Mount Laurel doctrine in New Jersey

2025(Mount A-0453-24 2 Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 279-81 (1983) (reaffirming Mount Laurel I and providing real-estate developers with recourse, based on a municipal failure to comply with the Mount Laurel doctrine, to challenge the denial of their affordable housing plans that violated municipal zoning codes).

2025(Mount A-0453-24 2 Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 279-81 (1983) (reaffirming Mount Laurel I and providing real-estate developers with recourse, based on a municipal failure to comply with the Mount Laurel doctrine, to challenge the denial of their affordable housing plans that violated municipal zoning codes).

2013See, e.g., Twp. of Bernards v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22 , 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194 , 570 A.2d 959 (1989) (rejecting numerous challenges to First Round Rules, including allegation that COAH acted arbitrarily in considering municipality’s wealth as allocation factor); Van Dalen v. Washington Twp., 120 N.J. 234, 246-47 , 576 A.2d 819 (1990) (upholding COAH’s reliance on planning designations in State Development Guide Plan); In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83 , 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.19

2013See, e.g., Twp. of Bernards v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22 , 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194 , 570 A.2d 959 (1989) (rejecting numerous challenges to First Round Rules, including allegation that COAH acted arbitrarily in considering municipality’s wealth as allocation factor); Van Dalen v. Washington Twp., 120 N.J. 234, 246-47 , 576 A.2d 819 (1990) (upholding COAH’s reliance on planning designations in State Development Guide Plan); In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83 , 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.19

2015While acknowledging that pre-FHA courts required reallocation because “[m]unicipalities with an excess of dilapidated housing occupied by the poor ‘should not be expected to provide decent housing for a disproportionate share of the need,’” the initial reviewing panel found that Mount Laurel did not require such reallocation and COAH was to be afforded “broad discretion in implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine.” In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, supra, 390 N.J.Super. at 58-59 , 914 A.2d 348 (quoting AMG Realty Co. v. Twp. of Warren, 207 N.J.Super. 388, 401 , 504 A.2d 692 (Law Div.1984))

2015While acknowledging that pre-FHA courts required reallocation because “[m]unicipalities with an excess of dilapidated housing occupied by the poor ‘should not be expected to provide decent housing for a disproportionate share of the need,’” the initial reviewing panel found that Mount Laurel did not require such reallocation and COAH was to be afforded “broad discretion in implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine.” In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, supra, 390 N.J.Super. at 58-59 , 914 A.2d 348 (quoting AMG Realty Co. v. Twp. of Warren, 207 N.J.Super. 388, 401 , 504 A.2d 692 (Law Div.1984))

2007The Court assumed that COAH would perform its duty to implement the Mount Laurel doctrine “with determination and skill.” Id. at 21 , 510 A.2d 621 .

2007The Court assumed that COAH would perform its duty to implement the Mount Laurel doctrine “with determination and skill.” Id. at 21 , 510 A.2d 621 .

2007The desire to exclude families with children drives exclusionary zoning, a fact recognized when the Court first announced the Mount Laurel doctrine, Mount Laurel I, supra, 67 N.J. at 171 , 336 A.2d 713 , and again recognized in 2002, Toll Bros., supra, 173 N.J. at 540 , 803 A.2d 53 .

2007The desire to exclude families with children drives exclusionary zoning, a fact recognized when the Court first announced the Mount Laurel doctrine, Mount Laurel I, supra, 67 N.J. at 171 , 336 A.2d 713 , and again recognized in 2002, Toll Bros., supra, 173 N.J. at 540 , 803 A.2d 53 .

2015While acknowledging that pre-FHA courts required reallocation because “[m]unicipalities with an excess of dilapidated housing occupied by the poor ‘should not be expected to provide decent housing for a disproportionate share of the need,’” the initial reviewing panel found that Mount Laurel did not require such reallocation and COAH was to be afforded “broad discretion in implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine.” In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, supra, 390 N.J.Super. at 58-59 , 914 A.2d 348 (quoting AMG Realty Co. v. Twp. of Warren, 207 N.J.Super. 388, 401 , 504 A.2d 692 (Law Div.1984))

2015While acknowledging that pre-FHA courts required reallocation because “[m]unicipalities with an excess of dilapidated housing occupied by the poor ‘should not be expected to provide decent housing for a disproportionate share of the need,’” the initial reviewing panel found that Mount Laurel did not require such reallocation and COAH was to be afforded “broad discretion in implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine.” In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, supra, 390 N.J.Super. at 58-59 , 914 A.2d 348 (quoting AMG Realty Co. v. Twp. of Warren, 207 N.J.Super. 388, 401 , 504 A.2d 692 (Law Div.1984))

2013See, e.g., Pascack Ass’n v. Mayor & Council of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 483-84 , 379 A.2d 6 (1977) (finding Mount Laurel doctrine only applied to developing municipalities when considering challenge to zoning ordinance in “fully developed, predominantly single-family residential community”).

