7 Washington opinions name it 1 courts 2009–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks
green
2 sentences2011Hicks, 166 Wash.2d at 778 , 214 P.3d 897 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wash.2d 293, 314-16 , *1249 209 P.3d 435 (2009). [7] ¶ 60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson's violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b) and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are fa 2011Hicks, 166 Wn.2d at 778 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wn.2d 293, 314-16 , 209 P.3d 435 (2009). 7 ¶60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson’s violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b), and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial a | 4 | 2010–2011 |
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster
green
2 sentences2011Hicks, 166 Wash.2d at 778 , 214 P.3d 897 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wash.2d 293, 314-16 , *1249 209 P.3d 435 (2009). [7] ¶ 60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson's violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b) and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are fa 2011Hicks, 166 Wn.2d at 778 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wn.2d 293, 314-16 , 209 P.3d 435 (2009). 7 ¶60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson’s violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b), and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial a | 3 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Eugster
green
2 sentences2011Hicks, 166 Wash.2d at 778 , 214 P.3d 897 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wash.2d 293, 314-16 , *1249 209 P.3d 435 (2009). [7] ¶ 60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson's violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b) and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are fa 2011Hicks, 166 Wn.2d at 778 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wn.2d 293, 314-16 , 209 P.3d 435 (2009). 7 ¶60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson’s violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b), and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial a | 3 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hicks
green
2 sentences2011Hicks, 166 Wash.2d at 778 , 214 P.3d 897 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wash.2d 293, 314-16 , *1249 209 P.3d 435 (2009). [7] ¶ 60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson's violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b) and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are fa 2011Hicks, 166 Wash.2d at 778 , 214 P.3d 897 ; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eugster, 166 Wash.2d 293, 314-16 , *1249 209 P.3d 435 (2009). [7] ¶ 60 The hearing officer applied the following standards to conclude that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Ferguson's violations of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(b) and 8.4(d), and that reprimand was the presumptive sanction for her violation of RPC 3.3(f): [Standard] 6.1 False Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation provides: 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are fa | 2 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding of Deruiz
green
2 sentences2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶ 25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wash.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wash.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. 2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wn.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wn.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen
green
2 sentences2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶ 25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wash.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wash.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. 2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wn.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wn.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz
green
2 sentences2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶ 25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wash.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wash.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. 2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wn.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wn.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen
green
2 sentences2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶ 25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wash.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wash.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. 2009The Board unanimously adopted these conclusions. ¶25 Hicks does not dispute that suspension is the presumptive sanction for a violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1), but rather cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wn.2d 323 , 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) and In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wn.2d 558 , 99 P.3d 881 (2004) for the proposition that the presumptive term of suspension is six months. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Christopher
green
1 sentence2010Id. [4] Hicks involved ABA Standards stds. 7.1 and 7.2, instead of ABA Standards stds. 4.41 and 4.42, but both make the same distinction between serious injury (leading to disbarment) and nonserious injury (leading to suspension). [5] Conversely, I agree that Shepard's lack of diligence harmed vulnerable victims, some of whom were incompetent to execute the living trusts. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schwimmer
green
1 sentence2009"Those two factors are '(1) proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and (2) the extent of the agreement among the members of the [d]isciplinary [b]oard.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Schwimmer, 153 Wash.2d at 764 , 108 P.3d 761 ). [2] Presumptive Sanction ¶ 24 The hearing officer concluded that pursuant to ABA Standard stds. 4.13 and 5.13 a reprimand was the presumptive sanction for counts 1-3 and the violation of former RPC 8.4(c) as charged in count 6. *903 The hearing officer also concluded that suspension was the presumptive sanction for violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1) as c | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schwimmer
green
1 sentence2009"Those two factors are '(1) proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and (2) the extent of the agreement among the members of the [d]isciplinary [b]oard.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Schwimmer, 153 Wash.2d at 764 , 108 P.3d 761 ). [2] Presumptive Sanction ¶ 24 The hearing officer concluded that pursuant to ABA Standard stds. 4.13 and 5.13 a reprimand was the presumptive sanction for counts 1-3 and the violation of former RPC 8.4(c) as charged in count 6. *903 The hearing officer also concluded that suspension was the presumptive sanction for violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1) as c | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kuvara
green
1 sentence2009"Those two factors are '(1) proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and (2) the extent of the agreement among the members of the [d]isciplinary [b]oard.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Schwimmer, 153 Wash.2d at 764 , 108 P.3d 761 ). [2] Presumptive Sanction ¶ 24 The hearing officer concluded that pursuant to ABA Standard stds. 4.13 and 5.13 a reprimand was the presumptive sanction for counts 1-3 and the violation of former RPC 8.4(c) as charged in count 6. *903 The hearing officer also concluded that suspension was the presumptive sanction for violation of ELC 5.3(e)(1) as c | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.