cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. [Citation.] The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in design

2024We recently explained the logic behind the rule in People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476 , ¶ 44: “A factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted generally cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise - 10 - have been imposed. [Citation.] The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in designating the a

2024We recently explained the logic behind the rule in People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476 , ¶ 44: “A factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted generally cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise - 10 - have been imposed. [Citation.] The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in designating the a

2024We recently explained the logic behind the rule in People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476 , ¶ 44: “A factor that is implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted generally cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise - 10 - have been imposed. [Citation.] The prohibition of such a ‘double enhancement’ is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, ‘in designating the a

2022The prohibition against consideration of a factor inherent in the offense “ ‘is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.’ ” People v. McGath, 2017 IL App (4th) 150608, ¶ 64 , 83 N.E.2d 671 (quoting People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 , 809 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (2004)). ¶ 50 “A sentence based on improper factors will not be affirmed unless the reviewing court can determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor w

2020The prohibition against consideration of a factor inherent in the offense “ ‘is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.’ ” People v. McGath, 2017 IL App (4th) 150608, ¶ 64 , 83 N.E.2d 671 (quoting People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 , 809 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (2004)). ¶ 31 “A sentence based on improper factors will not be affirmed unless the reviewing court can determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor w

2024Accordingly, the trial court’s eight-year sentence was within the statutory sentencing range. ¶ 37 The prohibition against consideration in aggravation of a factor inherent in the offense “is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. McGath, 2017 IL App (4th) 150608 , ¶ 64, 83 N.E.3d 671 .

2022The prohibition against consideration of a factor inherent in the offense “ ‘is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.’ ” People v. McGath, 2017 IL App (4th) 150608, ¶ 64 , 83 N.E.2d 671 (quoting People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 , 809 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (2004)). ¶ 50 “A sentence based on improper factors will not be affirmed unless the reviewing court can determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor w

2023The prohibition of such a “double enhancement” is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that, “in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12 . - 17 - ¶ 45 In contending that the trial court subjected defendant to a double enhancement by considering his predicate felonies during sentencing, defendant argues that we should disregard two cases that rejected the argument he now raises—People v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924 , and People v. Sherman

2023Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924, ¶¶ 1, 7 .

2022People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (2005).

2022In People v. McCain, the appellate court held that “[i]t is not improper per se for a sentencing court to refer to the significant harm inflicted upon society by drug trafficking.” People v. McCain, 248 Ill.