2013See, e.g., Pascack Ass’n v. Mayor & Council of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 483-84 , 379 A.2d 6 (1977) (finding Mount Laurel doctrine only applied to developing municipalities when considering challenge to zoning ordinance in “fully developed, predominantly single-family residential community”).

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2002The court further stated that Bi-County's interpretation of Holmdel "distorts the Supreme Court's rationale for upholding the validity of development fees and the Mount Laurel doctrine." Ibid.

2002The court further stated that Bi-County's interpretation of Holmdel "distorts the Supreme Court's rationale for upholding the validity of development fees and the Mount Laurel doctrine." Ibid.

2017Municipalities satisfy their “constitutional obligation by affirmatively affording a realistic opportunity for the construction of [their] fair share of the present and prospective regional need for low and moderate income housing.” Id. at 205 . 5 A thorough discussion of the history of affordable housing in this State may be found in the Supreme Court’s decision at In Re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 215 N.J. 578 (2013). 7 In light of the absence of a legislative solution to the provision of affordable housing in New Jersey, in Mount Laurel II, supra, the court fashioned a judicial remedy to enf

2017Municipalities satisfy their “constitutional obligation by affirmatively affording a realistic opportunity for the construction of [their] fair share of the present and prospective regional need for low and moderate income housing.” Id. at 205 . 5 A thorough discussion of the history of affordable housing in this State may be found in the Supreme Court’s decision at In Re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 215 N.J. 578 (2013). 7 In light of the absence of a legislative solution to the provision of affordable housing in New Jersey, in Mount Laurel II, supra, the court fashioned a judicial remedy to enf

2017Mount Laurel IV, supra, 221 N.J. at 3-4 , 110 A.3d 31 .

2017Mount Laurel IV, supra, 221 N.J. at 3-4 , 110 A.3d 31 .

2013See, e.g., Twp. of Bernards v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22 , 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194 , 570 A.2d 959 (1989) (rejecting numerous challenges to First Round Rules, including allegation that COAH acted arbitrarily in considering municipality’s wealth as allocation factor); Van Dalen v. Washington Twp., 120 N.J. 234, 246-47 , 576 A.2d 819 (1990) (upholding COAH’s reliance on planning designations in State Development Guide Plan); In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83 , 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.19

2013See, e.g., Twp. of Bernards v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22 , 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194 , 570 A.2d 959 (1989) (rejecting numerous challenges to First Round Rules, including allegation that COAH acted arbitrarily in considering municipality’s wealth as allocation factor); Van Dalen v. Washington Twp., 120 N.J. 234, 246-47 , 576 A.2d 819 (1990) (upholding COAH’s reliance on planning designations in State Development Guide Plan); In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83 , 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.19

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2010Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 , 336 A.2d 713 , appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 , 96 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that d

2025Once a municipality has done so, "the fact that its land use regulations contain restrictive provisions incompatible with lower[-]income housing, such as bedroom restrictions, large lot zoning, prohibition against mobile homes, and the like, does not render those provisions invalid under Mount Laurel." Id. at 260 ; see also Shire Inn, Inc. v. Borough of Avon-By-The- Sea, 321 N.J.

2025Once a municipality has done so, "the fact that its land use regulations contain restrictive provisions incompatible with lower[-]income housing, such as bedroom restrictions, large lot zoning, prohibition against mobile homes, and the like, does not render those provisions invalid under Mount Laurel." Id. at 260 ; see also Shire Inn, Inc. v. Borough of Avon-By-The- Sea, 321 N.J.

2013See, e.g., Twp. of Bernards v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22 , 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194 , 570 A.2d 959 (1989) (rejecting numerous challenges to First Round Rules, including allegation that COAH acted arbitrarily in considering municipality’s wealth as allocation factor); Van Dalen v. Washington Twp., 120 N.J. 234, 246-47 , 576 A.2d 819 (1990) (upholding COAH’s reliance on planning designations in State Development Guide Plan); In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83 , 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.19

2013See, e.g., Twp. of Bernards v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22 , 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194 , 570 A.2d 959 (1989) (rejecting numerous challenges to First Round Rules, including allegation that COAH acted arbitrarily in considering municipality’s wealth as allocation factor); Van Dalen v. Washington Twp., 120 N.J. 234, 246-47 , 576 A.2d 819 (1990) (upholding COAH’s reliance on planning designations in State Development Guide Plan); In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83 , 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.19

2010See Urban League of Essex County v. Twp. of Mahwah, 207 N.J.Super. 169, 204-06 , 504 A.2d 66 (Law Div.1984).

2010See Urban League of Essex County v. Twp. of Mahwah, 207 N.J.Super. 169, 204-06 , 504 A.2d 66 (Law Div.1984).

2007Furthermore, as we point out in our companion opinion, if RCA's have been abused, "it is incumbent upon Fair Share to identify the RCAs that have been improperly approved or inadequately monitored or enforced." In re the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, supra, 390 N.J.

2007Furthermore, as we point out in our companion opinion, if RCA's have been abused, "it is incumbent upon Fair Share to identify the RCAs that have been improperly approved or inadequately monitored or enforced." In re the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95, supra, 390 N.J.